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INTRODUCTION
This article reviews three lines of North Dakota cases relevant
to conveyancing and title examination. While the problems may
be more commonly encountered by mineral title examiners, this
article should interest any lawyer who practices real estate law
because these problems could arise in a variety of instruments and
contexts. The first topic primarily concerns the validity of third-
party reservations in deeds - that is, reservations of interests in
favor of persons who are not parties to the deed; the discussion will
analyze Malloy v. Boettcher.1 The second topic concerns the prob-
lem a subsequent purchaser faces when the chain of title to prop-
erty reveals a discrepancy between the terms of a recorded
contract for deed and the terms of the deed issued pursuant to the
contract; in addressing this problem, focus will be on Wehner v.
Schroeder.2 The third topic is the North Dakota rule against the
absolute suspension of the power of alienation, commonly referred
to as the State's statutory rule on perpetuities; this rule will be ana-
lyzed in light of Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co.3 The focus of this
article is on the reasoning of these cases; the authors of this article
only question the result reached in the Wehner decisions.
While these topics may appear to have little in common, they
provide a useful and illustrative vehicle to demonstrate that the
North Dakota Supreme Court is causing unnecessary uncertainty
in real estate title law.' In Malloy this uncertainty is caused by a
sweeping opinion which is greatly limited by three separate con-
curring opinions, joined in by four justices, who purport to agree
with each other but actually do not. In addition, the court's opin-
ion purports to overrule a case that the four concurring justices
wish to distinguish, even though that case conflicts with a pre-
existing statute. Also, the court provides no guidance about how
its decision will affect other related, but ignored, precedent.
1. 334 N.W.2d 8 (N.D. 1983).
2. 325 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983); 354 N.W.2d 674 (N.D. 1984).
3. 382 N.W.2d 655 (N.D. 1986).
4. This criticism is not new. See, e.g., Stroup, The Unreliable Record Title, 60 N.D.L.
REV. 203, 207-24 (1984) [hereinafter Stroup]. However, this article takes a different
approach and deals with different problems and cases.
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Finally, the court offers no reasons for its ultimate disposition of
the property.
In Wehner the court does what it believes to be fair and equi-
table and reforms a deed to conform to the terms of a recorded
underlying contract for deed, even though the property has been
conveyed to third parties who, but for being charged with con-
structive notice of the terms of the contract, may have been bona
fide purchasers for value. This decision is reached without careful
consideration of the common-law doctrines of merger and estop-
pel by deed.
In Nantt the court, for the first time, appears to adopt the
common-law rule against perpetuities, and then, in this same deci-
sion, rejects its strict application. The court concludes that the
interest in question does not violate the court's more relaxed view
of the rule. The court could have reached the same conclusion by
simply applying the traditional interpretation of the State's statu-
tory rule against the absolution suspension of the power of aliena-
tion, which, up until Nantt, was presumed to be the only
perpetuities rule in effect in North Dakota.
Collectively, the uncertainty resulting from these cases is
caused, in part, from incomplete reasoning and a failure to care-
fully consider, distinguish, or clearly overrule related cases and
statutory precedent and generally accepted legal maxims, and in
part from an apparent desire by the court to do equity at the
expense of certainty.
The following comments are made in full recognition of the
respective roles of judges and journal writers: the role of judges is
to decide and the role of journal writers is to criticize. With these
respective roles in mind, the reader is invited to reflect on
whether increasing uncertainty in real estate titles is proper public
policy. In addition, the authors trust that this article will assist real
estate lawyers in the service of their clients.
I. MALLOY V BOETTCHER
A reservation or exception in favor of a stranger to the title is
void. This common-law maxim was partially followed by the
North Dakota Supreme Court in the 1962 case of Stetson v. Nel-
son.5 In Stetson Charles Kistler conveyed certain property to
Henry I. Iverson by warranty deed.6 The deed contained a reser-
5. 118 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 1962).
6. Stetson v. Nelson, 118 N.W.2d 685, 686 (N.D. 1962).
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vation clause "excepting and reserving to said L.G. Marcus, one of
the parties of the first part, a four-fifths (4/5) interest of all right
and title in and to any and all oil, gas, and other minerals in or
under said land. . .. "' This reservation was repeated in a subse-
quent deed executed by Iverson which conveyed the property to
Norma M. Nelson.8 Note that L.G. Marcus was not a party to
either of these deeds.
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that this attempted
reservation in favor of a third-party stranger to the instrument of
conveyance was void as to the third party,9 but the court ruled that
the reservation did operate so as to reserve the minerals in the
grantor.10 The traditional common-law maxim applies to strangers
to the title, irrespective of whether the stranger was a stranger to
the instrument," and the attempted reservation is completely
void resulting in a transfer of the reserved interest to the
grantee. '
2
In Stetson the court offered no reasoning for its initial ruling
that the reservation did not operate to reserve minerals in the
third party. However, the court defended its conclusion that the
reservation did operate to reserve the minerals in the grantor by
noting that the parties to the deed did not intend to convey the
minerals to the grantee because the grantor had attempted to spe-
cifically reserve them in a third party.'
3
The North Dakota Supreme Court faced a similar question in
the more recent case of Malloy v. Boettcher.14 On May 22, 1978,
Clyde Boettcher conveyed an undivided one-third interest in a
quarter section of land to his daughter, Loretta Malloy. 15 The rec-
ord indicates that Clyde owned only a one-third interest in the
property at the time of this conveyance.' 6 Dorothy Boettcher,
Clyde's wife, also executed the deed, although the parties to the
7. Id.
8. Id. at 687.
9. Id. at 687-88 (citing Beardslee v. New Berlin Light & Power Co., 207 N.Y. 34, 100
N.E. 434 (1912); 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 138 (1956); 58 CJ.S. Mines & Minerals § 155 (1948)).
10. Stetson, 118 N.W.2d at 688 (citing Allen v. Henson, 186 Ky. 201, 217 S.W. 120
(1919); Annotation, Reservation or Exception in Deed in Favor of Stranger, 39 A.L.R. 128,
132 (1925); Joiner v. Sullivan, 260 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Martin v. Cook, 102
Mich. 267, 60 N.W. 679 (1894); and Wilson v. Gerard, 213 Miss. 177, 56 So. 2d 471 (1952)).
11. For a discussion of the common-law maxim, see infra note 126.
12. Stetson, 118 N.W.2d at 687-88.
13. Id. at 688.
14. 334 N.W.2d 8 (N.D. 1983).
15. Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8, 8 (N.D. 1983).
16. Stipulation of Facts to the District Court of Hettinger, Malloy v. Boettcher, 334
N.W.2d 8 (N.D. 1983) (Civ. No. 10339) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS 334
N.W.2d(2) at University of North Dakota Law Library).
[Vol. 65:1
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litigation stipulated thdit "Clyde was the sole owner of the prop-
erty, and that Dorothy had no interest in it.' 7  The deed to
Loretta Malloy contained the following reservation clause:
"RESERVING HOWEVER, to parties of the first part a life estate
in the one-third ('/3) interest hereby conveyed.'" The named
"parties of the first part" were the grantors, Clyde and Dorothy
Boettcher.19
The court noted that Clyde died intestate on September 8,
1978.20 Loretta filed a quiet-title action in 1982 contending that
Dorothy had no interest in the property because the attempted
reservation of the life estate was void as to Dorothy.2' Loretta,
relying on the common-law rule applied in Stetson, contended
that a reservation in a deed in favor of a third-party stranger is
void as to the third party.2 2 The district court entered judgment
for Loretta and Dorothy appealed.23 The supreme court reversed,
ruling that Dorothy, the decedent's wife, possessed a valid life
estate in an undivided one-third interest in Blackacre.2 4 Note that
if the court had applied the rule in Stetson, Clyde, the sole owner
of the one-third interest at the time of the grant, would have
retained the life estate solely for himself. Thus, at Clyde's death,
Loretta's remainder would have become possessory.
The court's opinion in Malloy is troublesome to title examin-
ers for several reasons. First, the opinion fails to provide any clear
and useful guidance to title examiners because, in addition to the
court's opinion, there are three specially concurring opinions
17. Id. The record does not clarify whether Dorothy had any homestead claim.
However, the plaintiff's attorney informed author Anderson that the property was not
Clyde and Dorothy Boettcher's homestead because they were residents of Nevada at the
time of the grant to Loretta. Telephone interview with James Vukelic, attorney for Loretta
Malloy (Feb. 18, 1988). •
18. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 8.
19. Warranty Deed in Record, Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8 (N.D. 1983) (Civ. No.
10339) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS 334 N.W.2d(2) at University of North
Dakota Law Library).
20. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 8. The record on appeal, however, reveals that a will,
purportedly signed by Clyde, was filed with the Clerk of District Court for Humbolt
County, Nevada. See Stipulation to Correct the Record, Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8
(N.D. 1983) (Civ. No. 10339) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS 334 N.W.2d(2) at
University of North Dakota Law Library). A copy of this will is contained in the record. Id.
Whether Clyde died intestate or testate is not relevant to the specific issue before the court
in this case; however, Clyde's death is relevant in that his reserved life estate in Blackacre
would have terminated with his death.
21. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 8. In a telephone conversation with James Vukelic, attorney
for Loretta Malloy, Mr. Vukelic informed author Anderson that Loretta was Dorothy's
stepdaughter and that they were also quarreling over the disposition of Clyde's estate.
Telephone interview with James Vukelic, attorney for Loretta Malloy (Feb. 18, 1988).
22. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 8-9.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id. at 10.
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joined in by four of the five justices. 25 Second, in ruling in favor of
Dorothy, the court relied, in part, on a provision of the State's
Field Code that was effective when Stetson was decided.26 Third,
Malloy further complicates the resolution of the related and recur-
ring problem of distinguishing between a "reservation from" (or
"exception to") a "grant" and an "exception to" a "warranty. '2 7
Finally, the court gives no reason for concluding that, following
the death of Clyde, Dorothy retained a life estate in the entire
one-third interest that had been reserved in the parties of the first
part (Clyde and Dorothy).28 These problems will be examined in
the sections that follow.
A. THE FOUR OPINIONS
Chief Justice Erickstad wrote the opinion of the court in Mal-
loy. While the opinion departs from the rule set forth in Stetson,
this opinion, by itself, is generally clear with respect to the rule
adopted. Chief Justice Erickstad stated:
[W]e abandon the common law rule [Stetson] and apply,
in its stead, the rule that a reservation or exception can be
effective to convey a property interest to a third party
who is a stranger to the deed or title of the property
where that is determined to have been the grantor's
intent. g
In adopting this new rule, Chief Justice Erickstad stated that "[t]o
the extent that the opinion in Stetson . . . is to the contrary, it is
hereby overruled. '30  In support of this new rule, he noted that
"[s]everal jurisdictions have abandoned the common law rule on
the ground that it serves no useful purpose and is contrary to the
25. Id. at 10-12 (VandeWalle, J., concurring specially; Paulson, J., concurring;
Pederson, J., concurring specially; Sand, J., concurring specially).
26. Id. at 10; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-17 (1978).
27. Cf. Winter v. United States, 783 F.2d 152, 153-54 (8th Cir. 1986Xgrantor intended
to transfer complete interest, so subsequent voiding of a prior reservation gave grantee a
fee simple); United States v. McKenzie County, 187 F. Supp. 470, 478 (D.N.D. 1960Xintent
of parties was to transfer all interests so void reservation went to grantee), affirmed sub.
nom. Murray v. United States, 291 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir. 1961); Monson v. Dwyer, 378
N.W.2d 865, 866 (N.D. 1985Xwords "'subject to" do not connote a reservation); Stracka v.
Peterson, 377 N.W.2d 580, 582 (N.D. 1985) (court found "'subject to" was intended to be a
limitation of warranty); Mueller v. Strangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450, 452 (N.D. 1983Xtechnical
meaning of exception and reservation will give way to intent of grantor); Royse v. Easter
Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 542, 545 (N.D.
1977Xreservations must be clearly expressed in the deed and the property to be excepted
must be described with certainty).
28. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 10.
29. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 10.
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rule that a deed must be construed to carry out a grantor's intent if
at all possible."
3 1
In addition, Chief Justice Erickstad relied upon a statute,32
which originated in the Field Code,33 providing that "[a] present
interest and the benefit of a condition or covenant respecting
property may be taken by any natural person under a grant
although not named a party thereto. ' 34 Although this statutory
provision was in effect when Stetson was decided, he concluded
that this provision "is inconsistent with the common law rule that
a reservation or exception cannot constitute a conveyance to a
third party."' 35 This conclusion will be further discussed in section
B below.
In applying this new rule, Chief Justice Erickstad concluded
that the reservation clause reserved a valid life estate in Clyde and
Dorothy Boettcher.36 Then without further discussion or analysis,
Chief Justice Erickstad stated: "We believe that the language of
the reservation clause expresses Clyde's intent that upon his death
Dorothy would possess a life estate in the property. We hold that,
under the May 22, 1978, deed, Dorothy possesses a life estate in
the property described in that deed. ' 37 By this holding, Chief Jus-
tice Erickstad concluded, without discussion or analysis, that Doro-
thy would assume full ownership of the entire one-third life estate
interest that was initially reserved in the deed to Loretta Malloy,
rather than to just one-half of the one-third interest. This conclu-
sion will be further discussed in section D below.
Had Chief Justice Erickstad's opinion been the only opinion,
the rejection of the Stetson rule and the adoption of the new rule
set forth in the opinion is, by itself, relatively clear: If the grantor
of a conveyance expressly intends to reserve an interest in a party
other than himself or the named grantee, the reservation will be
31. Id. at 9 (citing Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 7 Cal. 3d 473,
498 P.2d 987, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1972); Garza v. Grayson, 255 Or. 413, 467 P.2d 960 (1970);
Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1964); Krug v. Reissig, 488 P.2d 150 (Wyo. 1971)).
32. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-17 (1978).
33. COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
§ 482 (1865) [hereinafter FIELD CODE] (available in Rare Books at University of North
Dakota Law Library).
34. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-17 (1978). See Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 10.
35. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 10 (citing Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist,
Pacifica, 7 Cal. 3d 473, 498 P.2d 987, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1972) (construing an identical
California statute)).
36. Id. at 10.
37. Id. The opinion does not mention the possibility that Clyde may have intended to
reserve the life estate solely in himself and that his wife Dorothy was merely signing the
deed to clear the title of any future concern over whether the property constituted a
homestead.
1989]
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given effect. Unfortunately, the concurring opinions seriously
cloud the clarity of this rule.
Justice VandeWalle, in a specially concurring opinion, joined
by Justice Paulson,3" stated:
I concur in the result reached in the opinion authored by
the Chief Justice .... However, I reserve any comments
as to whether or not we should overrule the Court's deci-
sion in Stetson... until a case is presented to us on appeal
in which the issue of a reservation to a true stranger to the
title is raised and briefed. 9
Justice VandeWalle noted that the issue in Malloy "was merely
whether or not a wife is a stranger to the title."4 ° In addition, he
stated that he agreed with the concurring opinions of Justice Sand
and Justice Pederson that "a wife is not a stranger to the title."
4 1
Justice Pederson, concurring specially, stated "that to the
extent that Stetson .. .may be interpreted to defeat attempted
reservations to a husband and a wife in a deed signed by that hus-
band and wife, it ought to be overturned."4 _ Justice Pederson
then stated that "a necessary party to a transaction is certainly not
a stranger" and that "[it] is a misnomer to label Dorothy Boettcher
a stranger in this case."'43  He concluded that "[w]hen a case
involving a real stranger comes along, I think this court may very
well want to apply Stetson v. Nelson."
44
Justice Sand concurred with Justice Pederson and concurred
specially by distinguishing the facts in Malloy from the facts in
Stetson.45 Justice Sand noted that Dorothy Boettcher was a named
"party of the first part and was not a stranger to the instrument,
whereas the person receiving the reserved interest in Stetson ...
38. Id. at 10-11. In a separate paragraph following VandeWalle's opinion is the
following notation: "PAULSON, J., CONCURS." Id. at 11. One may question whether
Paulson is concurring with Chief Justice Erickstad, with Justice VandeWalle, or with just the
result. The introductory note, added by West Publishing Company in the Northwestern
(Second) Reporter, states that Justice VandeWalle "filed a specially concurring opinion in
which Paulson, J., joined." Id. at 8. In a telephone conversation between author Anderson
and the Clerk of the North Dakota Supreme Court, the accuracy of the West note was
verified. Telephone interview with Luella Dunn (March 8, 1988). Dunn stated that the
placement of Justice Paulson's statement of concurrence following Justice VandeWalle's
specially concurring opinion indicates that Justice Paulson concurs with Justice
VandeWalle. Id.






45. Id. Justice Sand stated he agreed with the result but not the rationale of the
majority, and that he concurred in the special concurring opinion of Justice Pederson. Id.
[Vol. 65:1
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was not a party to the instrument."4 6 Accordingly, Justice Sand
concluded that the "rule of law stated in Stetson ... is not applica-
ble in the instant case."
47
Then Justice Sand noted that "a spouse has an interest in the
other spouse's property. ' 48 In support of this statement, Justice
Sand cited the practice followed by lending institutions requiring
both spouses to sign instruments of conveyance, statutory provi-
sions which Justice Sand said implicitly recognize spousal inter-
est,49 and divorce cases that equitably divide property between
the husband and wife without regard to title.50
Finally, Justice Sand commented that section 47-09-17 of the
North Dakota Century Code, also cited by Chief Justice Erickstad,
did abrogate the common-law rule.51 However, in noting that sec-
tion 47-09-17 was an old statute not previously construed by the
court, Justice Sand said that he was left with "an uneasy feeling."
5
Reconciling the various opinions expressed in Malloy is diffi-
cult. In attempting to do so, one must bear in mind that Chief
Justice Erickstad wrote the opinion of the court. One would ordi-
narily refer to this opinion as the "majority opinion." On careful
analysis, however, the other justices agree only with the result; the
rest of Chief Justice Erickstad's opinion is his own, especially the
sweeping new rule that "a reservation or exception can be effec-
tive to convey a property interest to a third party who is a stranger
to the deed or title ... where that is determined to have been the
grantor's intent. '53 None of the other justices go this far; however,
exactly how far each may be willing to go in a future case is
unclear.54
Justice VandeWalle, in his specially concurring opinion, stated




49. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-10-23 and 23.1 (1978)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 11-12; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-17 (1978). Justice Sand also cited to
section 1-01-06 of the North Dakota Century Code, which provides that there is no
common law in North Dakota "where the law has been declared by the code." Malloy, 334
N.W.2d at 12 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-06 (1987)).
52. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 12.
53. Id. at 9.
54. Predicting the outcome of a future case involving a third-party reservation in
North Dakota is, at best, speculative since, Justices Paulson, Sand, and Pederson are no
longer on the court, although Justice Pederson occasionally serves as a surrogate justice.
Given the court's present makeup, Justices Gierke, Levine, and Meschke would face this
issue for the first time, and given the confusion caused by the various opinions in Malloy,
these Justices can be expected to rely on their own views, rather than existing precedent.
55. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 11.
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bly, he would also opine that a husband is not a stranger to his
wife's title. By itself, his opinion implies that a spouse is never a
stranger even where the spouse is not a named party. Thus, per-
haps Justice VandeWalle would allow a grantor to convey individ-
ually owned, nonhomestead property and reserve an interest in
the grantor's spouse without spousal joinder. However, he
prefaces the above statement by stating that he also agrees with
the specially concurring opinions of Justices Sand and Pederson.56
Arguably, Justice Pederson's opinion is more narrow than Jus-
tice VandeWalle's; however, it is also more confusing. Justice Ped-
erson would overturn Stetson to the extent it would defeat an
"attempted reservation to a husband and wife in a deed signed by
that husband and wife ....",' Both Clyde and Dorothy Boettcher
were named grantors and both executed the deed.58 These facts
and the above quotation suggest that Justice Pederson may regard
a spouse who is not a named party as a stranger. As a result, Justice
Pederson might apply the common-law rule of Stetson in such a
situation.
On the other hand, in an apparent reference to Dorothy
Boettcher, Justice Pederson also stated that "a necessary party to a
transaction is certainly not a stranger. '59 He does not state why
Dorothy is a necessary party, other than to note that the "interest
of a wife in her husband's property... readily appears in the law
of this state as interpreted by the decisions of this court and the
title opinions issued by examining lawyers.1
6 0
Justice Pederson's conclusion that Dorothy is a necessary
party is puzzling because the parties stipulated that Dorothy
Boettcher had no interest in the property.6" While not specifically
clarified by the court, the property was not the Boettchers' home-
stead.62 Accordingly, Clyde Boettcher could have conveyed the
property to his daughter, Loretta Malloy, without the joinder of his
wife, Dorothy. Since the property was not a homestead, such a
conveyance would not have been void.63 Thus, in this respect,
56. Id. at 10-11. For a discussion of how Justice VandeWalle's conclusion differs from
Pederson's and Sand's opinions, see infra notes 57-92 and accompanying text.
57. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 11 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 8.
59. Id. at 11.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 8.
62. In a telephone conversation, the attorney for Loretta Malloy informed author
Anderson that the property was not Clyde and Dorothy Boettcher's homestead because
they were residents of Nevada at the time of the grant. Telephone interview with James
Vukelic (Feb. 18, 1988).
63. Under section 47-18-05 of the North Dakota Century Code, any attempt by one
[Vol. 65:1
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Dorothy was not a "necessary party."
In three other respects, however, Dorothy could be regarded
as a necessary party, at least as a matter of prudent practice. First,
in North Dakota, nonowning spouses are customarily named
grantors and their signatures are acknowledged. 4 This is done to
cover the possibility that the property conveyed may be home-
stead and to avoid the necessity of executing and recording an affi-
davit of nonhomestead in order to maintain marketable record
title.6 Of course, since the property was not, in fact, homestead,
Dorothy's joinder could best be described as convenient, prudent,
and in accord with good legal practice, but her joinder was not
strictly necessary as a matter of law.
Second, under the Uniform Probate Code,66 adopted in North
Dakota,67 the property conveyed to Loretta may have been part of
Clyde's augmented estate. If Clyde's conveyance to his daughter,
Loretta, was a gift,68 Dorothy might have attempted to include the
value of the gift in Clyde's augmented estate for purposes of deter-
mining Dorothy's elective share rights. However, by having Doro-
thy join in the conveyance, this possibility is avoided.6 9
In fact, however, Dorothy could not have included this prop-
erty in Clyde's augmented estate since Clyde was domiciled in
Nevada, not North Dakota. Under the Uniform Probate Code 70
and North Dakota law,71 elective share rights are determined by
the law of the state where the decedent is domiciled. Nevada has
not enacted the Uniform Probate Code, nor does Nevada have an
augmented estate concept in its existing probate code.72 Thus,
Dorothy was not, in fact, a "necessary party" for purposes of avoid-
ing the augmented estate problem; however, her joinder could
again be described as convenient and prudent.
Third, since Clyde and Dorothy were residents of Nevada, a
spouse to convey a homestead without the joinder of the other spouse is absolutely void.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-05 (1978).
64. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 11 (Sand, J., concurring specially).
65. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 47-18 (1978) (homestead rights).
66. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE [hereinafter U.P.C.] § 2-202 (1982).
67. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02 (1976).
68. In a telephone conversation, the attorney for Loretta Malloy informed author
Anderson that he believed the conveyance to Loretta was a gift. Telephone interview with
James Vukelic (March 9, 1988).
69. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02 (1976). Property transferred by the decedent is not
included in the augmented estate "'if made with the written consent or joinder of the
surviving spouse." Id. at § 30.1-05-02(1).
70. U.P.C. § 2-201 (1982).
71. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-01 (1976).
72. See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 134 (1988) (succession and distribution of
property).
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community-property state, Dorothy's joinder may have been nec-
essary to transfer any community-property interest she may have
had in North Dakota land. For example, had Clyde purchased the
land with earnings attributable to the marriage, the earnings could
be "traced" to the land in North Dakota, possibly giving Dorothy a
community-property interest in the land.7 3 The appellant's brief,
however, indicated that Clyde inherited this property.74 Since
Clyde inherited the property, and absent further evidence of a
community-property interest, the property would be Clyde's sepa-
rate property.75 Accordingly, Dorothy's joinder was not strictly
"necessary" although again, joinder was convenient and
prudent.76
Justice Pederson's opinion fails to clarify whether the spouse
must both join and be a necessary party, or whether the spouse
need only join in the conveyance in order to avoid the rule of Stet-
son. Query: whether Justice Pederson would permit a grantor to
convey individually owned, nonhomestead property and
"reserve" an interest in the grantor's nonjoining spouse.
Justice Sand's opinion is the most confusing of all. Justice Sand
noted that Dorothy was a named party to the deed; as a result, he
suggested that the rule of Stetson was simply not applicable.77
This initial discussion suggests that a spouse need not be a neces-
sary party, but should be a named party.78
Justice Sand then asserted that under state law, a spouse has
an interest in the other spouse's property.79 Absent co-owned or
homestead property, this general statement is simply incorrect. In
defense of his statement, he cites the practice of lending institu-
tions who require spousal joinder in the execution of deeds and
73. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.220 (1988); Milisich v. Hillhouse, 48 Nev. 166,228 P. 307
(1924). Whether Dorothy was entitled to a community-property interest would depend on
whether Nevada community-property law would govern. The general rule is that Nevada
law would govern. See Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88, - (1848)
(prevailing law is that of the actual domicile); Edwards v. Edwards, 108 Okl. 93, 233 P. 477,
485 (1925) (marital domicile governs property rights).
74. Brief for Appellant at 2, Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8 (N.D. 1983) (Civ. No.
6457), reprinted in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 334 N.W.2d(2) (available at University
of North Dakota Law Library).
75. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 123-130 (1986). Of course, Clyde could have improved the
property by investing community-property funds, which may have given Dorothy a partial
community property interest or a claim for reimbursement. See generally W: REPPY & C.
SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 80-83 (2d ed. 1982).
76. Nothing in the briefs or the opinions suggests that the court even considered
community property issues.





other conveyancing instruments.80 Of course, such a practice is
certainly not law.
Justice Sand also noted that spousal interest is "implicitly rec-
ognized by our Legislature in the enactment of North Dakota
Century Code §§ 47-10-23 and 47-10-23.1.' ' l Section 47-10-23
provides that a grantor may create a joint tenancy in himself and
"any other person.., without the necessity of any transfer or con-
veyance to or through any third person."'8 2 This statute does not
recognize or create any spousal interest in property; it merely
eliminates the requirement of strict unity in time and title where
the grantor wishes to create a joint tenancy with himself and "any
other person."'8 3 At strict common law, such a grantor had to con-
vey the property to a strawman and then have it reconveyed to
himself and the other party in joint tenancy.
8 4
Section 47-10-23.1 of the North Dakota Century Code merely
provides that a transfer of property between spouses shall be pre-
sumed to be for consideration and not a gift.85 An annotation to
this section indicates that the legislative intent of this provision
was to recognize the "contribution of spouses to the marital and
familial relationship."86 Thus, this provision does not recognize or
create a spousal interest in property; it merely presumes spousal
contribution in its acquisition.
Next, Justice Sand noted that "inchoate" spousal interests are
recognized in divorce cases which equitably distribute the spouse's
property regardless of title.87 An inchoate interest is not a present
or vested interest in property; however, it may ripen into a vested
interest if not extinguished.8 8 Most lawyers would agree that, in
North Dakota, one spouse has no "interest" in the other spouse's
nonhomestead property prior to the commencement of divorce
proceedings. In general, under North Dakota law, one spouse may
unilaterally convey solely-owned, nonhomestead property free
and clear of the other spouse's unripened claim to equitable
distribution.
80. Id.
81. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-23 (1978Xtransfer by grantor to himself and
another in joint tenancy); Id. § 47-10-23.1 (Supp. 1987Xnon-testamental transfer between
spouses presumption).
82. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-23 (1978).
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., Pegg v. Pegg, 165 Mich. 228, 130 N.W. 617 (1911); Moe v. Krupke, 255
Wis. 33, 37 N.W.2d 865 (1949).
85. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-23.1 (Supp. 1987).
86. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-23.1 annot. (Supp. 1987).
87. Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8, 11 (N.D. 1983).
88. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 686 (5th ed. 1979) ("inchoate interest").
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Thus, Justice Sand's assertion that under North Dakota law,
"[a] spouse has an interest in the other spouse's property" 9 is
overbroad and unsubstantiated. This paragraph of Justice Sand's
opinion, however, does imply that Justice Sand would never view
a spouse as a stranger.9 ° Query: whether Justice Sand would
require a spouse to be a named grantor in order to receive a
reserved interest.
In his conclusion, Justice Sand then appears to agree with
Chief Justice Erickstad that the common-law rule, followed in Stet-
son, has been abrogated by statute. 9' If Justice Sand really does
agree with Chief Justice Erickstad on this point, then his preced-
ing discussion is irrelevant. Since he is left with an "uneasy feel-
ing"" and since he also concurs with Justice Pederson,93 one can
draw no firm and useful conclusions about Justice Sand's views,
except that he agrees with the result.
Any time four or five justices write separate opinions in one
case, the impact of the case in subsequent related cases is difficult
to predict. This is especially true of Malloy. Lack of predictability
is particularly troublesome where land titles are involved, as title
examiners are unable to pass upon ownership in similar circum-
stances. This causes uncertainty for title lawyers and for real estate
lawyers who prepare instruments. In turn, these uncertainties
complicate real estate transactions and may cause lengthy and
expensive litigation, resulting in unhappy clients who are likely to
lay the blame for these uncertainties on the legal profession.
Precisely what circumstances led to these four opinions is not
known. Perhaps Chief Justice Erickstad was randomly assigned
the case, but when his draft opinion was circulated, the other jus-
tices thought its sweeping rejection of Stetson went too far.
Rather than reassign the case for a new consensus opinion, the jus-
tices apparently decided to write brief concurring opinions stating
their individual concerns. While this approach may have initially
saved time and additional work, it created confusion. The end
result is that Malloy generates far more questions than it answers.
After studying the four opinions in Malloy, a title examiner
would appear to be safe in recognizing the validity of a third-party
reservation only if the reservation is in favor of a spouse who is a
89. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 11.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 12 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-17 (1978); Id. § 1-01-06 (1987)).
92. Id. at 12.
93. Id. at 11. Recall that Justice Pederson stated: "When a case involving a real
stranger comes along, I think this court may very well want to apply Stetson v. Nelson." Id.
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named party to the instrument. An extra-cautious examiner may
even require that the grantor/owner spouse also be a named
recipient. of the reservation, since that was the case in Malloy. In
any other situation, but especially where the third party is not a
spouse of the grantor, the examiner should request stipulations of
interest from all possible claimants. If the claimants cannot agree
about the validity of the reservation, then a quiet title action
(taken to the supreme court) would be necessary, since no one can
predict under what circumstances the North Dakota Supreme
Court may choose to resurrect the rule of Stetson.
B. THE VARIOUS RULES COMPARED
1. The North Dakota Statutory (Field Code) Rule
In ruling for Dorothy Boettcher and in rejecting the common-
law rule, Chief Justice Erickstad relied, in part, on North Dakota
Century Code section 47-09-17."4 Section 47-09-17 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides: "A present interest and the bene-
fit of a condition or covenant respecting property may be taken by
any natural person under a grant although not named a party as
thereto."'95 Justice Sand also acknowledged the relevance of this
section in his specially concurring opinion.
9 6
The immediate source of section 47-09-17 is the Field Code,97
enacted by the Dakota Territory Legislative Assembly in 1865.98
The language of this statute has remained unchanged since 1865
and is identical to the Field Code provision.99 An annotation in
94. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 10. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-17 (1978).
95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-17 (1978).
96. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 12.
97. FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 482. One of the New York Commissioners, David
Dudley Field, is credited for having done much of the drafting and promoting of the Civil
Code; accordingly the code is most commonly referred to as the Field Code.
98. LAWS, MEMORIALS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE TERRITORY OF DAKOTA §§ 1-2034
(Kingsbury 1865). Dakota Territory was the first jurisdiction to enact the Field Code and
the only one to do so virtually verbatim. See 1 C. LOUNSBERRY, NORTH DAKOTA HISTORY
& PEOPLE 437-39 (1917); 1 G. KINGSBURY, HISTORY OF DAKOTA TERRITORY 429-30 (1915);
Fisch, Civil Code: Notes for an Uncelebrated Centennial, 43 N.D.L. REV. 485 (1967).
Justice Sand noted that section 47-09-17 had been law since 1877. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at
12. This erroneous statement is due to the fact that the source notes to the North Dakota
Century Code cite the Dakota Territorial Code of 1877 as the earliest source of Dakota
Territory's Field Code. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-17 source note (1978). While the
Dakota Territory Legislative Assembly repealed the 1865 civil -code in a "General
Repealing Act" in 1877, a revised Field Code was reenacted that same year. See REVISED
CODES OF THE TERRITORY OF DAKOTA 208-476, 898 (2d ed. 1877). This revision was, in
part, based on a California revision of the Field Code. See CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE OF
1872; Deering's Annotated California Code, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1-3543 (Deering 1886). See
also CODES AND STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA 577-893 (Hittell 1876). Many provisions of the
initial Field Code, however, were reenacted without change, including the above quoted
provision.
99. FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 482. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1085 (Deering 1903)
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the Field Code states that "[t]his provision is contrary to common
law." 100 Thus, to understand the intended effect of this section,
one must first know the common-law rule as it was understood by
the drafters of the Field Code.
The Field Code annotation cites two cases as an illustration of
the common-law rule.10' In the oldest case, Hornbeck v. West-
brook,'0 2 the plaintiff-grantee charged another party with trespass
in the cutting of wood.'0 3 The defendant, a resident of the town of
Rochester, contended that he had a right to cut wood because
plaintiff's grantor reserved that right in favor of the inhabitants of
the town of Rochester. 10 4 The court noted that a conveyance to
the inhabitants of a town would be void for uncertainty; accord-
ingly, the court held that an attempted reservation to such inhabit-
ants is also void for the same reason.' 05 In addition, the court
stated:
[A] covenant or reservation to any third person would be
void. A person who is not a party to a deed, cannot take
anything by it, unless it be by way of remainder. The
grantor cannot covenant with a stranger to the deed.
This is an acknowledged rule of law. 10 6
In the second case, Craig v. Wells,'07 the grantor conveyed
land in fee simple, but attempted to limit the grantee's use of
water from the land.' 08 The court noted that the object of the
limitation was to protect third parties from competition in the
business of grinding grain.10 9 The court called the limitation a
naked prohibition and thus held that "[t]his prohibition is inconsis-
tent with the title conveyed by the deed, and is clearly void." 110
The court also noted that the limitation was not an enforceable
covenant because the benefit was intended for a third party."'
It is well settled, that an exception or reservation to a
(enacted March 21, 1872). Only the descriptive title has been changed. Id. ("Grant may
inure to benefit of stranger.")
100. FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 482 annot.
101. Id. (citing Craig v. Wells, 11 N.Y. 315 (1854); Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns. 73
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812)).
102. 9 Johns. 73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812).
103. Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns. 73, 73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 74.
106. Id. at 75.
107. 11 N.Y. 315 (1854).
108. Craig v. Wells, 11 N.Y. 315, 317 (1854).
109. Id. at 322.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 323.
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third person, not a party to the deed, is void.... It would
scarcely be in harmony with these rules, to create, by
mere legal implication; a restriction, by way of covenant,
which would be void in any other form. The law will
never, I think, imply a covenant in favor of a stranger to
the deed...." 2
Note that the discussion in both cases pertaining to third-party
reservations is dicta. Also, note that the attempted reservations
were in the nature of servitudes." 3 In Hornbeck the third-party
reservation was the right to cut wood, a profit a' prendre.14 In
Craig the grantee promised not to use water in a creek (or prom-
ised not to compete), a negative restrictive covenant intended to
benefit a third party." 5 Thus, based on these annotations, the
drafters of the Field Code clearly intended to change the com-
mon-law rule with respect to servitudes. Query: whether the
drafters intended to change the rule with respect to possessory
estates in land, such as the reservation of life estates or minerals in
favor of third parties.
The annotation to this Field Code section also states that "a
similar provision has been enacted in England."'" 6 This English
statute provides:
Under an indenture, executed after the 1st day of Octo-
ber, 1845, an immediate estate or interest, in any tene-
ments or hereditaments, and the benefit of a condition or
covenant, respecting any tenements or hereditaments,
may be taken, although the taker thereof be not named a
117party to the same indenture....
Since this statute specifically refers to an "estate or interest in
any tenements or hereditaments," 18 the drafters of this provision
apparently intended to modify the common-law rule with respect
to present possessory interests, as well as servitudes.119 Since the
112. Id. (footnotes omitted).
113. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1229 (5th ed. 1979).
114. Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns. 73, 73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812). See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1090 (5th ed. 1979).
115. Craig v. Wells, 11 N.Y. 315, 316-17 (1854).
116. FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 482 annot. (citing the Real Property Act, 1845, 8
& 9 Viet., ch. 106, § 5).
117. Real Property Act, 1845,8 & 9 Vict., ch. 106, § 5 (codified at II CHITrY's ENGLISH
STATUTES § 5, p. 753 (6th ed. 1911)).
118. Id.
119. The word "estate" is traditionally used to comprehensively describe every species
of property, real and personal, and everything capable of ownership. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 490-91 (5th ed. 1979). The word "interest" is the most general term that can
be employed to denote property. Id. at 729. The word "tenement" properly refers to
19891
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draftors of the Field Code used the broad term "present inter-
ests," 120 their intention would seem to be the same. Query:
whether a "future interest" could be reserved unto a third party
under either provision.
Note that both the Field Code provision 12' and the present
North Dakota statute 122 identify the eligible third party as "any
natural person." Accordingly, the common-law rule could still
govern reservations in favor of partnerships, corporations, or other
legal entities other than natural persons. However, while recog-
nizing this limitation in the identical California statutes,12 3 the
Supreme Court of California nonetheless rejected the common-
law rule in a case where the third party was a church.
24
2. The Common-Law Rationale
The traditional rationale for prohibiting third-party reserva-
tions lies in the formalities necessary for a valid grant. Historically,
a present possessory interest in land was conveyed in a feoffment
with livery of seisin ceremony. The grantor, 0, and the grantee, A,
would meet on the property in the presence of witnesses; 0 would
utter precise words of grant and pass a twig or handful of soil to A.
The livery of seisin ceremony was used to convey fee simple, fee
tail, and life estates; however, nonpossessory interests and future
interests were generally conveyed by written grants.125 Certain
formalities, such as precise words of grant, had to be expressed in
the instrument. Accordingly, the problem with third-party reser-
vations is that the reservation language includes no words expres-
sing a clear intent to grant an interest to the third party.1
2 6
everything that may be holden. Id. at 1316. The word "hereditament" describes property
capable of being inherited, whether corporeal, incorporeal, real, or personal. Id. at 653.
120. FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 482.
121. Id.
122. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-17 (1978).
123. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1085 (West 1982).
124. See Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 7 Cal. 3d 473, 498 P.2d
987, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1972). The court cited the corresponding, provision of the
California Civil Code (§ 1085), noting that the statute conflicts with the common-law rule in
some situations. Although the couit stated that the statute did not govern because the third
party in Willard was a corporation and not a natural person, it nonetheless rejected the
common-law rule. Id. at __, 498 P.2d at 990 n.3, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
125. See generally Payne, The English Theory of Conveyancing Prior, to the Land
Registration Acts, 7 ALA. L. REV. 227, 241-46 (1955). See also R. POWELL & P. ROHAN,
REAL PROPERTY 407 (abridged ed. 1968).
126. See, e.g., Cayce v. Carter Oil Co., 618 F.2d 669, 674 (10th Cir. 1980) (no valid
conveyance without words of grant). For a more detailed discussion of third-party
reservations, see Harris, Reservations in Favor of Strangers to the Title, 6 OKLA. L. REV.
127, 131-34 (1953). Justice Sand, specially concurring in Malloy, distinguished strangers to
the title and strangers to the deed, noting that although Dorothy Boettcher may have been
a stranger to the title, she was not a stranger to the deed since she was a named party.
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Without words of grant, a third party can claim no interest
because, unlike the grantor, the third party has no interest in the
land which can be "excepted" from the grant, and no interest
from which a "reservation" may be carved.'
27
3. The Rationale for Rejecting the Common-Law Rule
An increasing number of jurisdictions have rejected or at least
limited the common-law rule. A clear trend departs from the
common-law rule where the third party is a spouse. 128 Indeed,
some courts have concluded that third-party spouses fall within a
generally recognized exception to the common-law rule,129 while
others have validated such reservations on the basis of long-estab-
lished custom.1 30 The three specially concurring opinions in Mal-
loy agree with the view that a spouse should not be regarded as a
Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8, 11 (N.D. 1983). While a few courts have made this
distinction, this view is not supported by the rationale of the common-law rule since words
of grant to the stranger are still missing. Compare Mott v. Nardo, 73 Cal. App. 2d 159, -,
166 P.2d 37, 39 (1946Xreservation or exception in deed creates no interest in a stranger to
the deed); Flynn v. Fike, 291 Ky. 316, -, 164 S.W.2d 470, 472-73 (1942) (to be effective a
reservation must be in favor of a grantor and not a stranger to the deed); and Slone v.
Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co., 289 Ky. 623, __, 159 S.W.2d 993, 995 (1942Xgrantor
cannot except out of a conveyance an interest to which the grantor has no title) with Boyer
v. Murphy, 202 Cal. 23, -, 259 P. 38, 40 (1927Xintention, rather than ownership of title,
determines whether reservation can be made in favor of a stranger to title).
127. See generally Annotation, RESERVATION OR EXCEPTION IN DEED IN FAVOR OF
STRANGER, 88 A.L.R.2D 1199 (1963Xdeals with the validity of reservations or exceptions in
favor of strangers to a deed). While early common law was unsettled, courts in the United
States generally permitted a grantor to "reserve" an easement in a deed. In granting
Blackacre, the grantor could create a new interest, such as an easement, and retain it by
making a reservation. In addition, the grantor could retain an interest which already
existed by making an "exception" to the grant (e.g., by granting Blackacre, "excepting the
west 50 feet"). See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.24-.28 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952);
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 473 comment a (1944Xowner of land who is conveying
corporeal interests may retain part of his corporeal interests as incorporeal). See also, R.
POWELL & P. ROHAN, REAL PROPERTY 407 (abridged ed. 1968).
128. See, e.g., Boyer v. Murphy, 202 Cal. 23, -, 259 P. 38, 40-41 (1927Xreservation of a
life estate to the husband was allowed even though the wife was the sole fee owner);
Saunders v. Saunders, 373 Ill. 302, -, 26 N.E.2d 126, 129 (1940Xhusband and wife have
sufficient interest in property to support a reservation to both without express words of
grant from the one holding legal title); Glasgow v. Glasgow, 221 S.C. 322, _, 70 S.E.2d 432,
435 (1952Xwife was not a stranger to the deed because she had an inchoate right of house
and homestead right); Krug v. Reissig, 488 P.2d 150, 152 (Wyo. 197 1Xintention of husband
and wife with respect to reservation controls rather than the common-law rule). An article
published in 1953 contends that, at that time, 18 states validated reservations in favor of
third-party spouses. Harris, supra note 126, at 150. But see cases cited at infra, note 145.
129. See, e.g., Saunders v. Saunders, 373 Ill. 302, __, 26 N.E.2d 126, 129 (1940Xrights
that a husband and wife acquire in each other's property allows a reservation of a life estate
in favor of a spouse without a specific grant).
130. See, e.g., Bryan v. Bradley, 16 Conn. 474, 487 (1844Xthe intent of the grantor
allowed a life estate to pass to his wife even though she was a stranger to the deed). Still
other cases validate such reservations without considering the common-law rule. See, e.g.,
Derham v. Hovey, 195 Mich. 243, -, 161 N.W. 883, 884, (1917Xreservation of a life estate
to the wife by her husband was allowed even though the husband was the sole owner of the
land).
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stranger,13 ' although, as previously indicated, 32 the precise facts
that would lead the concurring justices to this conclusion are not
clear. Like Malloy, most cases validating third-party reservations
in spouses concern reservations specifically made in favor of both
the grantor and the nonowning spouses.1
3 3
A number of courts, again representing a trend, have
departed from the common-law rule with respect to servitudes.'
34
In addition, the Restatement of Property has rejected the com-
mon-law rule where easements' 35 or the benefit of covenants are
reserved in favor of third parties. 136  The rationale used in
rejecting the common-law rule is that the intent of the grantor
should be honored.'
37
If cases validating reservations in favor of third-party spouses
are excluded, only a few cases have departed from the common-
law rule where the grantor reserved a possessory interest in a third
party.'13  A law review article published in 1953 noted that
131. Malloy v. Boettcher, 343 N.W.2d 8, 10-12 (N.D. 1983).
132. See discussion supra accompanying notes 53-93.
133. For cases applying the common-law rule even though the nonowning spouse had
joined in the conveyance, see Field v. Morris, 88 Ark. 148, -, 114 S.W. 206, 208 (1908); and
Leidig v. Hoopes, 288 P.2d 402, 404 (Okla. 1955).
134. See, e.g., Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377, 380 (Alaska 1987Xcourt rejected
common-law rule and held that a right-of-way easement could be reserved in favor of a
third party); Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 7 Cal. 3d 473, -, 498 P.2d
987, 991, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739, 743 (1972Xcourt determined that reservation providing for
church parking lot must be upheld in favor of the third-party church); and Garza v.
Grayson, 255 Or. 413, -, 467 P.2d 960, 961 (1970Xgrantor can create an easement in a
person other than the grantee if the intention is adequately expressed in the deed). These
cases were cited and discussed by Chief Justice Erickstad in Malloy. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at
9-10. See also Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Ky. 1964Xone-half interest in oil
and gas interests in favor of a stranger allowed due to express intention shown in deed).
Townsend concerned the reservation of an oil and gas interest in favor of a third party;
although the case law is confusing, Kentucky is generally regarded as treating a severed oil
and gas interest as a profit a' prendre (servitude) rather than a possessory estate. See
discussion in 1 H. WILLIAMS AND C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 203, 203.1, and 209
(Matthew Bender 1987).
For a case bucking this trend, see Estate of Thomson v. Wade 69 N.Y.2d 570, 509
N.E.2d 309, 310, 516 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1987). In invalidating an easement in favor of a third
party, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the modern trend citing public policy
favoring certainty and stability in real estate titles and adherence to precedent over a
"'better or even a 'correct' rule of law."' Id. at -, 509 N.E.2d at 310, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 615,
quoting Matter of Eckart, 39 N.Y.2d 493, -, 348 N.E.2d 905, 908, 384 N.Y.S.2d 429, -,
(1976).
135. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 472, comment b (1944).
136. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 537, comment d and e (1944).
137. See, e.g., Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 9-10.
138. See, e.g., Maynard v. Maynard, 4 Edw. Ch. 711, 6 N.Y. Ch. 1029, 1030 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1848) (grantor reserved what the court called a life estate in favor of his three
daughters). In Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1964), the grantor reserved an oil
and gas interest in a third party. Id. at 807. While this could be construed as a reservation
of a possessory interest, Professors Williams and Meyers have concluded that Kentucky
would most likely regard an oil and gas interest as a nonpossessory profit a' prendre. See
discussion, supra note 134, above. In Simpson v. Kistler Inv. Co., 713 P.2d 751 (Wyo. 1986),
the heirs of former partniers in a ranching business were awarded mineral interests in ranch
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"[t]here seems to be a greater inclination to apply the common-
law rule when the interest sought to be reserved is only an ease-
ment or similar interest than when it reaches the dignity of an
estate in land."1 139 The authors of this article are inclined to the
opposite view. In other words, courts are likely to be less inclined
to follow the common-law rule when the interest reserved is a ser-
vitude and more inclined to follow the common-law rule where
the interest reserved is an estate in land. Indeed, the Restatement
of Property specifically recognizes third-party reservations only in
the case of easements and covenants.
140
Courts in several jurisdictions purport to follow the common-
law rule, but have barred the grantee from challenging the third-
party reservation on an estoppel by deed theory; by accepting the
deed, the grantee is estopped from asserting that the third-party
reservation is invalid. 14 1 This approach is apparently based upon a
desire to follow the intent of the grantor; yet, rather than simply
affirm the third-party reservation, these decisions take the back-
door approach of estoppel. The reasoning of these cases is not con-
vincing. The common-law rule is a rule of law which provides that
third-party reservations are void, not merely voidable; thus, the
application of this rule should not be barred by estoppel.
142
property even though title was held in the name of only one partner at the time the
grantor-partner reserved mineral interests in favor of the partnership. Williams and Meyers
conclude that Wyoming regards oil and gas interests as nonpossessory profits a'prendre, but
recognizes that language contained in some opinions suggests that such interests may be
regarded as possessory. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 203.1, at 39
(Matthew Bender 1987). In Dalton v. Eller, 153 Tenn. 418, 284 S.W. 68 (1926), the court
upheld third-party rights conferred by the following paragraph in a deed of 1.5 acres to J.H.
Merryman and R.O. Dalton:
All property on this lot of land is conveyed, except 30 by 36 feet in dimensions,
one 2-room ironclad storehouse, now occupied and owned by A.J. Eller, which is
not conveyed. The said A.J. Eller has the privilege to use the land that said house
is on and 10 feet in addition all around said storehouse, so long as said A.J. Eller
uses this storehouse in his merchandise business, but, when he declines to use
said house further for said business, then, in that event, said J.H. Merryman and
R.O. Dalton have the privilege to buy said storehouse at cost of building; but, if
the said J.H. Merryman and R.O. Dalton refuse to buy the same, then said A.J.
Eller must remove it at once.
Id. at __, 284 S.W. at 69 (1926). In upholding the rights of A.J. Eller, the court did not state
the exact nature of the interest.
139. Harris, supra note 126, at 136.
140. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 472, comment b, and § 537, comment d and e
(1944).
141. See, e.g., Beinlein v. Johns, 102 Ky. 570, _, 44 S.W. 128, 130 (1898Xacceptance of
a deed containing a third-party reservation will preclude the grantee from interfering with
the third-party's right); Hodge v. Boothby, 48 Me. 68, 71 (186lXgrantee's acceptance of
deed precluded him from interfering with third party's reservation); and Dalton v. Eller,
153 Tenn. 418, 284 S.W. 68, 70-71 (1926Xgrantee estopped from challenging third-party
reservation when grantee agreed to the provisions in the deed).
142. For cases rejecting the estoppel approach, see Rye v. Baumann, 231 Ark. 278,
329 S.W.2d 161, 165 (1959Xa grantee, though accepting a deed, is not estopped from
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Clearly, affirmative recognition of the third-party reservation is a
more direct and sensible approach.
A pure application of the common-law rule results in the void-
ing of the third-party reservation and the transfer of such interest
to the grantee.143 The courts in a number of cases, including Stet-
son v. Nelson,144 however, have modified the common-law rule by
construing the third-party reservation as an exception or reserva-
tion in favor of the grantor. 45 The rationale of these cases is that
the grantor (or both the grantor and grantee) did not intend for
the reserved interest to pass to the grantee. 146  This rationale is
puzzling. On the one hand, for purposes of voiding the intended
third-party reservation, the grantor's intent is irrelevant. On the
other hand, for purposes of determining ultimate title, the intent
of the grantor suddenly becomes relevant. Of course, where the
interest is retained in the grantor and the problem is discovered at
denying the efficacy of a reservation to a third-party); Guaranty Loan and Trust Co. v.
Helena Improvement Dist. No. 1, 148 Ark. 56, -, 228 S.W. 1045, 1046 (1921); and
Beardslee v. New Berlin Light & Power Co., 207 N.Y. 34, 100 N.E. 434, 437 (1912).
143. See, e.g., Field v. Morris, 88 Ark. 148, 114 S.W. 206, 208 (1908Xa reservation "to
ourselves" was construed as a personal right which died with the grantor and did not inure
to the benefit of his spouse who signed the deed only to relinquish dower).
144. 118 N.W.2d 685, 688 (N.D. 1962).
145. See, e.g., Allen v. Henson, 186 Ky. 201, -, 217 S.W. 120, 123 (1919Xexception in
deed for a walkway easement conferred title back to grantor and grantor had right to
dedicate interest in any way); Sword v. Sword, 252 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Ky. 1952Xreservation
of interest in coal to children was not valid, but it did operate in favor of the grantor father);
Martin v. Cook, 102 Mich. 267,_, 60 N.W. 679, 681 (1894); Wilson v. Gerard, 213 Miss. 177,
-, 56 So.2d 471, 473 (1952Xa reservation or exception to a stranger has the effect of
returning the unsuccessfully conveyed interest to the grantor); Carlton v. Wilson, 665
S.W.2d 356, 358 (Mo. App. 1984Xdeed reserving life estate to husband and wife was in favor
of wife who was grantor of the land); Lemon v. Lemon, 273 Mo. 484, -, 201 S.W. 103, 106
(1918Xan exception carved out of a deed in favor of a stranger becomes part of the grantor's
estate); Leidig v. Hoopes, 288 P.2d 402, 404 (Okla. 1955Xmineral reservation in favor of
husband and wife reserved an estate only to the husband since the wife owned no interest
in the real estate); and Joiner v. Sullivan, 260 S.W.2d 439, 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953 writ.
ref'd n.r.e.Xan exception or reservation can convey no interest to strangers to the deed, but
instead vests full rights to the grantor). Some decisions may limit this result to situations
where the grantor has attempted to reserve an interest in his heirs; these decisions may be
explained as an application of the doctrine of worthier title, rather than a modification of
the common-law rule respecting third-party reservations. See, e.g., In re Burchell's Estate,
299 N.Y. 351, __, 87 N.E.2d 293, 296 (1949Xdoctrine of worthier title caused a limitation
over to the heirs of the grantor in an intervivos conveyance to be a reversionary interest);
Beach v. Busey, 156 F.2d 496, 498 (6th Cir. 1946Xintervivos conveyance for.life, with
remainder to heirs generally creates a reversion in the grantor and an expectancy in the
grantee heirs); Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Beach, 145 Ill. App. 3d 673, -, 495 N.E.2d
1170, 1173 (1986Xdoctrine of worthier title mandates that a grant of a life estate with a
remainder to the grantor's heirs creates a reversion to the grantor), rev'd on other grounds,
513 N.E.2d 833 (Ill. 1987); and Doctor v. Hughes, 255 N.Y. 305, -, 122 N.E. 221, 221
(1 919Xtrust providing that upon death of grantor the rights should be conveyed to grantor's
heirs created a reversion in the grantor).
146. See, e.g., Stetson, 118 N.W.2d at 688 (reservation to a stranger operates in favor of
the grantor and prevents the title from passing to the grantee). Also, some cases suggest
that the grantee would be unjustly enriched by receiving the interest. Lemon, 273 Mo. at
-, 201 S.W. at 105.
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a time when the grantor is still alive, the grantor may be able to
convey the interest to the intended recipient, thereby accomplish-
ing what was intended in the first place. 147 Where the grantor has
died, however, the grantor's heirs may not be so inclined; in this
circumstance, the heirs could simply ignore the grantor's intent
and receive a windfall.
In an apparent attempt to fulfill the grantor's intent and yet
pay lip service to the common-law rule, one Oklahoma case goes
full circle.'14  The reservation in favor of the third party was invali-
dated, but was treated as an exception or reservation in favor of
the grantor.149 Then the grantor's intent was fulfilled by treating
the attempted reservation as creating a valid trust in favor of the
third-party beneficiaries!15 0 The rationale appears to be that while
express words of grant are necessary for a valid conveyance, "[n]o
particular words are necessary to create a trust."' 5'1
This brief review of how other jurisdictions have addressed
the problem of third-party reservations is not an exhaustive study.
For example, in addition to the above case categories, a few cases
have upheld reservations in favor of a public or governmental
third party on the ground that such entities are not strangers for
purposes of the common-law rule.' 52 In any event, the clear trend
is to either reject or limit the common-law rule; indeed, one may
question whether the strict common-law rule survives in any
jurisdiction.
147. Note, however, that if a long period of time has elapsed since the initial grant,
coupled with a significant change in value of the property, there could be serious income
and/or gift and estate tax consequences at the time of the conveyance. Also, in the case of
servitudes, there could be technical impediments to the reconveyance to the third party,
such as the nontransferability of a noncommercial easement in gross (see, R. POWELL & P.
ROHAN, REAL PROPERTY, 419 (abridged ed. 1968)); privity of estate problems in the
transfer of real covenants Id. at 674; and whether the burden of an equitable servitude
will run where the benefit is held in gross Id. at 675.
148. Burns v. Bastien, 174 Okla. 40, 50 P.2d 377 (1935).
149. Id. at -, 50 P.2d at 383.
150. Id. at __, 50 P.2d at 383-84.
151. Id. at -, 50 P.2d at 383. Because the facts of this case are peculiar, the result in
this case should not be construed as the general rule in Oklahoma.
152. E.g., Leffler v. Smith, 388 So.2d 261, 263 (Fla. App. 1980); Dade County v. Little,
115 So.2d 19, 21 (Fla. App. 1959); Edwards v. Brusha, 18 Okla. 234, -, 90 P. 727, 729
(1907); Bolio v. Marvin, 130 Mich. 82, -, 89 N.W. 563, 563 (1902). This review is largely a
summary of a much more detailed, although dated, study published in the Oklahoma Law
Review. See, Harris, Reservations in Favor of Strangers to the Title, 6 OKLA. L. REV. 127
(1953).. For further discussion of reservations in deeds and the common-law rule, see
Comment, Reservation of a Property Interest in a Deed in Favor of the Grantor's Spouse is
Effective When That is the Grantor's Intent, 60 N.D.L. REV. 317 (1984); Comment,
Reservations in Favor of Strangers to the Title: California Abandons the Common Law
Rule, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 469 (1973).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
4. What Should the North Dakota Rule Be?
The common-law rule serves little purpose except to defeat
the intent of the grantor and to provide a malpractice trap for
attorneys. And the underpinnings of the common-law rule are lit-
tle more than historic formalisms.15 3 Accordingly, given the trend
of recent decisions, and given the language of section 47-09-17 of
the North Dakota Century Code and its legislative history, the best
conclusion is that the common-law rule ought not to survive in
North Dakota with respect to any third-party reservation.
In North Dakota statutory language supersedes the common-
law and is to be construed liberally." 4 Section 47-09-17 provides:
"A present interest and the benefit of condition or covenant...
may be taken by any natural person under a grant although not
named a party thereto.' 55 The statutory reference to a "present
interest" is even broader than the language of the Restatement of
Property section 472 which refers only to easements and cove-
nants. 156 Moreover, the common-law rule is a trap for the unwary
who may reasonably believe that third-party reservations are
valid. Finally, if the intent of the grantor is to play any role in deal-
ing with third-party reservations, the grantor's intent should be
fully implemented, not just half-implemented as in Stetson. Thus,
the authors agree with Chief Justice Erickstad's opinion in Malloy,
and do not agree with the specially concurring opinions.
Notwithstanding the limiting language of the statute, the
rejection of the common-law rule should be applied uniformly,
whether or not the third party is a "natural person. ' '115 The
authors see no reason to treat third-party persons differently than
other entities. Moreover, continued adherence to the common-
153. See discussion supra, section B.2.
154. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 1-01-06, 1-02-01 (1987). Section 1-01-06 provides that there
is "no common law in any case where the law is declared by the code." N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 1-01-06 (1987) (derived from section 6 of the Field Code, supra note 33). Section 1-02-01
provides:
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
construed strictly has no application to this code. The code establishes the law of
this state respecting the subjects to which it relates, and its provisions and all
proceedings under it are to be construed liberally, with a view to affecting its
objects and to promoting justice.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-01 (1987) (derived from section 2032 of the Field Code, supra note
33).
155. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-17 (1978) (emphasis supplied).
156. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 472, comment b, and § 537 comment d and e
(1944). See discussion supra section B.1.
157. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-17 (1978). For a case agreeing with this conclusion, see




law rule for corporations and partnerships would only cause need-
less confusion. Also, confining the rule to only "present interests"
poses a trap for the unwary grantor who "reserves". "a future
interest" in favor of a third party.
The authors concede that Chief Justice Erickstad's reversal of
Stetson v. Nelson in Malloy poses a problem for title examiners
who may have relied on the common-law rule. The question of
past reliance on the common-law rule was briefly addressed by the
California Supreme Court in Willard.15 8 The court rejected the
reliance argument because there was no evidence of reliance in
that case.' 9 In dicta, however, the court did say that past reliance
on the common-law rule would be balanced against the desirabil-
ity of following the grantor's intent and against the language of the
California statute, which is identical to section 47-09-17 of the
North Dakota Century Code.'
60
The authors believe that the defense of past reliance on Stet-
son should not be recognized. First, Stetson involved an
attempted reservation of a possessory mineral estate in favor of a
third party who was not the spouse of the grantor. The rule in
Stetson is not good authority for dealing with the more common
situations concerning reservations in favor of third-party spouses
or reservations of servitudes in favor of third parties - situations
where courts have been more likely to validate the reservation.
Thus, title examiners should not have relied on a broader interpre-
tation of Stetson in the first place; the result in Malloy proves this.
Second, reliance on Stetson does not justify ignoring section 47-09-
17. This provision has been law since 1865 and should have pri-
macy over the 1962 decision in Stetson, a decision which ignored
the statute. While the court's failure to consider the statute in Stet-
son is regrettable, this error should not be continued, or com-
pounded and complicated by equitable considerations. Finally, a
healthy and efficient real estate industry requires certainty of law.
Title examiners cannot determine the question of reliance from an
examination of the record; accordingly, where third-party reserva-
tions are concerned, the North Dakota Supreme Court should
explicitly authorize attorneys to rely on record title without con-
siderations of equity.
158. Willard, 7 Cal. 3d at -, 498 P.2d at 991, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
159. Id. at -, 498 P.2d at 991, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
160. Id. at -, 498 P.2d at 990-91 and nn. 388, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
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C. THE "EXCEPTION" "RESERVATION" PROBLEM
Assuming that the North Dakota Supreme Court chooses to
follow Chief Justice Erickstad's opinion in Malloy, the court will be
only half way toward adopting a clear and certain rule that title
examiners may apply without recourse to litigation. The problem
lies in a series of deed construction cases which distinguish a "res-
ervation from" (or "exception to") a "grant" and an "exception to"
a "warranty." A review of these cases suggests that litigation is
often necessary because the North Dakota Supreme Court will
often conclude that a deed containing an exception or reservation
is ambiguous. The court will then consider extraneous facts to dis-
cern the parties' intent. When such deeds are construed in light of
extraneous facts, the court may conclude that the language consti-
tutes an exception to the warranty, an exception from the grant, a
reservation of an interest in the grantor, or in light of Malloy, a
reservation in a third party.
A brief analysis of these cases will illustrate the court's willing-
ness to consider extraneous facts - facts which are often of dubi-
ous value in determining the parties' intent. Also, this analysis will
show how the decision in Malloy may further complicate this
problem, unless the court elects, whenever reasonably possible, to
resolve such disputes by construing an instrument from its four
corners in light of prior recorded instruments.
The following provision from the North Dakota Standards of
Title serves as a useful introduction to this discussion:
A deed referring to a nonexistent reservation or excep-
tion and made expressly subject thereto does not operate
to reserve and except to the grantor any interest in the
matter or matters made subject to exception or reserva-
tion and the same shall be considered to have passed to
the grantee notwithstanding such recitation in the
deed. 161
While this provision may be valid for the specific situation dis-
cussed, in light of a series of decisions handed down in the
1980s,162 the standard is, at the very least, misleading. The follow-
161. STATE BAR ASSOC. OF N.D., STANDARDS OF TITLE § 6.04 (1988). An annotation to
this standard cites Winter v. United States, 624 F. Supp. 38 (D.N.D. 1985), aff'd 783 F.2d
152 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. McKenzie County, 187 F. Supp. 470 (D.N.D. 1960),
aff'd sub nom. Murray v. United States, 291 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1961); Monson v. Dwyer, 378
N.W.2d 865 (1985); Mueller v. Stangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450 (N.D. 1983); and Stracka v.
Peterson, 377 N.W.2d 580 (N.D. 1985).
162. See Monson v. Dwyer, 378 N.W.2d 865, 866 (1985); Mueller v. Strangeland, 340
N.W.2d 450, 453 (N.D. 1983); and Stracka v. Peterson, 377 N.W.2d 580, 583 (N.D. 1985); see
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ing analysis of this series of cases indicates that the North Dakota
Supreme Court will strive to carry out the intent of the grantor,
rather than adhere to any technical distinctions among "reserva-
tions," "exceptions," and grants "subject to" an interest.
The above standard is primarily based on .the decision in
United States v. McKenzie County.16 3 In McKenzie County Judge
Register, Federal District Judge for the District of North Dakota,
ruled that a provision in a warranty deed excepting a mineral
interest in a third party (McKenzie County) .merely referred to a
prior reservation 164 that the parties erroneously believed to be
valid. 65  Judge Register concluded' that the provision was
intended as an exception from the warranty and not a reservation
or exception from the grant,1 66 and also held. that the grantee
(United States) was not estopped from claiming title to the miner-
als as against the claim of the grantor.16 7  Accordingly, the dis-
puted mineral interest was held to have passed to the United
States. 168 Note that this case was decided prior to the North
Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Stetson v. Nelson.'6 9
In a subsequent and factually similar case, Winter v. United
States,170 the United States District-Court for North Dakota con-
cluded that its decision in United States v. McKenzie County '
7
and the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Stetson v. Nel-
son are factually distinguishable. Recall that in Stetson, the North
also Winter v. United States, 624 F. Supp. 38, 43 (D.N.D. 1985); Royse v. Easter Seal Society
for Crippled Children and Adults, Inc., of North Dakota, 256 N.W.2d 542, 545 (N.D. 1977);
cf. Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8, 9 (N.D. 1983).
163. 187 F. Supp. 470 (D.N.D. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Murray v. United States, 291 F.2d
161 (8th Cir. 1961).
164. McKenzie County had previously acquired the property for nonpayment of taxes.
When the County sold the land, it reserved 50 percent of the minerals. McKenzie County,
187 F. Supp. at 472.
165. Prior to this decision the North Dakota Supreme Court voided mineral
reservations made by counties with respect to lands acquired through tax forfeiture
proceedings. Adams County v. Smith, 74 N.D. 621,._, 23 N.W.2d 873, 874 (1946); Kershaw
v. Burleigh County, 77 N.D. 932, __, 47 N.W.2d 132, 136 (1951); Kopplin v. Burleigh
County, 77 N.D. 942,._, 47 N.W.2d 137, 140 (1951); State v. California Co., 79 N.D. 430,
56 N.W.2d 762, 763 (1953).
166. McKenzie County, 187 F. Supp. at 476. This conclusion was purportedly based on
North Dakota law. See id. at 474-75 (discussion and references to the North Dakota
statutes). Judge Register did acknowledge, however, that the North Dakota Supreme Court
had not yet ruled on this particular fact situation. Id. at 478.
167. Id. at 474. The conclusion that the United States was not estopped was based on
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution, which grants Congress
(not executive branch administrators) the sole authority to dispose of federal property. Id.
at 473.
168. McKenzie County, 187 F. Supp. at 478.
169. 118 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 1962).
170. 624 F. Supp. 38 (D.N.D. 1985) aff'd, 783 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1986).
171. 187 F. Supp. 470 (D.N.D. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Murray v. United States, 291 F.2d
161 (8th Cir. 1961).
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Dakota Supreme Court ruled that a mineral reservation in favor of
a third party was void, but effectively reserved the interest in the
grantor.17 2 In Winter, Judge Van Sickle concluded that the facts in
Stetson showed a clear intent to transfer the reserved interest to a
third party and to withhold such interest from the grantee.' 7 3 On
the other hand, in commenting on United States v. McKenzie
County, Judge Van Sickle concluded that the grantor did not
intend to transfer an interest to the county, but merely intended
to except a mineral interest from the warranty clause of the
deed. ' 7  Accordingly, Judge Van Sickle viewed the decision in
United States v. McKenzie County as consistent with North Dakota
law.
The North Dakota Supreme Court revisited this problem in
1983 in Mueller v. Stangeland.175 The court construed a provision
in a warranty deed which provided: "The Vendor excepts from
this Contract all minerals, including oil and gas, and all mineral
rights not now owned by the Vendor as disclosed by the records in
the office ofthe Register of Deeds of said County.' 76 The court
noted that its primary objective is to determine and effectuate the
grantor's intent; 77 as an aid in accomplishing this objective, the
court will apply rules of contract interpretation.' 78  Since the
above clause was part of the warranty clause, the court noted that
the use of the word "excepts" was most likely intended as an
exception to the warranty and not an exception from the grant.'7 9
The court, however, also concluded that the language was ambigu-
ous."' The court in Mueller construed the language against the
grantor,' 8 ' by noting that minerals were seldom reserved "prior to
the 1951 discovery of oil in North Dakota"' 2 and by referring to
172. Stetson v. Nelson, 118 N.W.2d 685, 687-88 (N.D. 1962).
173. Winter, 624 F. Supp. at 41-42.
174. Id. at 42.
175. 340 N.W.2d 450 (N.D. 1983).
176. Mueller v. Stangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450, 452 (N.D. 1983).
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-09-11; 9-07-02; 9-07-03; 9-07-04; 9-07-06; 9-07-
12; and 9-07-19). These sections provide rules of contract interpretation.
179. Id. at 452-53. In support of this construction, the court quoted from Royse v.
Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 542 (N.D. 1977):
"We believe exceptions or exclusions of property should be set forth in the granting clause
with the same prominence as the property granted, or, if placed elsewhere, should be so
explicit as to leave no room for doubt...." Mueller, 340 N.W.2d at 453 (quoting Royse, 256
N.W.2d at 545). In Royse, the court held that the phrase "excepting any rights of way... of
record" qualified the grantor's warranty and did not except from the grant the benefit of an
existing easement providing access to the conveyed property. Royse, 256 N.W.2d at 545.
180. Mueller, 340 N.W.2d at 453.
181. Id. at 454.
182. Id. The deed was dated 1944. Id. at 451.
19891 REAL ESTATE TITLES 29
testimony that the parties' only discussion of minerals concerned a
prior reservation by the state.'8 3 Therefore, the court concluded
that no minerals were excepted from the grant.' 84
Subsequently, in Stracka v. Peterson,'s5 the court construed
the following phrase in a special warranty deed dated 1946: "sub-
ject to the reservation of 50% of all oil or minerals."' 1 6 The facts
indicated that McKenzie County, in that same year, had previ-
ously reserved 50% of the oil and minerals in the same prop-
erty.'8 7 By reason of prior decisions, such county reservations are
void.' 8 8 The court approved the district court's findings that the
words "subject to" are generally construed as an exception to war-
ranty rather than as a reservation of an interest, and that their use
in this particular deed supported the general construction because
the phrase was nearly identical to the language of the prior county
reservation.18 9
The court rejected appellant's argument that, pursuant to
North Dakota Century Code section 47-09-13,190 the phrase was to
be construed in favor of the grantor. 191 The court reasoned that
the issue was "whether a reservation exists, not the interpretation
of a reservation.' 92 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
phrase should be construed against the grantor, since the grantor
had drafted it.' 93 The fact that the grantor had executed an oil and
gas lease in 1951 was not sufficient evidence of an intent to reserve
an interest.' 94 The court suggested that the grantor may have
183. Id. at 454.
184. Id.
185. 377 N.W.2d 580 (N.D. 1985).
186. Stracka v. Peterson, 377 N.W.2d 580, 581 (N.D. 1985).
187. Id.
188. See Adams County v. Smith, 74 N.D. 621, -, 23 N.W.2d 873, 878-79
(1946Xstatutory construction dictated that statute precluding reservations to counties
controls rather than statute allowing such reservations); Kopplin v. Burleigh County, 77
N.D. 942, __, 47 N.W.2d 137, 139-40 (195lXdeed attempting to reserve mineral rights to
county is void as to these rights); State v. California Co., 79 N.D. 430, _,56 N.W.2d 762, 763
(1953Xrule that deed cannot reserve mineral interests in a county is a rule of property and
under control of stare decisis doctrine); see also United States v. McKenzie County, 187 F.
Supp. 470, 472 (D.N.D. 1960Xunder North Dakota law, reservations of mineral rights to
counties are void), aff'd sub nom. Murray v. United States, 291 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1961);
Winter v. United States, 624 F. Supp. 38, 39 (D.N.D. 1985Xprior North Dakota decisions
have voided reservations of mineral interests to counties), aff'd, 783 F.2d 152 (8th Cir.
1986).
189. Stracka, 377 N.W.2d at 583.
190. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-13 (1978). Section 47-09-13 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides that, -[a] grant shall be interpreted in favor of the grantee, except
that a reservation in any grant ... is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor." Id.
191. Stracka, 377 N.W.2d at 583.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 9-07-19 (1987), 47-09-11 (1978)).
194. Id. at 583.
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believed that she acquired the 50% interest in minerals that
McKenzie County had unlawfully reserved.1 95 Finally, although
the phrase was not necessary as an exception to the warranty
because the grantor had used a special warranty deed, the court
nonetheless concluded that, "in view of all the considerations
"196 the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous.'97
Thus, the trial court's decision that the grantor retained no min-
eral rights was affirmed. 198
Later in the same year in which Stracka was decided, the
court in Monson v. Dwyer 19 9 construed the following clause which
immediately followed the property description in a deed dated
1959 from Roy Monson to Tim Dwyer:
[S]ubject to all reservations of record; and EXCEPTING
AND RESERVING unto the party of the first part, his
heirs, successors or assigns twenty-five (25%) per cent of
all right, title and interest in and to any and all oil, gas,
uranium, clay, gravel and other minerals in or under the
foregoing described lands, with such easement for
ingress, egress and use of the surface as may be incidental
or necessary for the use of said rights .... 200
Previously (1944), the Federal Land Bank had conveyed this same
property to Roy Monson, reserving a 25-year term interest in 50%
of the minerals. 21' In 1982, after the Bank's term interest had
expired, Roy Monson quitclaimed to Harvey Monson "only that
portion which was reserved and disclaimed by the Federal Land
Bank .... "22 This quitclaim deed further provided that Roy Mon-
son was to retain a 25% interest. 0 3 In the meantime, Dwyer had
executed oil and gas leases on the acreage released by the Federal
Land Bank with no claim having been made by Roy Monson. 20 4
The trial court concluded that Roy Monson held title to 25% of the
minerals, that Tim Dwyer held title to 75% of the minerals, and
that Harvey Monson held title to no minerals.20 5
195. Id.
196. Id. at 584.
197. Id. The court noted that at the trial court level no argument was made that
Friday didn't intend to reserve half of the minerals. Id. at n. 7.
198. Id.
199. 378 N.W.2d 865 (N.D. 1985).
200. Monson v. Dwyer, 378 N.W.2d 865, 866 (N.D. 1985) (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 865.
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In affirming the trial court's decision, the North Dakota
Supreme Court again concluded that the words "subject to" are
generally and, in this case, properly construed as a limitation on
the grantor's warranty, and not words of reservation.2 °6 The
placement of these words immediately following the property
description was not sufficient to alter their general construction.20 7
The court distinguished a Nebraska case which construed the
words "subject to" as words of reservation. 20  The supreme court
concluded that the context of the Nebraska case required a differ-
ent construction since there was no prior reservation of minerals
of record "to which the expression 'subject to' could refer .... 29
When Stracka and Monson are read together, one may be
tempted to conclude that the words "subject to" will be construed
as an exception to the warranty whenever there is a prior reserva-
tion of record to which the words can logically refer; if however,
there is no prior reservation of minerals, dicta in Monson suggests
that the words may constitute a reservation. 21 0 Such a conclusion,
however, is dangerous because the court will likely consider such
clauses ambiguous 21 1 and consider extraneous facts, such as testi-
mony concerning the transaction,2 1 2 evidence of custom, 21 3 evi-
dence of leasing activity by the various claimants,214 and perhaps
other factors. Also, if a grant is expressly made "subject to the res-
ervation of all oil and gas" and there is only a 50% oil and gas
interest outstanding, the court could properly conclude that the
grantor was excepting all oil and gas rights from the grant, not
merely qualifying a warranty. Finally, in the appropriate factual
setting, the court may consider whether the "subject to" language
expresses an intent to create a third-party reservation. 21 5
206. Id. (citing Stracka v. Peterson, 377 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (N.D. 1985)).
207. Id. at 867.
208. Bulger v. McCourt, 179 Neb. 316, -, 138 N.W.2d 18, 22 (1965). In Bulger, the
Nebraska Supreme Court held that the phrase, "subject to ONE-HALF OF ALL OIL AND
MINERAL RIGHTS" contained in the granting clause was a valid reservation of minerals.
Id. at -, 138 N.W.2d at 20.
209. Monson, 378 N.W.2d at 867.
210. Monson, 378 N.W.2d at 867 (discussing Bulger v. McCourt, 179 Neb. 316, 138
N.W.2d 18 (1965)).
211. See West v. Alpar Resources Inc., 298 N.W.2d 484, 490 (N.D. 1980) (cited in
Monson v. Dwyer, 378 N.W.2d 865, 867 (N.D. 1985)). The court in Alpar stated that an
ambiguity exists when a word can legitimately have more than one definition. Id. (citing
Kruger v. Soreide, 246 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 1976)).
212. Mueller v. Strangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450, 454 (N.D. 1983).
213. Id.
214. Monson, 378 N.W.2d at 866; Stracka, 377 N.W.2d at 583.
215. Cf. Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8, 9 (N.D. 1983); Stetson v. Nelson, 118
N.W.2d 685, 688 (N.D. 1962). In writing his opinion in Malloy, Chief Justice Erickstad
relied on Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientists, Pacifica, 7 Cal.3d 473, 498 P.2d 987,
102 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1972), wherein the California Supreme Court validated an easement
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These cases indicate the court's willingness to consider extra-
neous facts. Moreover, these cases indicate that extraneous facts
will be readily considered in cases like Malloy to determine
whether the grantor intended to make a third-party reservation.
Consideration of negotiations leading up to the transaction seems
justified provided both parties are alive and able to testify.216
Where only one of the parties is able to testify, however, testimony
concerning negotiations would invite perjury. Furthermore,
where neither party is able to testify, any oral testimony by pres-
ent claimants is likely to be hearsay, unreliable, and self-serving.
Consideration of custom is dubious. In Mueller the trial court
noted that few minerals were reserved prior to 1951; this fact was
used to bolster the court's conclusion that the language under con-
sideration was not intended as a reservation.217 Yet, the State of
North Dakota had made a mineral reservation on this same tract
in the early 1940s.211 While mineral reservations may have been
relatively uncommon in North Dakota prior to the discovery of oil,
that is not persuasive of the actual parties' intent in Mueller.
Evidence of leasing activity by the various claimants should
not be regarded as reliable evidence of a claim by the lessor; min-
eral developers will generally secure leases from all persons who
might conceivably have an interest in the subject property. The
developers' initial objective is to be certain that all possible claim-
ants are under lease. Accordingly, leases may be taken from per-
sons who do not believe they own any interest. Indeed, even the
developer/lessee may believe that the lessor does not own any
interest; however, where title is in doubt, the prudent developer
will choose to acquire a protection lease to guard against the possi-
bility that a court may recognize an interest in the lessor.
Moreover, evidence of leasing activity by one claimant with-
out objection by the other claimant should not be relevant. Per-
sons who claim a present interest in property have no duty to
periodically search the real estate records to protect themselves
from subsequently recorded claims. Yet, this may be the implica-
tion of Monson, where the court noted that the grantee had leased
reserved in favor of a third party. Id. at __, 498 P.2d at 988, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 740. The
language relied upon in Willard to create this "reservation" stated that the conveyance was
"subject to an easement. . . for the benefit of [third-party] church .. ." Id. at - 498 P.2d at
988, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 740 (emphasis added).
216. In Mueller, the trial court heard the testimony of only one of the parties because
the grantor was deceased. 340 N.W.2d at 452 (court indicates that the appellants were the
heirs of the grantor).
217. Mueller, 340 N.W.2d at 454.
218. Id. at 451-52.
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the acreage with "no claim made by" the grantor.219
These comments are not made to suggest that the results
reached in the above cases are wrong.220 The comments merely
underscore the likelihood that litigation will often be necessary to
determine the meaning of similar phrases because the court is
likely to conclude that the language is ambiguous and will there-
fore consider extraneous facts. When construed in light of extrane-
ous facts, the court may conclude that the language constitutes an
exception from the grant, an exception to the warranty, a reserva-
tion of a mineral interest in the grantor, or under Malloy, a valid
reservation in a third party.
221
In each of the above cases, the same result could have been
reached by simply construing the language within the four corners
of the instrument and by looking at the record title prior to the
transaction under consideration. If the court had so limited its
inquiries, title examiners could pass upon title in, at least, some
situations. However, given the court's willingness to consider a
variety of extraneous facts in such cases, title examiners will have
to secure stipulations of interest or recommend costly and time-
consuming actions to quiet title.
The above cases tie in to Malloy where the clause in question
refers to a third-party interest. In such cases, the court will have to
decide whether the clause in question was intended as a reserva-
tion or exception from the grant, or merely as an exception to the
219. Monson, 378 N.W.2d at 866.
220. The only troublesome result is the one in Mueller. Although the phrase in
question was within the warranty clause, a conclusion that the phrase was intended to be an
exception from the grant (reservation) is plausible. The grantor first acknowledges a prior
reservation by the State and then "excepts from this Contract all minerals, including oil and
gas, and all mineral rights not now owned by the Vendor as disclosed by the records in the
office of the Register of Deeds..." (emphasis supplied). Mueller, 340 N.W.2d at 451-52.
The facts indicate that this language "was typed in a blank space on the printed deed form."
Id. at 452. In other words, this blank space may have simply been a convenient place .to
type the phrase; thus, the clause's location may not indicate an intent to qualify only the
warranty. Moreover, if all that the grantor intended was an exception from the warranty,
the phrase could have been much shorter. Also, note that all of the minerals were excepted
from the "Contract," not merely from the warranty. Finally, the phrase, "excepts from this
Contract all minerals, including oil and gas, and all mineral rights not now owned by the
Vendor," could be construed as an intent to except from the grant all minerals, not just
those not owned by the grantor; indeed, there is no reason to except from the warranty
clause minerals that the grantor owns and intends to grant.
221. In Willard, the California Supreme Court, in dicta, distinguished a "reservation"
from an "exception:" "The effect of a reservation should be distinguished from an
exception, which prevents some part of the grantor's interest from passing to the grantee.
The exception cannot vest an interest in the third party, and the excepted interest remains
in the grantor." Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 7 Cal.3d 473, __, 498
P.2d 987, 989 n. 1, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1972). Since this distinction is not commonly made
by parties to a real estate transaction, this dicta is subject to the same criticism as the
common law rule that Willard rejected. Accordingly, this distinction is not commendable.
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warranty. In addition, the court will have to decide whether the
grantor intended to reserve an interest in a third party. Based on
the above cases, attorneys should expect that extraneous evidence
will be readily considered in resolving these questions. If the court
concludes that a reservation to a true stranger (a nonspouse) was
intended, the court will have to decide whether to follow Chief
Justice Erickstad's views as expressed in Malloy, or to revert to
Stetson v. Nelson.
Unfortunately, even if this last question is resolved, a case-by-
case approach, coupled with the court's willingness to consider
extraneous evidence will mean that title examiners will seldom be
able to pass title when confronted with such clauses. The authors,
however, hope that the North Dakota Supreme Court will recon-
sider its willingness to consider extraneous evidence so that title
examiners will be able to resolve most situations from a careful
examination of the record title.
D. DOROTHY'S LIFE ESTATE IN THE ENTIRE RESERVED
INTEREST
Recall that in Malloy, Clyde Boettcher, the sole owner of a
one-third interest in the property prior to the conveyance to his
daughter, Loretta Malloy, reserved a life estate to the "parties of
the first part," himself and his wife, Dorothy.2 2 Chief Justice
Erickstad's opinion framed the issue as "[w]hether or not, in a
deed of conveyance, a reservation of a life estate unto a third
party, who is a stranger to the title of the property, is effective to
convey the life estate to the third party. 223 Concluding that such
a reservation was indeed effective to convey a life estate interest
to Dorothy, Chief Justice Erickstad summarily held that, following
Clyde's death, "Dorothy possesses a life estate in the property
described in that deed. 22' Neither Chief Justice Erickstad nor
any of the specially concurring justices offer any explanation for
concluding that Dorothy possesses a life estate in the entire inter-
est reserved in the deed. There is no indication in the briefs or in
the opinions that suggests that this was considered to be an issue.
However, after resolving the threshold issue in favor of the third-
party "stranger," a second issue logically follows: what fraction of
222. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 8. The deed contained the following reservation clause:
"'RESERVING HOWEVER, to parties of the first part a life estate in the one-third ('/3)
interest hereby conveyed.'" Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 10.
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the property is subject to Dorothy's life estate interest following
Clyde's death - the full one-third or merely one-half of one-third?
At common-law, a conveyance or devise of property to a hus-
band and wife is presumed to create an estate by the entirety.
225
Tenancy by the entirety is a creature of the common-law created
by legal fiction, based wholly on the doctrine of unity of husband
and wife, the separate legal existence of the wife being merged
into that of the husband.2 26 Under this theory, the husband and
wife take the entire estate as a single entity with the right of survi-
vorship as an incident thereto.2 27 Thus, the estate conveyed is
held by the husband and wife together as long as they both live,
and upon the death of one, the entire estate belongs to the other
by virtue of the title originally vested.228 Thus, at common-law, if
the reservation in Malloy is viewed as a reconveyance by Loretta
to Clyde and Dorothy, a tenancy by the entirety would result; fol-
lowing Clyde's death, Dorothy would retain a -life estate in the
entire interest reserved in the deed. While many jurisdictions
continue to recognize the validity of the tenancy by the entirety,
North Dakota has never recognized this estate.229 Therefore, the
reservation of the life estate in Clyde and Dorothy Boettcher
could-not have created a tenancy by the entirety, thereby giving
Dorothy the entire estate upon Clyde's death. Consequently,
other possible grounds for the court's conclusion must be explored.
At English common-law, joint tenancies were favored over
tenancies in common.230 As a matter of law, where a deed con-
veyed property to two or more persons, the common-law pre-
sumed that the interest created in the grantees was that of a joint
225. See 2 H. TIFFANY & B. JONES, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 430 (3d ed.
1939Xtenancy by entireties arises under common law when husband and wife hold land
conveyed by a single instrument) [hereinafter H. TIFFANY & B. JONES].
226. See id. Tenancy by the entireties is essentially a form of joint tenancy modified by
common-law theory that husband and wife are one person. Id. Unlike joint tenancy, a
tenancy by the entireties is not subject to severance into a tenancy in common by one
spouse. Id.
227. Id. The most important incident of tenancy by the entirety is that the survivor of
the marriage, either husband or wife, is entitled to the whole of the estate. id. This right of
survivorship cannot be initially defeated by a conveyance by one spouse to a stranger nor
by a sale under execution against one spouse. Id.
228. Id. Of course, the estate may cease as a result of the dissolution of the marriage.
Id. at § 436.
229. See Renz v. Renz, 256 N.W.2d 883, 885 (N.D. 1977) (citing Schimke v. Karlstad, 87
S.D. 349, 208 N.W.2d 710 (1973), wherein the South Dakota Supreme Court stated that
tenancy by entireties did not exist in Dakota Territory). See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-
02-06 and -08 (1978) (providing for creation of joint tenancy and tenancy in common
interests, respectively).
230. 4A R.R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 602[1] (Bendere
ed. 1989) [hereinafter 4A R.R. POWELL & P. ROHAN].
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tenancy.231 In order to create a tenancy in common, the convey-
ance had to be specific and affirmatively provide language to con-
firm the grantor's intent to create a tenancy in common.
232
In'Malloy Clyde was the sole owner of the property prior to
the deed which reserved a life estate in the parties of the first part;
the language of this reservation failed to express any intention to
create any particular estate. 233 Thus, if the reservation is viewed
as a reconveyance by Loretta to Clyde and Dorothy, the deed
would have reserved the entire life estate interest in both Clyde
and Dorothy as joint tenants in accordance with the common-law
rule of construction favoring a joint tenancy. Following Clyde's
death, Dorothy would hold the entire life estate interest by virtue
of survivorship.
The modern policy of American law, however, is to disfavor
the creation of joint tenancy estates. 23 4 Indeed, North Dakota stat-
utory law abrogates the common-law presumption of joint tenancy
in favor of a presumption of tenancy in common.23 5 If this statu-
tory law were strictly applied, the reservation in the deed would
create life estates in Clyde and Dorothy as tenants in common; in
other words, each would have a life estate in an undivided one-
sixth interest of the property. 23 6 Thus, upon Clyde's death, osten-
sibly the ownership consisted of Dorothy's life estate interest of
one-sixth of the property subject to a vested remainder in Loretta,
with Clyde's one-sixth interest passing to Loretta in fee simple.
However, since the court did not reach this conclusion 2 3 1 further
231. 11 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 180 (Rees
Welsh & Co. 1897). The primary characteristic of joint tenancy is that upon the death of
one joint tenant, the other surviving joint tenant or tenants become vested with the entire
estate. 2 H. TIFFANY & B. JONES, supra note 225, at § 419.
232. 4A R.R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 230, at 602[1][2].
233. Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8, 8 (N.D. 1983).
234. See 2 H. TIFFANY & B. JONES, supra note 225, at § 427 (tendency of courts is to
construe co-ownership as creating a tenancy in common rather than a joint tenancy).
235. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-06 (1978). Section 47-02-06 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides: "A joint interest is one owned by several persons in equal shares
by a title created by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared in the will or transfer
to be a joint tenancy, or when granted or devised to executors or trustees as joint tenants."
Id. (emphasis added). See also id. § 47-02-08. Section 47-02-08 of the North Dakota Century
Code provides:
An interest in common is one owned by several persons not in joint ownership or
partnership. Every interest created in favor of several persons in their own right
is an interest in common, unless acquired by them in partnership for partnership
purposes, or unless declared in its creation to be a joint tenancy.
Id. (emphasis added).
236. The deed conveyed an undivided one-third interest in the property, thus,
Dorothy and Clyde would each have reserved a life estate interest in one-half of the one-
third interest conveyed, or an undivided one-sixth interest. See Malloy v. Boettcher, 334
N.W.2d 8, 8 (N.D. 1983).
237. Id. at 10.
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analysis is required.
Of particular interest is section 179 of the Field Code,2"'
adopted verbatim by the Dakota Territory Legislative Assembly in
1865. Section 179 provided that "[e]very interest created in favor
of several persons in their own right, including husband and wife,
is an interest in common, unless acquired by them in partnership,
for partnership purposes, or unless declared in its creation,
expressly or by necessary implication, to be a joint interest, with a
right of survivorship. ' 239  This statute clearly establishes a pre-
sumption favoring the creation of tenancies in common. Note,
however, that joint tenancy estates were still permissible in
instances where an intent to create them was manifested
"expressly or by necessary implication" at the time of creation of
the interest.24 °
The Dakota Territory Legislative Assembly amended this stat-
ute in 1877, five years after the California Legislature adopted a
modified Field Code in 1872, which included a modified version of
Field Code section 179.241 As a result of this amendment, the cur-
rent statute does not contain language allowing joint tenancies to
be created by "necessary implication;" the statute now requires an
express declaration in the transfer to create a joint tenancy
estate.242 The transfer in Malloy contained no express declaration
creating a joint tenancy in the reserved life estate.243 Thus, if Dor-
238. I.FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 179.
239. Laws of Dak. Terr. § 179 (Kingsbury 1865), currently codified as N.D. CENT.
CODE § 47-02-08 (1978).
240. Id. In an attempt to clarify the meaning attached to the phrase "necessary
implication," the drafters of the Field Code included an annotation to Coster v. Lorillard,
14 Wend. 264, 343 (N.Y. 1835). FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 179, annot. The court in
Coster was faced with the problem of construing a testator's devise to twelve heirs. Coster,
14 Wend. at 343. In concluding that the devise was intended to create a joint tenancy in
the heirs, the court found that although the will made no express reference to joint tenancy,
the context amply demonstrated that the testator had in fact intended to create such a
devise. Id. The court reasoned that since the instrument contained other language which,
upon a legal construction, necessarily created an estate in joint tenancy, the statutory
presumption favoring tenancy in common had been rebutted. Id. Thus, the court held that
the words joint tenancy need not be used in order to create the estate; any other expression
clearly importing such an intent was sufficient. Id.
241. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 686 (West 1903). In 1877, the Dakota Territory Legislative
Assembly modified portions of its 1865 civil code, including section 179; many of these
modifications conformed to the 1872 California Civil Code. See General Repealing Act,
1877 REVISED CODES OF THE TERRITORY OF DAKOTA 898 (1877); see also CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 683, 685, 686 (1872).
242. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-02-06 to -08 (1978). For the full text of the North
Dakota statutes, see supra note 235. These sections of the North Dakota 'Century Code
were derived from sections 683, 685 and 686 of the California Civil Code, which also
require an express declaration in the transfer to create a joint tenancy. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 683, 685, 686 (West 1982). For the full text of the original California statutes see infra
note 251.
243. Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8, 8 (N.D. 1983).
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othy's life estate interest is grounded in the assumption that Clyde
and Dorothy implicitly reserved a life estate in joint tenancy, such
a conclusion would be clearly contrary to North Dakota statutory
law, particularly in light of the foregoing legislative history. There-
fore, unless some other authority can be found in support of the
court's conclusion, the statute and the court's conclusion are irrec-
oncilable. When searching for other authority, however, one must
keep in mind another Field Code provision2 44 codified in North
Dakota: "there is no common-law in any case where the law is
declared by the code."-
245
One rule which may support the court's conclusion was dis-
cussed by the California Supreme Court in Green v. Brown,246 a
case factually similar to Malloy.247 In Green the plaintiff and his
wife had conveyed real property to the defendants, subject to a
reservation of a life estate in the grantors.248 The reservation
clause in the deed read: "Reserving and Excepting, however, a
Life Estate in the Grantors above named in all of the above
described property ... during the term of their natural lives."
249
Shortly thereafter the plaintiff's wife died, and in a declaratory
action, the trial court determined that under the terms of the deed
the wife's death had terminated her life estate in an undivided
one-half interest in the property, with the plaintiff retaining
an estate for his life in an undivided one-half interest in the
property.25 °
On appeal the California Supreme Court stated that the trial
court had erred in concluding that the reservation had created life
estates in tenancy in common; however, the supreme court did
acknowledge that the trial court's construction was predicated on
the statutory rule that a joint tenancy is created only when
expressly declared in the transfer.2 1 The court reasoned, how-
244. FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 6.
245. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-06 (1987).
246. 37 Cal. 2d 391, 232 P.2d 487 (1951).
247. Green v. Brown, 37 Cal. 2d 391, 232 P.2d 487 (1951); Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 8-9.
248. Green, 37 Cal. 2d at __, 232 P.2d at 489 (1951). Although the grantors had owned
the property as joint tenants, the court's analysis clearly demonstrated that this factor was
disregarded as having any bearing on the outcome.
249. Id. at -, 232 P.2d at 489.
250. Id. at -, 232 P.2d at 489.
251. Id. at -, 232 P.2d at 489. The court cited to CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE §§ 683,
686. Section 683 of the California Civil Code provides, in pertinent part:
A joint interest is one owned by two or more persons in equal shares, by a title
created by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared in the will or
transfer to be a joint tenancy, or by transfer from a sole owner to himself and
others, or from tenants in common to themselves, or to themselves and others, or
from a husband and wife when holding title as community property or otherwise
to themselves or to themselves and others when expressly declared in the
[Vol. 65:1
1989] REAL ESTATE TITLES 39
ever, that despite the presence of the statutory rule, other factors
had to be considered. 252 The court then proceeded to state a
"general rule" that "[a] gift to two or more persons for their lives is
ordinarily construed as creating an estate or estates to endure, not
so long as they are all alive, but until the death of the last survi-
vor." 25 3 Apparently interpreting the reservation of the life estate
unto the grantors to be analogous to a gift, the court applied the
above rule and concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to retain a
life estate in the entire property, notwithstanding the statutory
rule requiring joint tenancies to be expressly declared.25 4
transfer to be a joint tenancy, or when granted or devised to executors or
trustees as joint tenants.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 683 (Deering 1949) (emphasis added). When section 683 was enacted in
1872, it provided: "A joint interest is one owned by several persons in equal shares, by a
title created by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared in the will or transfer to be
a joint tenancy, or when granted or devised to executors or trustees as joint tenants." CAL.
CIV. CODE § 683 (Deering 1872). The 1872 version of section 683 is identical to section 47-
02-06 of the North Dakota Century Code. For the text of section 47-02-06 of the North
Dakota Century Code, see supra note 235. This language differs from the original Field
Code version which provides: "A joint interest is one owned by several persons in equal
shares, by a title created by a single will or transfer which confers a right of survivorship."
FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 176. The original version of the Field Code was enacted in
North Dakota in 1865. Laws of Dak. Terr. § 176 (1865).
Section 686 of the California Civil Code remains unchanged from its 1872 enactment
and provides: "Every interest created in favor of several persons in their own right is an
interest in common, unless acquired by them in partnership, for partnership purpose, or
unless declared in its creation to be a joint interest, as provided in Section 683, or unless
acquired as community property." CAL. CIv. CODE § 686 (Deering 1949) (emphasis added).
This is similar to the derivation contained in N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-08, supra note 235;
however, it differs from section 179 of the Field Code, which provides:
Every interest created in favor of several persons in their own right, including
husband and wife, is an interest in common, unless acquired by them in partner-
ship, for partnership purposes, or unless declared in its creation, expressly or by
necessary implication, to be a joint interest, with a right of survivorship.
FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 179.
Section 685 of the California Civil Code remains unchanged from its 1872 enactment
and provides: "An interest in common is one owned by several persons, not in joint owner-
ship or partnership." CAL. CIV. CODE § 685 (Deering 1949). Except for punctuation, this
provision is identical to the lead sentence of N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-08 (1978).
252. Green, 37 Cal.2d at -, 232 P.2d at 489.
253. Id. at -_, 232 P.2d at 489-90 (citing 1 H. TIFFANY & B. JONES, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY, § 49 (1939)).
254. Id. at -, 232 P.2d at 490. The court further noted that the language contained in
the deed supported the holding that a joint tenancy in the life estate had been reserved. Id.
at -, 232 P.2d at 490. Under the terms of the reservation, "[a] life estate [was] saved to
both grantors in all of the property and the right of enjoying the same (all of it) during the
term of 'their lives.'" Id. at -, 232 P.2d at 490. The court determined the words "their
lives" to be equivalent to the phrases "joint tenancy" or "to the survivor of them;" thus, the
lives of both grantors had to expire before any part of the use of the property was lost to
either of them. Id. at -, 232 P.2d at 490. The court found "[tihis construction [to be]
fortified by the statutory provision that reservations are 'to be interpreted in favor of the
grantor.'" Id. at -, 232 P.2d at 490 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1069 (Deering 1949)).
Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-13 (1978) providing that "[a] grant shall be interpreted
in favor of the grantee, except that a reservation in any grant, and every grant by a public
officer or body, as such, to a private party, is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor."
Green, 37 Cal.2d at -, 232 P.2d at 490 (emphasis added). See also FIELD CODE, supra note
33, at § 475. However, because the language employed in the reservation clause in Malloy
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The above "gift" rule could be applied to the facts of Malloy
to support the court's conclusion. Under the above rule, when
Clyde and Dorothy reserved the life estate interest in themselves,
they conceivably reserved a "gift" of the life estate interest to
themselves for the life of the survivor, or Loretta conceivably
reconveyed a gift of a life estate to Clyde and Dorothy for the life
of the survivor.255 Thus, the life estate in the entire reserved
interest would continue in existence for the benefit of Dorothy
until her death, at which time Loretta's vested remainder in fee
would become possessory.25 6 The court in Malloy, however, does
not set forth this rule and cites no prior decision as having done so.
In addition, this California authority may not be persuasive
because the California-modified Field Code does not provide that
"there is no common-law in any case where the law is declared ,by
the code," as does the North Dakota-modified Field Code.257
Another plausible rationale for the outcome in Malloy is the
application of the doctrine of implication of cross remainders for
life, a doctrine which is closely related to the construction of the
reservation as a gift. Cross remainders are defined as:
remainders limited after particular estates to two or more
persons... in several undivided shares in the same parcel
of land, in such way that on the determination of the par-
ticular estates in any of the ... undivided shares, they
remain over to the other grantees (or devises) and the
reversioner or ulterior remainder-man is not let in until
the determination of all the particular estates.25 8
Although cross remainders may be created by express provision in
the transfer, they may arise by implication in instances where the
grantor intends that the estate should pass as a whole to the fee
remainderman.2 5 9  Thus, where an interest in property is con-
is distinguishable, this portion of the opinion provides little authority on which to base the
conclusion in Malloy that Dorothy remained a life tenant in the entire reserved estate.
255. See Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8, 8 (N.D. 1983).
256. See 3 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 300 (1947).
257. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-06 (1987) (derived from FIELD CODE, supra note 33,
at § 6 (1865)).
258. Comment, Cross-remainders Arising from Devise to Two "During Their Lives", 11
MICH. L. REv. 474, 474 (1912) (quoting 1 Preston, Estates 94 (1828)).
259. 1 R. Niles & W. Walsh, Types of Freehold Possessory Estates and Their
Characteristics in, 1 AMERICAN LAW PROPERTY § 2.15, at 128 (1952). The doctrine of
implication of cross remainders was originally developed as a corollary to the general
presumption against intestacy. See 2 H. TIFFANY & B. JONES, supra note 225, at § 334. For
example, when a will is executed, a presumption arises that the testator intended to die
testate, and that he intended to dispose of his entire estate. See In re Paulson's Estate, 113
Colo. 373, __, 158 P.2d 186, 190 (1945). The presumption serves as a rule of construction,
implying cross remainders to prevent interests from reverting back into the estate as a
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veyed to named persons as tenants in common for their several
lives, and thereafter to fee remaindermen, the life tenants take
cross remainders for life, and the possession of the *property does
not pass to the fee remaindermen until the death of the last survi-
vor of the life tenants in common. This result is based upon the
presumed intent of the creator of these interests.26 ° Moreover, this
intention to vest the entire interest in the survivor cannot be frus-
trated, for cross remainder interests are indestructible by the acts
of one cotenant.261
The Restatement of Property26 2 addresses the doctrine of
implication of cross remainders for life, but rather than providing
clarification, it simply raises additional questions pertaining to the
rule's correct application. Section 115 provides, in pertinent part:
When an otherwise effective conveyance creates concur-
rent estates for life held as a tenancy in common, and also
creates a future estate limited to take effect on the death
of the survivor of the expressly designated life tenants,
then, in the absence of a manifestation of an inconsistent
intent, such conveyance also creates in favor of each such
life tenant a remainder estate for life in the share of each
other such life tenant, which remainder takes effect in
possession only if the first life tenant outlives the life ten-
ant as to whose share such remainder estate is created.26 3
The comments to this section, however, acknowledge that
"[w]hether the future estate is, or is not, 'limited to take effect on
the death of the survivor of the expressly designated life tenants,'
within the meaning of that phrase as used in this Section, presents
result of "gaps" which arise under the terms of a will. See 2 H. TIFFANY & B. JONES, supra
note 225, at § 334. While the implication of cross remainders is better established in the
context of devises and bequests, there is substantial authority recognizing implied cross
remainders as equally applicable to inter vivos conveyances. 1 R. Niles & W. Walsh,
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.15 (1952). See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 115,
comment a (1936); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-13 (1978) (providing rule of construction
against grantor where ambiguity exists). For the text of section 47-09-13 of the North
Dakota Century Code, see supra note 254.
260. 2 H. TIFFANY & B. JONES, supra note 225, at § 430.
261. 4A R.R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 230, at 602[8]; Durrant v. Hamrick,
409 So.2d 731, 738 (Ala. 1981). Accordingly, there is a great distinction between the
limitation of survivorship in joint tenancy and the limitation of survivorship when imposed
on a tenancy in common. Burns v. Nolette, 83 N.H. 489, -, 144 A. 848, 852 (1929). The
survivorship right in an estate in joint tenancy may be defeated at the pleasure of one joint
tenant by any act which severs the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common; in this case, the
survivorship right terminates. Id. at -, 144 A. at 852. However, when survivorship is
annexed to a tenancy in common, the limitation takes effect by virtue of the conveyance,
not by virtue of any characteristic inherent in joint tenancy, and may not be unilaterally
defeated by a covenant. Id. at -, 144 A. at 852.
262. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 115 (1936).
263. Id.
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a problem in construction."26 This comment suggests that the
language of the grant must indicate some intention to create survi-
vorship rights for cross remainders to be implied. For example,
such a conveyance may specifically provide: 0, owning Blackacre
in fee simple, transfers Blackacre "to A, B, and C as tenants in
common for life and upon the death of the survivor of A, B and C,
remainder to D."
If the grantor fails to incorporate this express language in the
transfer, the result is uncertain. A strict application of North
Dakota statutory law26 5 might result in the creation of life estates
as tenants in common of equal and undivided interests. As each
life tenant dies, that undivided interest passes to the remainder-
man. For instance, assume that 0, owning Blackacre in fee sim-
ple, transfers Blackacre "to A, B, and C as tenants in common for
life, remainder to D." A, B, and C will be deemed as holding life
estates as tenants in common in an undivided one-third interest
each. As each dies, their respective interests will pass to D in fee
simple.
On the other hand, if the general rule regarding the gift of a
life estate to two or more persons is applied,266 other ownership
schemes are possible. Under the usual construction, upon the
death of one life tenant, the entire life interest inures to the bene-
fit of the surviving life tenant grantee. Using the example in the
previous paragraph, if A and B predecease C, the entire life inter-
est would vest in C until C's death, at which time all of Blackacre
passes to D in fee simple. However, under an alternate construc-
tion, the heirs or devisees of a deceased life tenant in common
would succeed to an estate pur autre vie for the lives of the
remaining life tenants. Under this construction, if A dies, B and C
will each continue to hold their respective life estates, but A's heirs
or devisees will succeed to A's interest in Blackacre for a term
measured by the lives of B and C. The same will be true for the
heirs or devisees of the first of B or C to die. When the final mea-
264. Id. at comment c.
265. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-02-06, -08 (1972), supra note 235.
266. See 1 H. TIFFANY & B. JONES, supra note 225, at § 49, which states as follows:
A gift to two or more persons for their lives is ordinarily construed as
creating an estate or estates to endure, not so long only as they are all alive, but
until the death of the last survivor. And a gift to a person for the lives of himself
and another clearly creates an estate in his favor to endure until the death of the
survivor, the donee having an estate for his own life upon the death of such other
person, while if the donee is the first to die, the estate then assumes the
characteristics of an estate pur autre vie.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Green v. Brown, 37 Cal. 2d 391, -, 232 P.2d 487, 489-90
(1951) (discussed supra notes 246-54 and accompanying text).
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suring life ends, all of the interests pass to D, giving D Blackacre in
fee simple.
A final and perhaps preferable alternative is to allow cross
remainders to be implied even where the express survivor lan-
guage does not appear in the conveyance. The use of imperfect
language should not operate to thwart the reasonable and prob-
able intent of the grantor. While an in-depth discussion of the
basis for this proposition is beyond the scope of this article, there is
authority holding that a reservation by a husband and wife "for
their lifetimes," "for their natural lives," or the like was effective
to permit survivorship by implication.267 This would promote
public policy favoring a presumption against intestacy and give
force to statutory provisions recognizing that a reservation in a
grant is to be interpreted in favor of the probable intent of the
grantor.
268
North Dakota recognizes the validity of the creation of the
right of survivorship in tenants in common, and thus, perhaps the
creation of cross remainders by implication.269 Applying the doc-
trine of cross remainders to the facts in Malloy, the reservation
could be viewed as though Loretta had reconveyed a life estate to
Clyde and Dorothy for life as tenants in common, with a remain-
der (reversion) for life in the survivor, followed by a remainder
(reversion) to Loretta after the death of the survivor of Clyde and
Dorothy. Consequently, when Clyde died, Dorothy would have
continued to possess a life estate in the entire interest, a result con-
sistent with the conclusion stated by the court. While such a con-
struction is not specifically contemplated by existing statutory law,
this construction would not conflict with the statutory require-
ment that joint tenancies must be specifically created.
This discussion demonstrates that the construction of concur-
rent life estate interests in future cases is in doubt, notwithstand-
ing the North Dakota Supreme Court's abrupt conclusion in
267. See, e.g., Goff v. Davenport, 96 Ga. 423, -, 23 S.E. 395, 396 (1895Xintent of
husband and wife dictated that deed to son reserved a life estate in grantors and also right
of use to the survivor); Rollins v. Davis, 96 Ga. 393, -, 23 S.E. 392, 393 (1895Xlife estate
held by husband and wife for support during "their lifetime" precluded children from
taking property until death of both parents); Hall v. Meade, 224 Ky. 718, -, 51 S.W.2d 974,
976-77 (1932Xintent of grantor husband and wife manifested that reservation of life estate
included right of survivor to receive oil and gas royalties).
268. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-13 (1978); Corbett v. LaBere, 68 N.W.2d 211
(N.D. 1955Xintent of the parties in an oil and gas lease must clearly appear from the terms
of the assignment).
269. See First National Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. Green, 66 N.D. 160, -, 262 N.W.
596, 598-99 (1935Xcourt allowed creation of right of survivorship in tenants in common of a
bank account) (citing Burns v. Nolette, 83 N.H. 489, -, 144 A. 848, 852 (1929)).
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Malloy that Dorothy retained a life estate interest in the entire
property interest following Clyde's death.2 7 0 The parties and the
court in Malloy overlooked this important issue and the court
failed to set forth any rationale for its conclusion.2 1 Accordingly,
until this issue is specifically addressed by the court, title examin-
ers must take note of this issue when encountering concurrent life
estates that fail to specifically address survivorship. If stipulations
of interest cannot be secured, a title examiner will have little
choice but to recommend an action to quiet title.
II. WEHNER V SCHROEDER
A deed supersedes any conflicting terms in the contract for
sale and becomes the sole measure of the parties' respective rights
and liabilities. Upon the execution of a deed, a grantor may not
deny any matter asserted therein. These maxims, which respec-
tively state the doctrines of merger and estoppel by deed, were
relevant to two opinions by the North Dakota Supreme Court,
both titled Wehner v. Schroeder,2  which will be identified hereaf-
ter as "Wehner 1" (1983) and "Wehner II" (1984).273 The two
decisions raised substantial questions about whether a prospective
purchaser, who has no knowledge of extraneous facts giving rise to
270. Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8, 10 (N.D. 1983).
271. Id.
272. Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983) (Wehner I); Wehner v.
Schroeder, 354 N.W.2d 674 (N.D. 1984) (Wehner II).
273. The underlying facts of Wehner I and Wehner 11 are the same. Wehner I, 335
N.W.2d at 564-65; Wehner 11, 354 N.W.2d at 675-76. In 1950, grantors X (Wehners) entered
into a contract for deed with grantees Y (Schroeders) conveying Blackacre, reserving to
.'parties of the second part (Y)" 50% of the minerals. Wehner 1, 335 N.W.2d at 564; Wehner
11, 354 N.W.2d at 675. Subsequently, in 1950, X issued a warranty deed to Y conveying
Blackacre with no reservation of minerals. Wehner 1, 335 N.W.2d at 564; Wehner 11, 354
N.w.2d at 675. The warranty deed, on its face, was valid and effective; both the contract
and the deed were recorded. Wehner 1, 335 N.W.2d at 565; Wehner 11, 354 N.W.2d at 675.
Subsequently, third party purchasers (John and Eva Tormaschy) acquired title to Blackacre,
who later sold Blackacre to other third party purchasers (Z) (Albert and Genevieve
Tormaschy), the named defendants in possession of Blackacre. Wehner I, 335 N.W.2d at
565-65; Wehner 11, 354 N.W.2d at 675. Approximately 30 years after the delivery of the
warranty deed, the original grantor X sought to reform the warranty deed to include a
reservation in his favor of 50% of the minerals. Wehner 1, 335 N.W.2d at 565; Wehner II,
354 N.W.2d at 675-76. The third party purchasers (Z) sought to block reformation, arguing
that they (Z) were bona fide purchasers, denying mistake, and asserting various affirmative
defenses. Amended separate answer and counterclaim, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d
563 (N.D. 1983) (Civ. No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335
N.W.2d(5) at University of North Dakota Law Library). In Wehner I, the North Dakota
Supreme Court ruled that N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-04-17 did not bar reformation, holding in
part that the third party purchasers (Z) were not bona fide purchasers because they had
constructive notice of the discrepancy between the contract for deed and the subsequent
warranty deed. Wehner I, 335 N.W.2d at 565; Wehner 1H, 354 N.W.2d at 676-77. Thus the
decision rendered the doctrine of merger meaningless, at least in the context of the
prospective, third party purchasers (Z). The facts of Wehner I and Wehner f are discussed
in greater detail infra at notes 294-315 and accompanying text.
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actual or implied notice of an outstanding adverse claim, is enti-
tled to rely on record title. Furthermore, the decisions ignore the
doctrines of merger and estoppel by deed, 4 at least with respect
to prospective, third-party purchasers, and raise new concerns
about the viability of the doctrine of estoppel by deed. Specifi-
cally, this article focuses on these issues in light of the competing
interests of the bona fide purchaser and the parties to the prior
transaction who seek reformation.
North Dakota's real estate recording system 275 is commonly
characterized as a "race-notice" system. 6 Its primary purpose is
to protect the investment of a prospective, innocent purchaser -
commonly referred to as the "bona fide purchaser. ' 277 In order to
qualify as a bona fide purchaser, there must be a purchase for
value, made in good faith without actual or constructive notice of
any prior outstanding claim on the real estate.2 7 8  Further, the
bona fide purchaser must be without knowledge and notice of any
facts which would cause a prudent individual to inquire concern-
ing an adverse interest. 9
Traditionally, the bona fide purchaser has been a "favorite
child" under the law. 280 The bona fide purchaser's interests are
absolute and cut off all prior interest and title regardless of their
274. Wehner 11, 354 N.W.2d at 679 (doctrine of merger did not apply since mutual
mistake existed). The doctrine of "merger of title" contemplates that where a deed is
executed and delivered in full execution of a contract for sale of land, the provisions of the
contract generally are merged therein. Zimmer v. Bellon, 153 N.W.2d 757,761 (N.D. 1967)
(quoted by the court in Wehner II, 354 N.W.2d at 679). The estoppel by deed doctrine bars
a grantor from denying the transfer, of an interest asserted in the granting clause and
warranted in the warranty clause. Sibert v. Kubas, 357 N.W.2d 495, 497-98 (N.D. 1984).
275. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-01 (1978Xproviding for the recording of any
instruments affecting title or possession of real property). See Texaco Oil Co. v. Mosser, 299
N.W.2d 191, 194 (N.D. 1980) (a mineral interest is an interest in real property); Mar Win
Development Co. v. Wilson, 104 N.W.2d 369, 373 (N.D. 1960) (an oil and gas lease conveys
an interest in real property). Section 47-19-41 of the North Dakota Century Code provides
that recorded instruments shall constitute notice to all persons, in part, as follows: "Every
conveyance of real estate not recorded shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in
good faith, and for a valuable consideration, of the same real estate ... whose conveyance
... first is deposited with the property oflicer for record and subsequently recorded ..
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-41 (1978).
276. For a discussion of the different types of recording systems, see R. CUNNINGHAM,
W. STOEBUCK, & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.9 (L.ed. 1984).
277. Hunt Trust Estate v. Kiker, 269 N.W.2d 377, 381 (N.D. 1978). See also Burlington
Northern, Inc. v. Hall, 322 N.W.2d 233, 238 (N.D. 1982X"One who has knowledge of the
facts sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry with regard to the existence of an
unrecorded deed, and fails to make such inquiry, cannot claim protection as a bona fide
purchaser under the recording act.").
278. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Advance Realty Co., 78 N.W.2d 705, 714-15 (N.D.
1956).
279. Cress v. Evans, 1 Dakota 371, -, 46 N.W. 1132, 1134 (1877); City of Bismarck v.
Casey, 77 N.D. 295, -, 43 N.W.2d 372, 378 (1950).
280. 8 G. THOMPSON & J. GRIMES, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY, § 4312, at 363 (1963 Replacement)[hereinafter 8 G. THOMPSON & J. GRIMES].
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validity as between prior parties.281 This rule is grounded in a
strong public policy to keep land titles definite in order to protect
investment and encourage trade.2 s ' One authoritative commenta-
tor writes:
This involuntary loss'of rights results from the over-
whelming public policy of encouraging trade by guarding
buyers regardless of what individual legal rights may be
trampled in the dust. Since our civilization cannot live
without trade and since trade cannot exist without buyers
and since no buyer will pay adequate consideration unless
he is certain of receiving good title when he parts with his
consideration, such civilization must provide a means of
guaranteeing that he will receive an indefeasible title.
The "bona fide purchaser" rule is the result. If one is a
"bona fide purchaser" he takes good title. The sole ques-
tion is, is he a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice?
283
The necessary corollary to protecting the bona fide purchaser
is that prior unrecorded interests acquired from the seller are
absolutely cut off. In other words, once a purchaser qualifies as a
bona fide purchaser, his interest must be protected "regardless of
what individual legal rights may be trampled in the dust. ' 284 As
an example, where one qualifies as a bona fide purchaser, parties
to a prior transaction involving the same land are barred from
seeking to reform their transaction based on mutual mistake
where reformation would prejudice the rights of the bona fide
purchaser.28 5
In spite of the overwhelming public policy encouraging the
stability of land titles, protecting bona fide purchasers, and foster-
ing commerce, there is a disturbing trend, evidenced by the
Wehner decisions, in which the North Dakota Supreme Court
appears inclined to allow reformation between prior parties even
281. Id.
282. 8 G. THOMPSON & J. GRIMES, supra note 280, § 4312, at 363; see Crum, Five Steps
Toward Sounder Record Title, 32 N.D. L. REV. 223, 223-224 (1956Xone purpose of the
recording acts is to keep property freely alienable and in the stream of commerce).
283. 8 G. THOMPSON & J. GRIMES, supra note 280, § 4312, at 363.
284. Id.
285. Section 32-04-17 of the North Dakota Century Code governs reformation:
"When, through fraud or mutual mistake of the parties, or a mistake of one party which the
other at the time knew or suspected, a written contract does not truly express the intention
of the parties, it may be revised on the application of a party aggrieved so as to express that
intention so far as it can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in
good faith and for value." N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-04-17 (1976Xemphasis added).
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though the reformation prejudices the rights of subsequent pur-
chasers - purchasers that the authors believe should be afforded
the protective status of bona fide purchasers. The Wehner deci-
sions signal prospective purchasers of real property to lessen their
reliance on record title and on title doctrines that are not as sacred
as in the past.
The trend of not affording the bona fide purchaser adequate
protection was addressed in a recent North Dakota Law Review
article, "The Unreliable Record Title. '2 8 6 The article provides an
excellent analysis of the North Dakota case law dealing with the
bona fide purchaser. Essentially, the author of that article argues
that the North Dakota Supreme Court has moved from an attitude
of "strict construction" (objective analysis, favoring record title) to
an attitude of "open construction" (subjective analysis, favoring
unrecorded equitable claims).2 7 The discussion culminates with
Earth Builders, Inc. v. State28  wherein the court's "open con-
struction" was sharply criticized by Judge Garaas in his dissent. 28
9
The article concludes by arguing that "[o]pen construction effec-
tively emasculates the Recording Act."-
290
286. Stroup, The Unreliable Record Title, supra note 4.
287. Id. at 219. The author, Stroup, discussed Henniges v. Johnson, 9 N.D. 489, 84
N.W. 350 (1900) and Rolette County Bank v. Hanlyn, 48 N.D. 72, 183 N.W. 260 (1921) to
illustrate the court's previous attitude favoring "strict construction." Stroup, supra note 4,
at 219. Stroup then identified Pierce Township v. Ernie, 74 N.D. 16, 19 N.W.2d 755 (1945)
to signal the shift to an attitude of "open construction" wherein the intended purchaser
cannot rely on record title:
The court's analysis of the circumstances would be subjective, heavily favoring
the unrecorded equitable claim holder, notwithstanding his active participation
in the creation of the situation. In contrast to the relatively more stable situation
when the court applied strict construction, open construction invokes absolute
subjectivity in every case and the facts of each case become overwhelmingly
significant. The burden is on the party relying on the record to prove a negative
- that the facts do not negate his reliance on the record.
Id. at 219-20.
288. 325 N.W.2d 258 (N.D. 1982).
289. Earth Builders, Inc. v. State, 325 N.W.2d 258, 261 (N.D. 1982); Stroup, supra note
4, at 223-24. In Earth Builders, the defendant was charged with notice of an unrecorded
sand and gravel lease. 325 N.W.2d at 260. The finding was based on a statement by lessor
to defendant that the land had been leased, but that he thought it had expired. Id.
Although the surface to the lease area had been restored to agricultural purposes, the court
held that these circumstances were sufficient to "provoke a prudent person to make
inquiry .. ." Id. at 260. Judge Garaas (District Judge, sitting for Justice Paulson) issued the
following dissent:
The majority opinion works an injustice to innocent purchasers for value by
requiring them to defend their position against a previous lessee who refused to
record its lease. . . An intending purchaser should not have to travel throughout
the community and inquire of all the neighbors as to possible interests of third
persons. The majority opinion will place such burden on all future purchasers in
North Dakota.
Id. at 261 (Garaas, D.J., dissenting).
290. Stroup, supra note 4, at 224. The author suggests that the court readopt the
following as the correct statement of the law concerning protection of bona fide purchasers:
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This trend towards "open construction" continued in Wehner
I and Wehner II. It has disturbing implications for the real estate
and oil and gas industries which depend on stable and clear real
property titles. Real estate transactions should be cost and time
efficient. The decisions of the court, however, have the opposite
effect by encouraging reformation and other equitable litigation at
the expense of the third-party purchaser.
Justice Pederson, aware of the questionable course charted by
the court, issued a sharp dissent in Wehner J,291 wherein he points
to the direct consequences of failing to protect the bona fide pur-
chaser: "The majority opinion, in reversing the judgment, will dis-
turb the stability of both property law and contract law."'292 In
Wehner II he again dissents, correctly arguing that "life is going to
be less stable as a result of action by this court.
293
A. SUMMARY OF WEHNER I AND WEHNER H
Christ Wehner and Helen Wehner owned 100% of the sur-
face and oil, gas, and other minerals under Blackacre exclusive of
coal reserved to the United States by patent.29 4 In 1950 the
Wehners executed a contract for deed in which they agreed to sell
Blackacre to Frank and Barbara Schroeder.295 The contract for
deed, which was recorded, stated "[t]hat second parties
[Schroeders] retain 50% of all oil, gas, and minerals on said
land. "296
Later that same year, the Wehners executed a warranty deed
conveying Blackacre to the Schroeders; however, the warranty
deed contained no mineral reservation. 297 The Wehners asserted
Where the court is satisfied that the subsequent purchaser acted in bad faith, and
that he either had actual notice or might have had that notice had he not
willfully or negligently shut his eyes against those lights, which, with proper
observation, would have led him to knowledge, he must suffer the consequences
of his ignorance and be held to have had notice....
Id. at 225 (citing Trumbo v. Vernon, 22 N.D. 191, -, 133 N.W. 296, 298 (1911)).
291. Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563, 567 (N.D. 1983) (Wehner 1).
292. Id.
293. Wehner v. Schroeder, 354 N.W.2d 674, 679 (N.D. 1984) (Wehner 11).
294. Findings of Fact at 2, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983) (Civ. No.
10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at University of North
Dakota Law Library).
295. Wehner I1, 354 N.W.2d at 675.
296. Brief for Appellant at 3, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983) (Civ.
No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at University of
North Dakota Law Library). Appellant Wehner's brief indicates that the reservation in the
contract for deed "was also abstracted in the abstract, a copy of which was introduced into
evidence at trial." Id.
297. Wehner 1, 335 N.W.2d at 564; Wehner 11, 354 N.W.2d at 675.
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that they did not read the warranty deed which they executed. 298
Like the contract for deed, the warranty deed was duly
recorded.29 9
The Wehners also gave up possession to the property in
1950.300 In 1951 the Schroeders executed a mineral deed convey-
ing 50% of the mineral interest in Blackacre to a third party.301
There was no dispute as to the validity of this third-party
conveyance.30 2
In 1963 the Schroeders sold Blackacre to John and Eva
Tormaschy by warranty deed which contained no mineral reserva-
tion.30 3 The deed was recorded. 30 4 A few years later John and
Eva Tormaschy sold Blackacre to their son and his wife Albert and
Genevieve Tormaschy. 305 The purchase by Albert and Genevieve
Tormaschy occurred by three documents: (1) a contract for deed,
dated 1966, containing no mineral reservation, (2) a mineral deed,
dated 1966, conveying a one-half mineral interest, and (3) a war-
ranty deed, dated 1976, containing no mineral reservation. 30 6 All
three instruments were recorded.30 7
In 1978, 28 years after the Wehners deeded Blackacre to
Schroeders without having reserved any minerals in the deed, the
Wehners asserted title to 50% of the minerals at a time of renewed
oil and gas leasing activity. 30 8 The Wehners contended that they
298. Brief for Appellees at 3, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983XCiv.
No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at University of
North Dakota Law Library). Appellee Tormaschy's brief indicates that Helen Wehner
testified at trial that they did not read the documents (contract and deed) involved in the
Schroeder sale at the time that they were signed and that if she had read the same that she
would have noticed that the deed did not contain a mineral reservation. Id. (citations
omitted).
299. Wehner 1, 354 N.W.2d at 675.
300. Wehner 1, 335 N.w.2d at 564.
301. Id.
302. Brief for Appellee at 3, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983) (Civ.
No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at University of
North Dakota Law Library). Appellee Tormaschy's brief indicates that oil and gas leases
were executed by both the Wehners and the Schroeders. Id. at 3-4. Frank and Barbara
Schroeder executed a lease to R. V. Hodge, dated January 19, 1951, and recorded February
7, 1951. Id. at 3. The lease was not released until 1961. Id. The Wehners executed a lease
to Ed M. Catron, dated May 28, 1951, and recorded June 7, 1951. Id. at 4. These recorded
leases were not discussed in the supreme court decisions (Wehner I and Wehner II).
303. Wehner 1, 335 N.w.2d at 564.
304. Findings of Fact at 4, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983) (Civ. No.
10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at University of North
Dakota Law Library).
305. Wehner 1, 335 N.W.2d at 564.
306. Id. at 564-65.
307. Id.
308. Amended Complaint at 3, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983)
(Civ. No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at University
of North Dakota Law Library).
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did not discover this discrepancy between the contract and the
deed until 1978 when they checked the real estate records.3 0 9
Subsequently, in 1981, the Wehners commenced litigation
seeking to reform the warranty deed so as to quiet title to 50% of
the minerals in their name.31 u The Wehners argued that the par-
ties intended to include a 50% reservation of minerals in the 1950
warranty deed, but that the reservation was omitted as a result of a
mutual mistake of the parties.3 1 1 Accordingly, they demanded ref-
ormation pursuant to section 32-04-17 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code. 12 The complaint, as amended, alleged that the mistake
was not discovered until approximately three years before the
action was commenced. 13
The Tormaschys counterclaimed, seeking to bar reformation
by asserting their rights as bona fide purchasers and asserting title
to 50% of the minerals in their name.31 4 The amended answer of
the Tormaschys denied the mistake and asserted various affirma-
tive defenses, including statutes of limitation, estoppel, and
309. Appellant's Trial Brief at 3, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983)
(Civ. No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at University
of North Dakota Law Library).
310. Brief for Appellant at 5, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983) (Civ.
No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at University of
North Dakota Law Library). Appellant Wehner's brief describes the events immediately
prior to the commencement of the litigation:
Approximately three (3) years before this action was commenced, when there
was renewed interest in leasing oil and gas near the subject premises, and
immediately after an oil and gas lease was executed by Christ's brother on
property near the property which is the subject of this lawsuit, Christ and Helen
Wehner checked into this matter and discovered to their surprise and dismay
that the Warranty Deed from them to Schroeder's did not contain the mineral
reservation contained in the Contract for Deed.
Christ and Helen then went to see an attorney to inquire about correcting
the mistake. No litigation was commenced at that time, on the advice of their
then attorney. In 1980, after the decision in Ell v. Ell, 295 N.W.2d 143 (N.D.
1980), Christ and Helen contacted their present attorney and commenced this
litigation in which they sought to have the Warranty Deed in question reformed
and revised so as to express the true and actual agreement of parties and to
conform to the Contract for Deed, and to quiet title to 50% of the oil and gas in
them.
Id. at 4-5. In Ell v. Ell, a deed was reformed in an action between the original parties to the
deed; the facts indicate that a subsequent oil and gas lessee had actual notice of the mistake
in the deed and that one of the party's spouses, a joint tenant, was merely a donee. 295
N.W.2d at 147, 152.
311. Wehner v. Schroeder, 354 N.W.2d 674, 675-76 (N.D. 1984XWehner M).
312. Amended Complaint at 3, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983)
(Civ. No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at University
of North Dakota Law Library). N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-04-17 (1978). For the text of section
32-04-17 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 285.
313. Amended complaint at 3, Wehner I (Civ. No. 10329).
314. Amended Separate Answer and Counterclaim, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d
563 (N.D. 1983) (Civ. No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335
N.W.2d(5) at University of North Dakota Law Library).
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laches. 315
The trial court in Wehner I held that the Wehners' claim for
reformation was barred by the statute of limitations found in sec-
tion 28-01-04 s1' of the North Dakota Century Code and by section
32-04-17 of the North Dakota Century Code, which prohibits revi-
sion of a contract for fraud or mistake where the revision would
prejudice rights of bona fide purchasers.3 1 7 Accordingly, the trial
court dismissed the Wehners' complaint and entered judgment
quieting title to the 50% mineral interest in favor of the Tormas-
chys, against the claims of the Wehners.3 18
On appeal, the Wehners raised two issues: "Whether or not
the 1950 warranty deed can be reformed under section 32-04-17
of the N.D.C.C., and whether or not the Wehners' claim is barred
under any of the statutes of limitation.-
319
B. WEHNER I - ANALYSIS
1. Statutes of Limitation
Although the focus of this article is not on statutes of limita-
tion, the issue was of considerable importance in Wehner 1.320
315. Brief for Appellee at 1, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983) (Civ.
No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at University of
North Dakota Law Library). The Tormaschys stated in their brief that:
The Amended Answer of the Defendants, Albert and Genevieve Tormaschy,
dated December 1, 1981, puts the Plaintiffs to proof concerning the alleged
mistake and specifically denies the alleged mistake. Affirmative defenses of
estoppel, laches and the six, ten and twenty-year Statutes of Limitation are
raised by the Answer, including the provision of Chapter 47-19.1, N.D.C.C.
(Marketable Record Title Act). The Answer also includes a Counterclaim seeking
a judgment quieting title against the claims of the Plaintiffs.
Id.
316. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-04-17 (1976). Section 28-01-04 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides:
No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall be
maintained, unless the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, was seized
or possessed of the premises in question within twenty years before the
commencement of such action.
Id. (emphasis added).
317. Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563, 565 (N.D. 1983XWehner I); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-04-17 (1976).
318. Wehner 1, 335 N.W.2d at 565.
319. Id.
320. North Dakota Century Code section 28-01-04 was applied by the trial court in
Wehner I to bar suit. Id. at 566; N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-04 (1974). However, the
supreme court reversed, holding the statute of limitation inapplicable since neither party
was technically in possession of the minerals. Section 28-01-04 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides: "No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession
thereof shall be maintained, unless the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, was
seized or possessed of the premises in question within twenty years before the
commencement of such action." N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-04 (1974Xemphasis added).
Other statutes of limitation considered and rejected by the trial court included the
following: Section 28-01-05 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
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Therefore, the matter is briefly discussed herein.
The trial court ruled that the statute of limitation found in sec-
tion 28-01-04 of the North Dakota Century Code 321 was a bar to
the Wehners' cause of action.322 The ruling was based on the trial
court's finding that the Wehners were not seized or possessed of
the premises within twenty years prior to commencement of the
action.323 Section 28-01-04 of the North Dakota Century Code pro-
vides: "No action for the recovery of real property or for the pos-
session thereof shall be maintained, unless the plaintiff, his
ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, was seized or possessed of the
premises in question within twenty years before the commence-
ment of such action. ' 324  Ultimately, in Wehner I the North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision on this
issue, holding that section 28-01-04 of the North Dakota Century
Code 325 did not bar the Wehners' claim.326 The supreme court
No cause of action . . . founded upon the title to real property . . . shall be
effectual unless it appears that the person prosecuting the action ... was seized
or possessed of the premises in question within twenty years before the
committing of the act in respect to which such action is prosecuted or such
defense or counterclaim is made.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-05 (1974Xemphasis added). Section 47-19.1-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides:
Any person... who has an unbroken chain of title to any interest in real estate
by himself and his immediate or remote grantors under a deed of conveyance
[Wehner deed to Schroeder, November 1950] which has been recorded for a
period of twenty years or longer, and is in possession of such real estate, shall be
deemed to have a marketable record title to such interest....
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-01 (1978Xemphasis added).
The remaining two statutes to the limitations considered by the court were N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-01-15(2) (Supp. 1987) ind N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-16(1) (Supp. 1987). Section
28-01-15(2) of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
The following actions must be commenced within ten years after the claim for
relief has accrued: (2) An action upon a contract contained in any conveyance
or mortgage of an instrument affecting the title to real property except a cove-
nant of warranty, an action upon which must be commenced within ten years
after the final decision against the title of the covenantor....
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-15(2) (Supp. 1987). Section 28-01-16(1) of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code provides: "The following actions must be commenced within six years after the
claim for relief has accrued: (1) An action upon a contract, obligation or liability, express or
implied, subject to the provisions of sections 28-01-15 and 41-02-104." N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 28-01-16(1) (Supp. 1987).
In Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563, 567 (N.D. 1983XWehner I), the North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that these last two statutes of limi-
tation were not applicable, holding that the action did not accrue until the time when the"mistake forming the basis for reformation was discovered or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have been discovered." Id. In this case, the court held that the period for
the statute of limitation did not commence until 1978. Id.
321. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-04 (1974).
322. Wehner I, 335 N.W.2d at 566.
323. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment at 7, 10,
Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983) (Civ. No. 10329) (available in NORTH
DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at University of North Dakota Law Library).
324. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-04 (1974).
325. Id.
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first noted that possession was crucial. However, after noting the
inherent problems in possessing minerals, the court held that
neither Tormaschy nor Schroeder had possession of the minerals
prior to commencement of suit.327 Therefore, the court created
an exception to the statute of limitation, holding that where
neither party was in possession, the statute of limitation was not
applicable.328
Although Wehner I focused on the statute of limitation issue,
the case also dealt with the question of whether the Tormaschys
were bona fide purchasers who could bar the Wehners' claim for
reformation. 32 9 As is subsequently discussed herein, the supreme
court in Wehner I reversed the trial court on this issue, holding
that the Tormaschys had constructive notice of the Wehners'
adverse claim.330 Had the court held that the Tormaschys could
rely on the recorded warranty deed, they would then have had
constructive possession 331 and section 28-01-04 of the North
Dakota Century Code 33 2  could have effectively barred* the
Wehners' claim. Thus, the statute of limitation issue and the
"bona fide purchaser issue" are closely related.
326. Wehner 1, 335 N.W.2d at 566.
327. Id. The court discussed the possession of minerals issue as follows:
In the instant case, neither the Wehners nor the Tormaschys had actual or
constructive possession of the fifty percent mineral interest. They did not
engage in subsurface activity to acquire actual possession of the severed
minerals. See Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Hall, 322 N.W.2d 233, 241 (N.D.
1982). They did not have constructive possession because they had constructive
notice of the problems in the recorded documents involving the mineral interest
and, therefore, did not have the authority to exercise dominion over the mineral
interest. We believe the trial court incorrectly determined that the Tormaschys
had possession of the mineral interest at issue within the twenty years before the
commencement of this action. Neither the Wehners' nor the Tormaschys' claims
are barred by § 28-01-04, N.D.C[ent].C[ode].
Id.
328. Id. at 566-67. In creating the exception, the court seemed to find that section 28-
01-04 of the North Dakota Century Code did not adequately deal with severed mineral
interests. No doubt, had Schroeders physically removed minerals from the property, the
court would have held that they were in possession of the premises prior to commencement
of the suit. The authors believe that in such case, the statute of limitation found at section
28-01-04 would have effectively barred the Wehners' claim.
329. Wehner 1, 335 N.W.2d at 565.
330. Id.
331. In Wehner I, the court stated that possession, for purposes of section 28-01-04 of
the North Dakota Century Code could be either actual or constructive. Constructive
possession was defined as follows:
A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power
and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing,
either directly or through another person or persons is then in constructive
possession of it.
Wehner 1, 335 N.W.2d at 566 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)).
332. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-04 (1974). For the text of section 28-01-04 of the North
Dakota Century Code, see supra note 320.
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2. Protection of Bona Fide Purchaser
As indicated in the prior section, Wehner I dealt primarily
with the statute of limitation defense. However, the Tormaschys'
original pretrial brief refers to the issues of estoppel and laches3 33
Also, although the brief does not address the issue of "merger of
title '3 34 by name, that issue was arguably raised by the Tormas-
chys in the form of an estoppel argument to bar the Wehners'
claim for reformation. 3 5 Also, the issue of protection of the
Tormaschys as bona fide purchasers was raised in the Tormaschys'
Supplemental Pretrial Brief.3 3 6 These documents indicate that the
doctrines of estoppel, merger, and bona fide purchaser were at
issue at the original trial.
The trial court's "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order for Judgment" concludes in summary fashion that the
Tormaschys purchased the land in 1950 in good faith and for
value. 337 Although the trial court did not name the legal theory
upon which it relied, based on its rationale, the trial court appar-
ently relied either on the theory of "merger of title," or on both
333. Pretrial Brief of Defendants Tormaschy at 5, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d
563 (N.D. 1983) (Civ. No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335
N.W.2d(5) at University of North Dakota Law Library).
334. The doctrine of "merger of title" is discussed later in this paper. See infra notes
339-341 and accompanying text.
335. Pretrial Brief of Defendants Tormaschy at 11, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d
563 (N.D. 1983XCiv. No. 10329Xavailable in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335
N.W.2d(5) at University of North Dakota Law Library). In Tormaschys' Pre-trial Brief, the
merger of title" argument appears as follows:
Insofar as the record of the transaction is concerned, the delivery of the
warranty deed in November, 1950, to Frank Schroeder and Barbara Schroeder,
constituted a ratification of the transaction without reservation of mineral
interests upon which subsequent purchasers for value were entitled to rely. For
this reason alone the Plaintiffs are estopped at this time to come in and claim
interests which they had clearly conveyed by execution of the warranty deed in
1950, notwithstanding the ambiguous language of the contract for deed which
had been previously recorded.
Id.
336. Defendants' Supplemental Pretrial Brief at Appendix p. 54-55, Wehner v.
Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983) (Civ. No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA
BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at University of North Dakota Law Library).
337. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment at 8, Wehner v.
Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983) (Civ. No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA
BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at University of North Dakota Law Library). In the
Findings of Fact, the trial court noted that there was not evidence of bad faith or other
notice to Defendants Albert J. Tormaschy and Genevieve Tormaschy except for the
recorded instruments, which indicated only that a deed had been given in satisfaction of
the prior Contract for Deed under terms not explained by the recorded instruments. Id.
Thus, the court found that the conveyance was made in good faith and for value. Id. In its
Conclusions of Law, the trial court ruled that the action was barred by the statute of
limitation found at section 28-01-04 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. at 10. Further,
it ruled that reformation could not be granted since it would prejudice the rights of third
party purchasers who had acquired the property in good faith and for value. Id.
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"merger of title" and "estoppel by deed" 338 to bar the Wehners'
claim for reformation so as to protect the Tormaschys as bona fide
purchasers.
a. "Merger of Title"
In Wehner the merger doctrine could have been used to deny
the Wehners' suit. The doctrine of merger contemplates that
where a deed is executed and delivered in full execution of a con-
tract for sale of land, the provisions in the contract for sale are
generally merged therein.33 9  As typically applied, the merger
doctrine bars an action by the buyer under a contract for sale once
the deed has been issued. The merger doctrine is a rule of con-
struction which can be overcome in a reformation action between
the parties to the deed; however, the doctrine should govern
where rights of third parties are prejudiced.340 Therefore, upon
merger of the two instruments, third parties need not consider the
terms of the underlying contract for deed because it is superseded
by the deed. Had the court in Wehner applied the doctrine of
merger, the terms of the contract for deed which contained the
mineral reservation would have been superseded by the terms of
the deed which made no mention of the mineral reservation. In
other words, the deed would have controlled. After applying the
doctrine of merger, the only governing instrument in Wehner I
was a deed which, on its face, purported to grant fee simple title
without reservation.
341
338. See infra notes 347-370. As is subsequently discussed herein, the supreme court
in Wehner I remanded the case back to the trial court. Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d
563, 567 (N.D. 1983). In its memorandum decision on remand, the trial court did expressly
refer to the Doctrine of Merger. Memorandum Decision on Remand at 1, Wehner v.
Schroeder, 354 N.W.2d 674 (N.D. 1984) (No. 10637) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF
REPORTS, 354 N.W.2d(6) at University of North Dakota Law Library). There is also an
express reference to the doctrine of estoppel by deed. Id.
339. Zimmer v. Bellon, 153 N.W.2d 757, 761 (N.D. 1967); Tamm, Inc. v. Pildis, 249
N.W.2d 823, 836 (Iowa 1976).
340. See infra note 411 and accompanying text.
341. Wehner I, 335 N.W.2d at 564. This approach is analogous to that of Commissioner
Smedley in the seminal case of Duhig v. Peavey-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144
S.W.2d 878 (1940).
In Duhig, 0 conveyed Blackacre to A by warranty deed, reserving one-half of the
minerals. Id. at -, 144 S.W.2d at 878. At the time of the conveyance, 0 only owned the
surface and one-half the minerals. Id. at -, 144 S.W.2d at 878. The other one-half of the
minerals had been reserved by a prior grantor. Id. at -, 144 S.W.2d at 879. The Texas
Supreme Court held that A received the surface and one-half of the minerals and that 0
retained nothing. Id. at __, 144 S.W.2d at 881. The rationale of the court was that 0 had
purported to convey the surface and one-half of the minerals and had warranted that
conveyance; thus, 0 was estopped by the terms of his deed from denying what the deed
purported to convey and warrant. Id. at -, 144 S.W.2d at 878. Commissioner Smedley,
who wrote the opinion for the court, noted that he would have arrived at the same
conclusion by simply construing the deed; Smedley opined that the deed should be
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b. "Merger of Title" and "Estoppel by Deed"
As an alternate to using solely the doctrine of merger of title
to deny the Wehners' claim, the court could have based its deci-
sion on merger and estoppel by deed. Under estoppel by deed, a
grantor is barred from denying his warranty 42 which, in this case,
warranted fee simple title to the property.3 43 Therefore, notwith-
standing the Wehners' intent to reserve a mineral interest as
expressed in the underlying contract, the contract should have
been superseded (merged into) the deed. And since the Wehners'
deed warranted fee simple title, they should have been barred
(estopped) from denying their warranty.
344
On appeal in Wehner I the North Dakota Supreme Court,
without any discussion of the doctrines of merger or estoppel by
deed, reversed the trial court, holding that the Tormaschys had
constructive notice of the Wehners' adverse claim, and therefore
were not bona fide purchasers.345 The court does not specifically
clarify how the Tormaschys are charged with notice of a mistake in
the deed for which reformation will lie. Apparently, however, the
Tormaschys are charged with record notice of the discrepancy
between the recorded contract and the recorded deed, giving rise
to a duty to inquire about the discrepancy. Therefore, in failing to
inquire, the Tormaschys are charged with constructive notice of
the Wehners' mistake in failing to reserve mineral rights in the
deed and of their right to seek reformation.
Unfortunately, the supreme court overlooked the trial court's
apparent reliance on the doctrines of estoppel by deed and
merger as the basis for holding that the Tormaschys were, as a
matter of law, bona fide purchasers without constructive notice of
construed in accordance with the parties apparent intent - "to invest the grantee with
title to the surface and a one-half interest in the minerals, excepting or withholding from
the operation of the conveyance only the one-half interest theretofore reserved in the
[prior] deed .... Id. at -, 144 S.W.2d at 879-80. For a discussion of Duhig, see Maxwell,
Some Comments on North Dakota Oil and Gas Law - Three Cases from the Eighties, 58
N.D.L. REV. 431, 433 (1982).
342. For a discussion of estoppel by deed, see supra note 338. See 6A R. POWELL & P.
ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 927 at 84-114 (1989). ("[e]stoppel by deed serves
to preclude a party from denying the truth of his deed"). Estoppel by deed is often
discussed in relation to the concept of after-acquired title. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK
& D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.5, 745 (L. ed. 1984).
343. Warranty Deed at Appendix pp. 18-19, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563
(N.D. 1983XCiv. No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at
University of North Dakota Law Library). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-13"(1978) (grant
presumes fee simple title).
344. The majority of the court in Duhig used estoppel by deed. 135 Tex. at 507, 144
S.W.2d at 880.
345. Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563, 565 (N.D. 1983X Wehner I).
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the Wehners' adverse claim. 346  Under these doctrines, the
Tormaschys could have ignored the contents of the recorded con-
tract and simply relied on the deed warranting fee simple title to
the property. The supreme court's failure to discuss these doc-
trines suggests that the court may have decided the case on what it
believed to be the most equitable result without careful considera-
tion of merger and estoppel by deed.
Ironically, after ruling that the Tormaschys had constructive
notice of the Wehners' adverse claim, the court remanded the case
to the trial court to address the issue of estoppel.34 v From the
court's brief discussion 348 and its follow-up opinion in Wehner
1I,349 the court was referring to estoppel in pais,350 not estoppel by
deed. This is not the first time the court has failed to clearly distin-
guish these two doctrines.3 5 1 As subsequently recognized by the
trial court, the issue of estoppel in pais was moot due to the
supreme court's finding that the Tormaschys had constructive
notice of the Wehners' mineral interest by virtue of the contents
of the recorded contract.3 52 Based upon the supreme court's find-
ing, the trial court also concluded that any consideration of merger
and estoppel by deed was moot.35 3 On remand of Wehner I, the
trial court, under the heading of "Estoppel," commented on the
supreme court's opinion as follows:
On page 5 of the [Wehner I] opinion the supreme court
stated:
We believe Albert and Genevieve Tormaschy had
constructive notice of a possible claim by the
Wehners through recorded instruments and, as a
result, they are not third-party bona fide purchasers.
346. See text supra note 338. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for
Judgment at 8, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983) (Civ. No. 10329)
(available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.w.2d(5) at University of North Dakota
Law Library) ("deed had been given in satisfaction of the requirements of a previously
recorded contract...").
347. Wehner 1, 335 N.W.2d at 567.
348. Id.
349. Wehner 11, 354 N.W.2d at 677.
350. Id. (citing Gjerstadengen v. Hartzell, 9 N.D. 268, 275-76, 83 N.W. 230, 232 (1900).
Estoppel in pais arises out of a person's statement of fact, silence or omissions, rather than
from a deed or written contract. See R.G. Patton, Other Methods of Acquiring Title to
Land, in 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.18 (1952).
351. See Gilbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144, 148 (N.D. 198lXgrantor not estopped
from asserting interest due to constructive knowledge by grantee even though deed. did not
grant or reserve the interest).
352. Memorandum Decision on Remand at 11, Wehner v. Schroeder, 354 N.W.2d 674
(N.D. 1984) (Civ. No. 10637Xavailable in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 354 N.W.2d(6) at
University of North Dakota Law Library).
353. Id. at 1-2.
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This finding pretty well strips Defendants of any equities.
It makes the doctrine of merger as argued by Defendants
inapplicable. I do not agree with the supreme court's
opinion on the matter of notice, but, am obligated to fol-
low it. 3 54
The supreme court's decision to remand Wehner I for consid-
eration of estoppel arguments is difficult to understand since the
court had already held that the Tormaschys had constructive
notice of an adverse claim. However, the decision was based in
part on the court's prior rejection of the concept of estoppel by
deed in favor of estoppel in pais in Gilbertson v. Charlson.35 The
distinction between the doctrines of estoppel by deed and estop-
pel in pais will be discussed further in the analysis of Wehner 11.356
In Gilbertson,357 the court rejected the estoppel by deed doc-
trine, which previously had been adopted in Kadrmas v.
Sauvageau.358 Ironically, later in the same year in which Wehner
354. Id. at 1.
355. 301 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1981) (distinguished by Sibert v. Kubas, 357 N.W.2d 495,
497-98 (N.D. 1984)). Gilbertson's discussion of estoppel in pais was cited in Wehner 11.
Gilbertson is analyzed in the following articles: Maxwell, supra note 341; Edin,
Examination of Title to North Dakota Fee Lands, The Law of Oil and Gas in North Dakota
(I.ED. 1983); Comments, Conveyances of Fractional Mineral Interests: North Dakota
Supreme Court Repudiates the Duhig Rule, Gilbertson v. Charlson, 17 TULSA L.J. 117, 127-
28 (1981). For a general discussion of the problems relating to conveyances and
reservations of fractional mineral interests, see 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, Oil and Gas
Law, §§ 308-319 (1988).
356. See infra notes 371-387 and accompanying text.
357. Gilbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1981).
358. 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971). In Kadrmas, 0 conveyed Blackacre to A by
warranty deed, "excepting and reserving" one-half of the minerals. Id. at 754. At the time
of this conveyance, 0 only owned the surface and one-half of the minerals because the state
had previously reserved the other one-half. Id. In a dispute over title to the minerals, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that 0 retained no interest in the minerals. Id. at 756.
In so ruling, the court applied the doctrine of estoppel by deed as was in the seminal case of
Duhig v. Peavey-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940); since 0 had
purported to convey the surface and one-half of the minerals and had warranted such
conveyance, 0 was estopped to deny the contents of the deed. Id.
Gilbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1981), which rejected the doctrine of
estoppel by deed, concerned the following facts:
1. State conveyed Blackacre by warranty deed to Thorlackson, reserving 5% of
the minerals. This deed was duly recorded. Gilbertson, 301 N.W.2d at 145.
2. Thorlackson died intestate and Blackacre descended to his children, Louise,
Pauline, and Paul in equal shares. Each child then owned an undivided 31
and 2/3% mineral interest. Id.
3. Louise and Paul joined together and conveyed Blackacre by warranty deed
to Pauline, reserving 50% of all the minerals. No reference was made to the
5% mineral interest owned by the state or the 31 and 2/3% mineral interest
already owned by Pauline, the grantee. Id.
The plaintiffs, Pauline's successor in interest, brought an action to quiet title to 81 and
2/3% of the minerals under Blackacre. Id. at 145-46. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants, the successors in interest to Louise and Paul (Pauline's
grantors). Id.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that Louise and Paul warranted title to a full 50% of
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I was decided, the court readopted the doctrine of estoppel by
deed in Sibert v. Kubas.359 However, subsequently in McLaughlin
v. Lambourn,6 ° the court again cited Gilbertson to support the
the minerals, and that they should be estopped from asserting anything to the contrary. Id.
at 146. The plaintiffs relied on the doctrine of estoppel by deed, previously adopted by the
court in Kadrmas. Id.; Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971).
The court first distinguished Gilbertson from its earlier Kadrmas ruling by noting that
there was no assertion in Kadrmas that the grantee had either direct or constructive knowl-
edge of the outstanding mineral interest. Gilbertson, 301 N.W.2d at 147-48. In Gilbertson
the grantee (Pauline) had at least constructive knowledge of the duly recorded 5% mineral
interest owned by the State and actual knowledge of the 31 and 2/3% interest already
vested in herself. Id. at 148.
The court then inexplicably stated that the doctrine of estoppel in pais (equitable
estoppel) "as applied to the title of realty," is the standard by which it would determine
whether the grantors in the present case should be estopped from claiming an interest in
the minerals. Id. at 147. This was a dramatic shift from the doctrine of estoppel by deed
which was applied in Kadrmas. Kadrraas, 188 N.W.2d at 756. The court in Gilbertson held
that the requirements of equitable estoppel were not met because the grantee (Pauline)
had knowledge of the outstanding mineral interests. Gilbertson, 301 N.W.2d at 148. This,
then precluded any finding of estoppel and the court ruled in favor of the successors in
interest to Louise and Paul (Pauline's grantors). The successors in interest to Pauline were
also estopped from claiming an additional interest because they were regarded as having
constructive (record) notice of the prior mineral reservations. Id. at 148. The state of the
resulting title was as follows: 5% outstanding with the State; 50% reserved by X and Y
(successors to Louise and Paul); and 45% vested with Z (successor to Pauline).
359. 357 N.W.2d 495 (N.D. 1984). Sibert concerned facts nearly identical to Kadrmas.
In Sibert, the supreme court reaffirmed the doctrine of estoppel by deed and limited
Gilbertson to its facts (the decision in Wehner II was dated July 27, 1984). The court in
Sibert left open the door to the application of equity, stating:
It is significant to note that in this case no party sought to reform the deed based
on alleged mutual mistake, fraud, or other ground. Consequently, this opinion in
no way operates to preclude, in a reformation case, the proper introduction of
extrinsic evidence relevant to the reformation claim. See, Ell v. Ell, 295 N.W.2d
143 (N.D. 1980).
Sibert v. Kubas, 357 N.W.2d 495, 499 (N.D. 1984).
360. 359 N.W.2d 370 (N.D. 1985). In McLaughlin, Mr. and Mrs. 0 contracted to sell
Blackacre to A by general warranty deed. McLaughlin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W.2d 370, 371
(N.D. 1985). At the time of this contract for deed (1950), 0 did not own Blackacre. Id.
However, 12 days later, Mr. and Mrs. 0 acquired Blackacre from X subject. to the
reservation of '/2 of the minerals in X. Id. Two years later, X quitclaimed the minerals in
Blackacre to Mr. and Mrs. 0. Id. Thus, in 1952, Mr. and Mrs. 0 owned all of Blackacre,
subject to A's contract for deed. Id. In 1955, Mr. and Mrs. 0 conveyed to B, subject to A's
contract for deed. Id. In 1960, A made the final payment on the contract for deed and B
conveyed Blackacre to A by warranty deed that contained no reservation of mineral rights.
Id. at 372. Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. 0 died and through respective deeds of distribution,
transferred a 1/2 interest in the minerals to C. Id. In a title dispute over '/2 of the minerals
between C and A, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that C was estopped from
claiming the minerals. Id. The court purported to apply the doctrine of estoppel by deed,
but really applied estoppel in pais. Id. C argued that A was not entitled to rely on estoppel
because A was not destitute of all knowledge of the true state of Mr. and Mrs. O's title
because, at the time of the contract, A had constructive notice that Mr. and Mrs. 0 had no
title. Id. at 374. The supreme court, however, correctly noted that A was entitled to
assume that Mr. and Mrs. 0 would obtain and convey fee simple title to A in accordance
with their contract which called for a warranty deed. Id. at 374. In this case, the court
would have reached the same result had it actually applied estoppel by deed. Under
estoppel by deed, C would be estopped from denying the contents and warranty in the
deed that his predecessors (Mr. and Mrs. 0) had given A, through B, in accordance with the
contract.
When McLaughlin and the Wehner cases are compared, the cases are distinguishable
in a strange way. In McLaughlin, A was entitled to assume that Mr. and Mrs. 0 would
obtain and then convey fee simple title at a time when they had no actual or record title. In
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application of traditional estoppel in pais requirements to a real
property conveyance.3 6 1 Thus, given the court's continuing confu-
sion of estoppel by deed and estoppel in pais, it is not surprising
that the court's remand of Wehner I is difficult to understand.
Although the court did not specifically address the issue of why the
Tormaschys were not entitled to rely solely on the recorded war-
ranty deed, the court did set out the general rules governing the
reformation of contracts under section 32-04-17 of the North
Dakota Century Code and the protection to be afforded bona fide
purchasers.36 2
The court then analyzed whether the Tormaschys were "bona
fide purchasers":
"To become a bona fide purchaser one must have
acquired title without notice, actual or constructive, of
another's rights and also must have paid value for the
same. "363
See Ell v. Ell, 295 N.W.2d 143, 153 (N.D. 1980); Annot.,
79 A.L.R.2d 1180. The deed at issue in the instant case
can be reformed only if the rights of third persons,
acquired in good faith and for value, are not prejudiced.
The trial court found that Albert and Genevieve
Tormaschy are such third-party bona fide purchasers and
that the reformation sought by the Wehners would preju-
dice their rights. We disagree with the trial judge's deter-
mination that the Tormaschys acquired the mineral
interest "in good faith," i.e., without actual or construc-
tive notice of the Wehners' claim.
the Wehner cases, the Tormaschys were not entitled to rely on the Schroeders" title (an
actual and record title based on a warranty deed from the Wehners), because a pre-
recorded contract was inconsistent with the terms of the Wehners' warranty deed to the
Schroeders. In other words, in McLaughlin, A was not estopped where his predecessors
had no title, but the Tormaschys were estopped in the Wehner cases because their
predecessors had actual title that was partially inconsistent with the underlying contract for
sale!
361. McLaughlin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W.2d 370, 372 (N.D. 1985).
362. Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d at 563, 565 (N.D. 1983XWehner1); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-04-17 (1976). Section 32-04-17 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
When, through fraud or mutual mistake of the parties, or a mistake of one party
which the other at the time knew or suspected, a written contract does not truly
express the intention of the parties, it may be revised on the application of a
party aggrieved so as to express that intention so far as it can be done without
prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in good faith and for value.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-04-17 (1976Xemphasis added).
363. Wehner 1, 335 N.W.2d at 565 (quoting Sieger v. Standard Oil Co., 155 Cal. App.
2d 649, -, 318 P.2d 479, 484 (1957Xemphasis added) in which a California court




In Sickler v. Pope, 326 N.W.2d 86, 95 (N.D. 1982), we
stated that "[a] person dealing with real property is
charged with notice of properly recorded instruments
affecting title." In the instant case the contract for deed
and the warranty deed were recorded in 1950. A search
of the title abstract should have disclosed the discrepancy
between the two instruments executed by the Wehners
and the Schroeders. A title examination should have
made the Tormaschys aware of the potential problem and
caused them to investigate further.364
Prior to Wehner I, title examiners might have relied on the
doctrine of merger or on the doctrines of merger and estoppel by
deed to make the subsequently issued warranty deed the control-
ling instrument, regardless of its content. However, such reliance
is now imprudent.
To conclude this section, the North Dakota Supreme Court in
Wehner I reversed the trial court; holding that the statutes of limi-
tation were not applicable and that the Tormaschys were not bona
fide purchasers.3 65 . The supreme court remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings as follows:
The trial judge did not make any findings or conclusions
regarding whether or not a mutual mistake was made
364. Wehner 1, 335 N.W.2d 565. Other statutes related to the protection of third-party
purchasers for value without notice are as follows:
1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-20 (1987):
A valuable consideration means a thing of value parted with, or a new obligation
assumed at the time of obtaining a thing, which is a substantial compensation for
that which is obtained thereby. It also is called simply "value."
Id.
2. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-21 (1987):
Good faith shall consist in an honest intention to abstain from taking any uncon-
scientious advantage of another even through the forms of technicalities of law,
together with an absence of all information or belief of facts which would render
the transaction unconscientious.
Id.
3. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-23 (1987):
Actual notice shall consist in express information of a fact.
Id.
4. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-24 (1987):
Constructive notice means notice imputed by the law to a person not having
actual notice.
Id.
5. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-25 (1987):
Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent
man upon inquiry as to a particular fact and who omits to make such inquiry
with reasonable diligence is deemed to have constructive notice of the fact itself.
365. Wehner I, 355 N.W.2d at 566.
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upon which reformation should be based because he
incorrectly determined that the Wehners' action was
barred. The trial judge also did not make any findings or
conclusions regarding the affirmative defenses of estoppel
and laches raised by the Tormaschys. Therefore, we must
reverse and remand for a determination of whether or
not the doctrines of estoppel or laches bar the Wehners'
action, and, if not, whether or not the 1950 deed should
be reformed on the basis of mutual mistake.
366
The court incorrectly states that the trial court did not make
any findings or conclusions regarding the issue of estoppel. The
trial court's holding requires that the Tormaschys were entitled to
rely on the warranty deed.367 As previously indicated, the trial
court's rationale for this holding implies that it was based on
merger of title and estoppel by deed. On this basis, the trial
court ultimately found that the Tormaschys were bona fide pur-
chasers entitled to bar the Wehners' suit for reformation. 69
Admittedly, the issues would have been clearer had the trial court
expressly identified the doctrine upon which it relied.
In Wehner I Justice Pederson dissented, arguing that "[t]he
majority opinion, in reversing the judgment, will disturb the stabil-
ity of both property law and contract law."'370  The authors
endorse these sentiments; however, Justice Pederson's dissent is
weak because he does not rely on the doctrines of merger or estop-
pel by deed to support his view. In short, like the majority opin-
ion, Justice Pederson's dissent is based upon his view that finding
for the Tormaschys is the equitable result.
C. WEHNER II- ANALYSIS
On remand, the trial court allowed reformation on grounds of
366. Id. at 567.
367. Id. at 565.
368. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
370. Wehner 1, 335 N.W.2d at 567. Justice Pederson's dissent reads as follows:
The judgment should be affirmed. If there are some missing, necessary or
desirable findings of fact or conclusions of law, the remedy is found in Rule 35(b),
NDRAppP, to wit: remand for that purpose.
The majority opinion in reversing the judgment, will disturb the stability of both prop-
erty law and contract law. A party to a contract who has affirmatively performed in a man-
ner that is inconsistent with an insignificant provision (at that time before oil was
discovered) of the contract and waits 28 years to recognize the difference and 31 years to
ask that he be allowed to do it over, does not have the law on his side.
To imply that Tormaschy had constructive notice in 1963 that what Wehner did in
1950 was a mistake, but that Wehner did not have notice until 1978 or 1981, appears to me
to be a distortion. Id. at 567.
[Vol. 65:1
1989] REAL ESTATE TITLES
mistake, thus quieting title to an undivided 50% of the minerals in
Wehner.
On appeal, in Wehner II, the North Dakota Supreme Court
addressed the following issues: (1) whether laches should have
barred reformation; (2) whether the Wehners should have been
estopped from seeking reformation; and (3) whether the Wehners
and Schroeders had made a mutual mistake, thus entitling them to
reformation of the warranty deed.3
1. Laches
The supreme court held that the action accrued in 1978 when
the Wehners allegedly discovered the mistake.372 Having found
that nothing occurred to prejudice Tormaschys' interest from
1978 to 1981, the trial court ruled that laches did not bar reforma-
tion.3 73 The North Dakota Supreme Court thus affirmed the trial




The Tormaschys raised the same estoppel arguments which
they previously raised in Wehner I. However, as noted by the trial
court, this argument was futile, since, in Wehner I, the supreme
371. Wehner v. Schroeder, 354 N.W.2d 674, 676 (N.D. 1984) (Wehner II).
372. Id.
373. Id. at 677.
374. Id.
375. Wehner II, 354 N.W.2d at 676. The court relied on the following rules governing
the equitable doctrine of laches:
1) Laches does not arise from a delay or lapse of time alone, but is such a delay in
enforcing one's right as to work a disadvantage to another. Simons v. Tancre,
321 N.W.2d 495 (N.D. 1982); Frandson v. Casey, 73 N.W.2d 436, 446 (N.D.
1955).
Id.
2) Laches is an equitable doctrine, and as such, cases involving laches must stand
or fall on their own facts and circumstances. Burlington Northern, Inc. v,.
Hall, 322 N.W.2d 233, 242 (N.D. 1982); Strom v. Giske, 68 N.W.2d 838, 845
(N.D. 1954).
Id.
3) [I]n addition to the time element, the party against whom laches is sought to
be invoked must be actually or presumptively aware of his rights and must fail
to assert them against a party who in good faith permitted his position to
become so changed that he could not be restored to his former state. E.g.,
Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Hall, 322 N.W.2d 233, 242 (N.D.: 1982); Adams v.
Little Missouri Minerals Association, 143 N.W.2d 659, 667 (N.D. 1966).
Id. at 676-77.
4) [T]he general rule is that "laches do not commence to run against an action
for reformation of an instrument, until the fraud or mistake had been or
ought to have been discovered." Annot., 106 A.L.R. 1338, 1345 (1937).
Id. at 677.
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court had already ruled that the Tormaschys had constructive
notice of the Wehners' interest.3 76 Thus, an estoppel argument
was essentially moot. Nonetheless, the Tormaschys specifically
argued that the doctrine of estoppel by deed should be applicable:
Generally, estoppel by deed is based upon equitable con-
siderations. In other words, it rests upon the inequity of
allowing the party estopped from asserting a contrary
position. The principle is that when a man has entered
into a solemn engagement by deed, he shall not be per-
mitted to deny any matter which he has asserted therein,
for a deed is a solemn act to any part of which the law
gives effect as the deliberate admission of the maker; to
him it stands for truth, and in every situation in which he
may be placed with respect to it, it is true as to him. It has
been stated that it is a mistake to liken an estoppel by
deed to an estoppel in pais.
377
The supreme court, however, ignored this argument, and
instead applied "estoppel in pais," more commonly known as
equitable estoppel.37s In North Dakota the elements of equitable
estoppel are:
1) [T]he party making the admission by his declaration or conduct
was apprised of the true state of his own title;...
2) [T]hat he made the admission with the express intention to
deceive or with such careless and culpable negligence as to
amount to constructive fraud;. 380
3) [T]he other party was not only destitute of all knowledge of the
true state of the title, but of the means of acquiring such
knowledge;...38
4) [T]hat he relied directly upon such admission and will be
injured by allowing its truth to be disproved; [and] ...
5) There must be some degree of turpitude in the conduct of the
party before a court of equity will estop him from the assertion
376. Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563, 566 (N.D. 1983X Wehner I).
377. Brief for Appellant at 23-24, Wehner v. Schroeder, 354 N.W.2d 674 (N.D. 1984)
(Civ. No. 10637Xquoting 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 4 at 603) (available in
NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS at University of North Dakota Law LibraryXemphasis
added).
378. Wehner I1, 354 N.W.2d 677 (citing Gjerstadengen v. Hartzell, 9 N.D. 268, -, 83
N.W. 230, 232 (1900)).
379. Id. at -, 83 N.W. at 232.
380. Id. at -, 83 N.W. at 232.
381. Id. at -, 83 N.W. at 232.
382. Id. at __ 83 N.W. at 232.
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of his title; ... 383
In ruling that the Wehners were not estopped, the supreme
court simply referred back to its decision in Wehner I where it
held that an examination of the recorded contract for deed would
have made the Tormaschys aware of a potential problem. 84 Thus,
the court held that the Tormaschys were not destitute of the
means of acquiring knowledge of the Wehners' adverse claim. 8
This illustrates that the estoppel issue should have been a thresh-
old question in Wehner L Raising the question in Wehner II makes
little sense when, as a practical matter, the answer had already
been given in Wehner L
As previously indicated, the ruling is not surprising in light of
the supreme court's apparent abandonment of the doctrine of
estoppel by deed in Gilbertson v. Charlson,386 a supreme court
decision which has generated considerable concern by title exam-
iners in North Dakota.3 7 The Gilbertson decision adopted equita-
ble estoppel and rejected estoppel by deed which previously had
been adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Kadrmas v.
Sauvageau.388
Although the Kadrmas decision was discussed in Tormaschys'
appellate brief, it was not mentioned by the supreme court in
Welner II. Also, Gilbertson received only passing comment by
the court.38
9
3. Mutual Mistake (Including Doctrine of Merger of Title)
Upon remand, the trial court determined that a mutual mis-
take had occurred and, therefore, ordered reformation. 9 0 On
appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
the following described elements of reformation had been met:
A court of equity will grant relief by way of reformation
of a written instrument, resulting from a mutual mistake,
when justice and conscience so dictate. The party seek-
ing reformation has the burden of proving that the writ-
383. Id. at -' 83 N.W. at 232.
384. Id. at -, 83 N.W. at 232.
385. Id. at __, 83 N.W. at 232.
386. 301 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 198lXdistinguished by Sibert v. Kubas, 357 N.W.2d 576
(N.D. 1984)).
387. Gilbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1981); see supra note 354 and
accompanying text.
388. Gilbertson, 301 N.W.2d at 148; Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D.
1971).
389. Wehner 11, 354 N.W.2d at 677.
390. Id. at 676.
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ten instrument does not accurately state what the parties
intended with evidence that is clear, satisfactory, specific,
and convincing that there was a mutual mistake of fact.
Each case must be determined on its own particular facts
and circumstances and the court can take into considera-
tion all facts which disclose the intention of the parties.
We will not reverse a trial court's finding that the evi-
dence of mutual mistake was clear, convincing, persua-
sive, and compelling, unless it is clearly erroneous. 391
The supreme court also held that the Wehners' failure to read the
warranty deed did not bar them from seeking reformation.392 In
so ruling, the court noted that the trial court had not erred when it
noted in its "memorandum opinion that the Wehners' negligence
in not reading the deed before they signed it 'did not rise to a high
degree because one is entitled to rely on the product of an
attorney.' -393
Finally, the court addressed the applicability of the doctrine
391. Id. at 678 (citations omitted).
392. Id. at 678-79 (citing 66 Am. Jur. 2d Reformation of Instruments §§ 83, 84 and 85
(1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157 comment b (1981); Annotation,
Negligence in Executing Contract as Affecting Right to Have it Reformed, 81 A.L.R. 2d 7,
§ 12, 13 (1962 & Later Case Service).
393. Wehner v. Schroeder, 354 N.W.2d 674, 679 (N.D. 1984XWehner 11). The court
stated:
It has also been stated that "[w]here the parties entrust to an attorney or
scrivener the duty of preparing a deed or other document in accord with their
agreement, and he, by his own mistake or fraud, embodies in it stipulations and
conditions other than those agreed upon, the party against whom it is sought to
be enforced may have it reformed, although he signed it without reading it." 66
Am. Jur. 2d Reformation of Instruments § 85 (1973). -
We believe that in order to bar reformation under these particular
circumstances, the fault of the party requesting relief must amount "to a failure
to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealings."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157 (1981). The trial court applied
this test and noted in its memorandum opinion that the Wehners' negligence in
not reading the deed before they signed it did "not rise to a high degree because
one is entitled to rely on the product of an attorney."
Id. See 6A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 230, 901[3], at 81A-164 (courts seem to be
in agreement that even though a person does not read the deed this does not deny that
person the right to reformation). But cf Rink v. NPN, Inc., 419 N.W.2d 194, 195 (N.D.
1988Xbuyer's failure to read a retail installment contract deprived him of any recovery on
the basis of mistake of fact).
The appellate record, as limited to the appellate briefs and appendices (containing trial
briefs, and trial court decisions), is silent on whether the attorney in this case was a mere
scrivener or acted as attorney on behalf of either the Wehners or the Schroeders. This
question, however, probably is immaterial. The more important question is whether the
result would be different where the parties to a transaction draft the document without
benefit of counsel. The answer probably is no, in light of the court's broad initial comment:
"Generally the negligent failure of the complaining party to read an instrument before
signing it does not, in itself, bar reformation." Wehner 11, 354 N.W.2d at 678 (citations
omitted).
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of merger of title.394 The court recognized that the doctrine gen-
erally provides that all prior agreements and negotiations are
merged in the subsequent deed which governs the rights of the
parties to the transaction. 395 The Tormaschy brief states the issue
as follows:
We contend that Tormaschy and no title examiner exam-
iniig the abstract of title or the original records recorded
in the office of the Register of Deeds, would look further
than the deed between Wehners and Schroeders for a
complete and final determination of the intent of the par-
ties to that transaction and the state of the title unless the
original parties in the transaction (Wehners and
Schroeders) had done something to indicate to
Tormaschy that the title was not accurately presented by
the recorded warranty deed into which the ambiguous
contract for deed was merged. 96
The supreme court, however, rejected the argument, holding
that the doctrine of merger is not applicable where mistake has
occurred. Quoting from Zimmer v. Bellon,397 the court stated:
As a general rule * * * a deed made in full execution of a
contract of sale of land merges the provisions of the con-
tract therein, and this rule extends to and includes all
prior negotiations and agreements leading up to the exe-
cution of the deed, all prior proposals and stipulations,
and oral agreements, including promises made contem-
poraneously with the execution of the deed. * * * Accord-
ingly, although the terms of preliminary agreements may
vary from those contained in the deed, the deed alone
must be looked to for determination of the rights of the
parties, in absence of fraud or mistake. ** *398
The above rule states that the doctrine of merger applies
when determining the rights of the "parties," in the absence of
mistake. Presumably, this refers to parties to the underlying trans-
action. There is no dispute that "merger of title" is not applicable
394. • Wehner 11, 354 N.W.2d at 679.
395. Id. at 679. See generally 6A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 230, 901[1][d]
at 81A-157 and 8A G. THOMPSON & J. GRIMES, supra note 280, § 4458 at 331.
396. Brief for Appellant at 15, Wehner v. Schroeder, 354 N.W.2d 674 (N.D. 1984) (Civ.
No. 10637Xavailable in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 354 N.W.2d(6) at University of
North Dakota Law Library).
397. 153 N.W.2d 757 (N.D. 1967).
398. Wehner 11, 354 N.W.2d at 679 (quoting Zimmer v. Bellon, 153 N.W.2d 757, 761
(N.D. 1967) which cited 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 91c, p. 842Xemphasis added).
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as to the original seller and purchaser where a mutual mistake has
occurred. However, this does not address the question of. how
"merger of title" affects the rights of prospective, third-party pur-
chasers who have no notice other than what appears of record -
in this case, a recorded contract that under the merger doctrine
has been superseded by a warranty deed. Obviously, the court's
ruling implies that the status of such a purchaser does not affect
application of merger of title; however, the court's discussion does
little to shed light on the rationale behind the decision.
As was the case with estoppel, the merger question should
have been resolved in Wehner I as a threshold issue in determin-
ing whether the Tormaschys had notice. When the supreme court
first ruled that the Tormaschys had constructive notice of the
adverse claim, the trial court concluded that the merger argument
was moot.399 Perhaps if merger had been addressed in Wehner I,
the issue would have been discussed more completely with regard
to its affect on third-party purchasers.
The doctrine of merger of title by its very nature contem-
plates that the provisions of a given contract for deed may well
vary from the terms of a subsequent deed issued in satisfaction of
the contract. The deed generally is "deemed to be an executed
contract modifying the former executory contract of sale." 40 0 The
doctrine is considered to be a rule of contract construction, 40 1 and
generally evidence of contradictory earlier agreements cannot be
introduced to vary the terms of the deed.40 2 Thus, the controlling
instrument is the deed. When coupled with the traditional view of
estoppel by deed (that is, that the grantor cannot deny the truth of
399. Memorandum Decision on Remand p. 1, Wehner v. Schroeder, 354 N.W.2d 674
(N.D. 1984) (Civ. No. 10637) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 354 N.W.2d(6)
at University of North Dakota Law Library). For the trial court's statement that Wehner I
made the estoppel by deed and merger of title arguments moot, see text supra at note 354.
400. 8A G. THOMPSON & J. GRIMES, supra note 280, § 4458, at 332.
401. 6A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 342, § 901[1][d], at 81A-157.
402. See supra note 339 and accompanying text; see also Annotation, Deed as
Superseding or Merging Provisions ofAntecedent Contract Imposing Obligations Upon the
Vendor, 38 A.L.R.2d 1310, 1319-20 (1954). The annotation author summarized the
common law as follows:
As already noted, the presumption that the deed is the final contract is slight
where the deed is silent as to covenants contained in the antecedent contract of
sale. A much stronger presumption, said by some courts to be virtually
conclusive, appears to arise where the deed, although it contradicts or is
inconsistent with the provisions of the contract, covers the same subject matter.
In such a case, undoubtedly by analogy with the rule that makes a writing
conclusive or prior oral agreements covering the same matter, the view appears
to be that extrinsic evidence will not be permitted to vary or contradict the final
contract of the parties as expressed by the deed." [Citation omitted.]
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any material fact asserted in his own deed), the doctrine supports a
conclusion that the deed in Wehner should not have been
reformed.
In the instant case, the Tormaschys had notice only of a dis-
crepancy between the recorded contract for deed and the war-
ranty deed. The discrepancy was the presence of a mineral
reservation in the contract and its absence in the deed. Other
than what appeared of record, there was no notice of any adverse
claim. Moreover, the deed's granting and warranty clauses
directly contradicted the alleged reservation of minerals in the
contract for deed. As such, the Tormaschys should have been able
to presume that all prior agreements had been merged in the war-
ranty deed. In other words, merger of title should have been con-
sidered the rule of construction by which the Tormaschys would
have judged the underlying transaction, and by which the court, in
turn, should have judged the Tormaschys' actions to determine
whether they qualified as innocent, bona fide purchasers. Query:
whether the court would reform a deed that contained a mineral
reservation, where the underlying contract does not?
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of direct authority to support
the proposition that merger of title should be applied to protect a
third-party purchaser where there in fact has been a mistake in
the underlying transaction. In fact, the cases relied upon by the
Tormaschys in their Wehner II appellate brief offered little, if any,
support for this proposition.4 °3 Thus, in spite of the authors' argu-
403. The cases cited by the Tormaschys in their Wehner 11 appellate brief do not
appear to support this proposition. See, e.g., Tamm, Inc. v. Pildis, 249 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa
1976). In Tamm, the vendor Hunt owned a parcel of land, lot 3, which he subdivided into
the North Half and the South Half. Id. at 826-27. In 1952, vendor Hunt entered into a
contract for deed to sell the South Half to vendee Smith. Id. at 826. The contract for deed,
which was duly recorded, contained a reservation of an easement. Id. In 1955, Smith sold
the South Half to vendee McCuen by quit claim deed. Id. In 1965 vendor Hunt executed a
warranty deed conveying Whiteacre to McCuen in full and complete satisfaction of the
terms of the contract for deed. Id. The warranty deed contained no easement reservation.
Id. Subsequently, in 1965, McCuen conveyed the South Half to vendee Pildis by warranty
deed. Id.
After selling the South Half, vendor Hunt continued to operate the North Half until
1956, when he conveyed it to vendee Johnston. Id. at 826-27. The conveyance was made
by a warranty deed conveying all of the North Half "with the appurtenances." Id. at 827.
In 1968, Johnston conveyed the North Half to vendee Tamm, Inc., "together with any
easements and servient estates thereto... " Id.
Tamm, Inc. brought an equitable action against Pildis to enforce the easement
reflected in the original, recorded contract for deed to Smith. Id. at 825-26. Although the
court ultimately upheld the easement as an implied easement, it refused to find an
easement by grant. Id. at 837-38. In so ruling, the court held that the contract for deed was
merged into the deed and that the "latter is entirely controlling." Id. at 836. The court
relied on a prior Iowa decision entitled Phelan v. Peeters, 260 Iowa 1359, 152 N.W.2d 601
(1967), in which it stated: "The broad rule is that a contract to convey land presumptively
becomes merged in the subsequent deed executed in performance thereof and that the
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ments that merger should have been applied to bar reformation in
Wehner, the supreme court may have properly refused to apply
the doctrine of merger if there was in fact a mistake in the under-
lying transaction.4 °4 However, even if merger is not applicable,
the doctrine of estoppel by deed, as previously discussed, could
have been applied to bar reformation. And if merger is not appli-
cable in Wehner because of a "mistake" in the underlying transac-
tion, one must question whether there was sufficient evidence to
support a finding of mistake.
In Wehner, the vendees to the underlying transaction, Frank
and Barbara Schroeder, were deceased by the time suit was
filed.4 °5 Thus, the only direct evidence concerning whether a
mutual mistake had been made came from two sources. First, the
Wehners, the parties seeking reformation, were allowed to give
self-serving testimony.4 °s Second, Nick Schroeder, the son of
Frank and Barbara Schroeder, testified through a deposition
admitted into evidence that although he wasn't present at the
deed speaks and the contract is silent as to all matters of conflict between them." Tamm,
249 N.W.2d at 836 (quoting Phelan v. Peeters, 260 Iowa 1359, -, 152 N.W.2d 601, 602-03
(1967).
In Tamm, the court acknowledged that there are many qualifications to the doctrine of
merger. Id. Although the issue of mistake in the underlying transaction was not expressly
discussed, evidence was allowed, over a parole evidence objection, to assist in the
interpretation of the language involved. (Evidence offered to attempt to add contractual
language was disallowed.) Id. at 835. Finally, after the court ruled that this doctrine of
merger applied to bar enforcement of the easement, it stated: "[t]here is the additional fact
plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption the contract did in fact merge into the deed." Id.
at 837. This statement does appear to support the North Dakota Supreme Court's refusal to
apply the doctrine of merger in the Wehner decisions.
Dicta in a recent case arising in Texas, however, suggests that the doctrine of merger of
title should be applied strictly. See Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1988). In
Alvarado, 0 had received title to Blackacre, subject to the reservation of one-half of the
minerals. Id. at 47. Bolton subdivided Blackacre into 26 lots, conveying certain tracts to
Alvarado and others. Id. The contracts for sale provided that Bolton would deliver to the
purchasers a general warranty deed to the premises free and clear of all encumbrances;
however, the warranty deeds specifically reserved one-half of all minerals to Bolton and
were made "subject to all outstanding mineral interests." Id. at 47. Under the deeds, the
grantees would have received no minerals. Id. A bare majority of the Texas Supreme
Court allowed reformation of the deeds to eliminate the mineral reservation under the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Id. at 48 (relying on TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.41-.826 (Vernon 1987). However, the majority acknowledged that reformation would
have been barred under common law by the doctrine of merger. Id. at 48. Four dissenting
justices would have barred reformation by applying the doctrine of merger under the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act and at common law. Id. at 48-49. This case was litigated by
the original parties to the deeds, not subsequent purchasers. While the Alvarado discussion
may represent an extreme view of the doctrine of merger, the Wehner cases would seem to
represent the .other extreme.
404. But see Lathem v. Richey, 772 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (grantor's
drafting error is unilateral mistake and not grounds for reformation of deed even between
the original parties).
405. Deposition of Nick Schroeder at p. 7, Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563 (N.D.
1983) (Civ. No. 10329) (available in NORTH DAKOTA BRIEF REPORTS, 335 N.W.2d(5) at the
University of North Dakota Law Library).
406. Wehner MI, 354 N.W.2d at 678.
REAL ESTATE TITLES
transaction, he recalled that his father told him that the Wehners
retained 50 percent of the mineral rights.4 °7 The statement was
supposedly made to Nick Schroeder at about the time of the sale of
the property to John Tormaschy.40 8 The testimony of Nick
Schroeder was allowed over a hearsay objection by the Tormas-
chys' counsel.40 9
The testimony of key witnesses, the vendees in the underlying
transaction, was unavailable since both parties were deceased.
Thus, the case was decided based primarily on the Wehners' self-
serving testimony and the testimony of Nick Schroeder, who was
not even present when the underlying transaction took place,
more than thirty years before the claim for reformation was made.
Aside from the issues of merger and estoppel by deed, one must
question whether such testimony should be regarded as reliable
and sufficient to reform a deed.4 10
Self-serving and hearsay evidence does not rise to the level of
"clear and convincing proof." In reformation cases, it is possible
that the terms of agreements might be substantially altered prior
to the recording of the deed. For instance, parties might cut side
deals with the purposeful intent of eliminating mineral reserva-
tions, easements, etc. More money may be paid at the last minute
in return for eliminating the mineral reservation. On occasion,
parties will change their minds in the time between signing the
contract and recording the deed. Such possibilities are what the
doctrine of merger was intended to address.
However, even if the intent of the parties was accomplished
by reformation in Wehner, deciding cases on the basis of such rela-
tively one-sided testimony about the parties' intent may do a gross
injustice in other cases. Moreover, there is no guarantee that a
case-by-case approach will lead to ultimate decisions accurately
reflecting the parties' intent. These problems and possibilities pro-
vide a basis for courts to rely solely on the recorded instruments to
determine the parties' intent.
While the court achieved what it undoubtedly perceived to be
the most equitable result in the instant case, it failed to consider
the broader ramifications of the decisions with respect to the sta-
bility of record title. The effect of the Wehner I and Wehner II is to
407. Id.
408. See deposition, supra note 405, at 17.
409. Id. at 5.
410. The burden of proof required of those seeking to reform an instrument as a result
of mutual mistake is by "clear, satisfactory, specific and convincing evidence .. " Oliver-
Mercer Electric Coop., Inc. v. Fisher, 146 N.W.2d 346, 357 (N.D. 1966).
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reduce certainty and to promote litigation, causing inefficiency in
real estate transactions both in time and cost. As indicated at the
outset of this article, this causes great concern to the real estate
and oil and gas industries which depend on stable and clear prop-
erty records.
D. WHERE DOES THE WEHNER ROAD END?
If the North Dakota Supreme Court continues to allow the
reformation of warranty deeds in cases such as Wehner I and
Wehner II, the potential problems are limitless. As a hypothetical,
assume that a recorded contract for deed provides that payments
are to be made over a 30-year period, at which time a warranty
deed shall be issued in satisfaction of the terms of the contract.
However, the recorded warranty deed appears after 20 years
rather than 30 years. Based on the holdings in Wehner I and
Wehner II, the title examiner and prospective purchaser cannot
rely on the validity of this warranty deed, but rather must inquire
as to whether the deed was erroneously issued in derogation of the
terms of the underlying contract for deed.4 1 1 Such a result under-
mines the very concept of record title.
In other words, any time there is any form of discrepancy
between a recorded contract for deed and a subsequently issued
warranty deed (no matter how minor), the prospective purchaser
will have to make inquiry. The title examiner and prospective
purchaser can no longer rely on the sanctity of the warranty deed.
The necessary corollary of this instability of title is that North
Dakota courts will be muddled in a continuing series of cases con-
411. The subsequent third-party purchaser should be able to rely on merger of title
and estoppel in such case as to bar the vendor from seeking reformation based on the
failure of the purchaser to pay the balance of the purchase price, at least where the
subsequent purchaser had no actual notice of nonpayment.
See generally Scull v. Davis, 434 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968Xcontract between
parties was presumed to have been merged into the deed). However, this result would be
different where subsequent purchasers had constructive notice of adverse claims arising
from facts other than those of record. Unfortunately, in light of the North Dakota Supreme
Court's intense desire to do what it perceives to be justice in individual cases, the court
seems equally inclined to stretch facts to support such constructive notice to achieve its
desired result.
For an example of the North Dakota Supreme Court's approach, see Nygaard v.
Robinson, 341 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1983), where an oil and gas lessor was defrauded by the
original lessees. Id. at 355. Subsequently, HNG Oil Company, a subsequent subassignee
paid $171,875.00 for the lease. Id. HNG asserted its position as a bona fide purchaser,
seeking to prevent cancellation. Id. at 353. The court ruled against HNG, holding that
HNG had sufficient knowledge of facts outside the record title (that oil and gas leases are
customarily paid for with sight drafts) to give rise to its duty to investigate and that upon
investigation the lessor's adverse claim would have become apparent. Id. at 356-57.
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cerning reformation and the status of subsequent purchasers vis-a-
vis the party seeking reformation.
An excellent example of the potential long-term problems
resulting from this instability in title can be found in another
recent North Dakota case, Texaco v. Mosser.412 Mosser involved
adverse claims to an undivided one-half interest in the oil, gas, and
other minerals in a certain parcel of real estate.4 13 To determine
each party's fraction of ownership, it was necessary for the court to
establish the priority of each claim.414 The Mossers claimed that
their mineral deed related back to an option which was recorded
prior to the creation of the other parties' interest.
415
In this case, Mosser received in 1955 and recorded in 1957 an
"option to purchase a 1/8th of 1/8th royalty... [to] be exercised
... on or before October 28, 1960.... ,416 In March 1960 Mosser
acquired and recorded "an undivided 200/1597.20 mineral acre
interest in . . . all of the oil, gas, . . . and other minerals in and
under that may be produced.... "417 Mosser contended that this
acquisition was an exercise of the original option.41 " The court
held that the option was for a royalty interest and the mineral
deed executed in favor of Mosser was for a mineral interest.41 9
Accordingly, the court held that Mosser had not exercised the
option, but rather, merely acquired a different interest in the
property.420 Thus, the acquisition of the mineral interest could
not relate back to the option date for purposes of establishing rela-
tive priorities.421 Here, as in Wehner I and Wehner II, there
existed a discrepancy between two recorded instruments of
record.422
Mosser claimed that the royalty language in the option was a
mistake and attempted to have the option reformed so that the
subsequently executed mineral deed conformed with said
option.423 However, this attempt was denied for lack of evidence
412. 299 N.W.2d 191 (N.D. 1980). The Mosser decision was analyzed in Maxwell, Some
Comments on North Dakota Oil and Gas Law - Three Cases from the Eighties, 58 N.D.L.
REV. 431 (1982).
413. Texaco v. Mosser, 299 N.W.2d 191, 192 (N.D. 1980).
414. Id. at 193.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 193-94.
417. Id. at 194.
418. Id. at 193.
419. Id. at 194.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 193.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 194.
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about the parties' intentions.424
If, however, the evidence in Mosser had been sufficient to sup-
port reformation, the court's analysis indicates that it may have
granted reformation even against parties that may have purchased
other interests subsequent to the option and the mineral deed to
Mossers. 25 Such a result would have been extremely inequitable
with respect to the subsequent purchaser. A title examiner con-
fronted with these instruments ought to be able to assume one of
two things: (1) that either the option expired by its own terms and
that the mineral interest was conveyed through a wholly separate
transaction, or (2) if the mineral interest was purchased pursuant
to the option, that the option terms were merged into the mineral
deed.
After Wehner I and Wehner II, one could argue that the dis-
crepancy between the option and the subsequently issued mineral
deed would have put the subsequent purchaser in Mosser on con-
structive notice that a royalty interest, rather than a mineral inter-
est, was intended. This is an example of the potential inequities
that may result from the Wehner decisions.426
Finally, once this Pandora's box is opened, why stop with dis-
crepancies between two recorded instruments? Consider the case
where a recorded deed recites that it was issued pursuant to a cer-
tain unrecorded contract for deed. Based on this reference, should
subsequent purchasers have a duty to inquire about the contents
of the contract which may reveal discrepancies that could later be
the basis for reformation? The Wehner cases allow for such expan-
424. Id. at 195.
425. Id. at 194.
426. Another related case dealing with the issue of whether a subsequent purchaser
can rely on record title is found at Schultz v. Hauck, 312 N.W.2d 360 (N.D. 1981), which is
summarized as follows: Facts: The state of North Dakota owned 50% of the minerals. Id.
at 360. Schultz owned the remaining 50%. Id. at 361. Schultz then entered into a
purchase agreement whereby he agreed to sell Hauck the lands subject to a 25% mineral
reservation. Id. The purchase agreement was not recorded. Id. Subsequently, Schultz
executed a warranty deed to Hauck. Id. It did not contain any reservation. Id. (The deed
wasrecorded.) Hauck then executed a mineral deed to Schultz conveying one-half of the
minerals, limited to minerals owned by Hauck as "disclosed by the public records." Id.
Schultz then conveyed by mineral deed to Hauck a one-fourth interest in the minerals. Id.
Hauck then executed a warranty deed to a third party, Schnaidts. Id. The deed contained
no reservations. Id. Issue: Whether the third party acquired one-half interest in the
minerals as a good faith purchaser. Id. Ruling: The court ruled that the third-party
purchaser was not a bona fide purchaser, holding that the mineral deed executed by Hauck
to Schultz which conveyed one-half of the minerals limited to minerals owned by Hauck as
"disclosed by the public record" was ambiguous. Id. at 362. This, coupled with the
existence of repeated conveyances between the same parties put the third parties on
constructive notice that Schultz may claim some interest in the minerals. Id. Accordingly,
the court held that the third party was not an innocent successor and did not take free of
Schultz's claim to the minerals. Id.
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sion, notwithstanding a North Dakota Title Standard to the
contrary.427
Wehner I and Wehner II illustrate that title examiners and
prospective purchasers can rely less and less on the sanctity of the
warranty deed and record title in general. As Justice Pederson
wisely observed in his dissents to Wehner I and Wehner II: The
decisions undermine both property and contract law;4 28 "life is
going to be less stable as a result of the action by this Court.
429
III. NANTT V. PUCKETT ENERGY CO.
No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest. The above abbreviated statement of the common-law
rule against perpetuities appears to have been specifically adopted
for the first time in North Dakota in Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co.4"'
However, in this same decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court
rejected the strict application of this rule.43 ' This decision creates
unnecessary confusion for title examiners who have generally
believed that North Dakota has only a statutory perpetuities rule
which substitutes for the common-law rule. 3 2 Moreover, in hold-
ing that the common-law rule will not be strictly applied, the court
fails to provide precise guidance as to when the rule will and will
not be applied.
In Nantt a number of plaintiffs, collectively identified as the
Rockstads, sued to collect a bonus payment allegedly due under
the terms of several oil and gas "top leases. ' 43  The Rockstads
owned various fractional interests in the minerals underlying a
427. STATE BAR Assoc. OF N.D., STANDARDS OF TITLE, § 10.02 (1988) provides:
The recital in a deed that it is given in performance of or pursuant to a contract
for deed, the contract for deed not being of record, does not in itself constitute
constructive notice of the terms, parties or existence of the contract. A title
examiner may presume that the terms of the contract were complied with and
that the deed was in accordance with the terms of the contract.
Id. (proposed revision 1988).
428. Wehner v. Schroeder, 335 N.W.2d 563, 567 (N.D. 1983XWehner 1).
429. Wehner v. Schroeder, 354 N.W.2d 674, 679 (N.D. 1984XWehner 1I).
430. 382 N.W.2d 655 (N.D. 1986).
431. Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co., 382 N.W.2d 655, 661 (N.D. 1986).
432. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-27 (1978).
433. Nantt, 382 N.W.2d at 656-57. See H. WILLIAMS AND C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL
AND GAS TERMS, 1011 (7th ed. 1987). A top lease is "[a] lease granted by a landowner
during the existence of a recorded mineral lease which is to become effective if and when
the existing mineral lease expires or is terminated." Id. Although the taking of a top lease
was once regarded as tantamount to claim jumping, the top lease has become a commonly
used tool for acquiring oil and gas properties. See generally Ernest, Top Leasing - Legality
v. Morality, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 957 (1980Xdiscussion on the implications of top
leasing).
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half section of land.434 In 1981 these interests were subject to
existing oil and gas leases whose primary terms were due to expire
at various specified dates in 1982 and 1983. 4 35 The defendant,
Puckett, acquired top leases from the Rockstads in 1981.436 Puck-
ett's leases were to take effect if and when the existing or "bot-
tom" leases expired.43 7
Each top lease contained a rider which, in part, provided that,
at the expiration of the corresponding existing lease,
[The] [1lessee shall be obligated (1) to pay or tender to
lessor as additional bonus . . . the sum of ten dollars
($10.00) and more per mineral acre, as agreed upon by
the parties hereto and as tendered herewith, for each
mineral acre under those portions of the described prem-
ises which lessee desires to retain, if any under the provi-
sions of this lease and, (2) to release this lease as to all
portions of the described premises for which lessee has
not paid such additional bonus.438
At the time these top leases were executed and delivered, each
lessor received two sight drafts: one for $100 per mineral acre
owned by the lessor, payable 45 days after sight, and a second for
$300 per mineral acre owned by the lessor, payable 30 days after
expiration of the corresponding bottom lease. 439 Each of the sec-
ond drafts contained a notation that they were issued as
"[c]onsideration for oil and gas lease.. ." and payment was "subject
to approval and acceptance of title.
440
Puckett paid the first set of sight drafts and recorded each of
434. Nantt, 382 N.W.2d at 656.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 657.
437. Id. The typical oil and gas lease is issued for a term of years (primary term) and so
long thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities (secondary term). If there is
no production at the end of the primary term, the lease terminates. Although Justice
Meschke states that the top leases were "to take effect when the existing leases expired
without production," the lease language quoted in the opinion provides that
"[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this lease, the effective date of this
lease shall be the date(s) upon which the existing lease terminates,for whatever reason...."
Id. (emphasis added). In other words, a bottom lease could have been-perpetuated into the
secondary term by production, but then production could have ceased; at that time, the top
leases would take effect.
438. Id.
439. Id. As used in the oil and gas leasing business, sight drafts refer to drafts generally
drawn on a bank and payable within a specified number of days following presentment to
the payor bank. They are usually not negotiable instruments because their payment is
generally conditioned on the validity of the lessor's title to the lands being leased. In
practice, payment by sight draft allows the lessee time to record the lease and check the




the top leases. However, when the existing leases expired, except
for one draft which Puckett claimed was paid by mistake, Puckett
did not pay the second set of drafts.44 ' Puckett also recorded
releases for each lease: five were released seven months and one
was released five months after the second drafts were payable, and
one was released shortly before the second draft was payable. 42
The Rockstads sued for payment of the second drafts.443 While
Puckett's principal defense was that payment was optional and
due only in the event that Puckett elected to retain the leases,
444
Puckett also argued that the top leases were void as an absolute
suspension of the power of alienation in violation of Section 47-02-
27 of the North Dakota Century Code.44 ' The trial court rejected
both of these arguments.4 46
On appeal the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.447 The
court rejected Puckett's first argument by noting that the trial
court had acted properly in construing the top lease provisions
contemporaneously with the "subject to" clause in the second set
of sight drafts.448 The court then affirmed the trial court's con-
struction of the lease rider and sight draft notations as not allowing
Puckett to avoid payment of the second draft at will; the trial court
had suggested that Puckett could avoid payment only if the bot-
tom leases were perpetuated by production.4 49
The supreme court also rejected Puckett's second argument
that the top lease violated North Dakota's statutory rule against
the absolute suspension of the power of alienation.450 The court's
disposition of this argument qualifies this- case as yet another deci-
sion that will confuse title examiners.
The court begins by quoting the statutory rule, including its
head notes.451 The entire codified statute provides as follows:
Suspension of power of alienation - Rule against perpe-
tuities. The absolute power of alienation cannot be sus-
pended, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a




444. Id. at 657-58.
445. Id. at 658.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 662.
448. Id. at 658.
449. Id. at 658-59. While not specifically mentioned, Puckett could have avoided
payment had the lessors' title failed for any reason.
450. Id. at 659-62.
451. Id. at 659.
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persons in being at the creation of the limitation or condi-
tion and twenty-one years.
452
Puckett argued that because the term of the top lease would
not commence until after the term of the existing lease had
expired, and because the existing lease could be perpetuated
indefinitely by production, the top lease may not vest within the
time "reflected in the rule against perpetuities.
4 53
In response, the court noted that an oil and gas lease is an
interest in real property,454 and, as such, could be subject to the
"rule against perpetuities. '4 5  The court also correctly noted that
the normal oil and gas lease does not violate the rule.45 6 Although
not specifically explained by the court, these conclusions are cor-
rect, because an oil and gas lease is either classified as a convey-
ance of a present possessory interest in the nature of a fee simple
determinable or as a conveyance of a present nonpossessory inter-
est in the nature of a profit a' prendre.457 Regardless of the classifi-
cation, an oil and gas lease which takes effect immediately upon
execution and delivery does not violate the rule, because the lease
is an immediately vested present interest. Since vested interests
are not subject to the rule, they cannot violate the rule.458
An oil and gas lease top lease, however, may be void for violat-
ing the common-law rule against perpetuities. If, by its terms, the
top lease becomes effective at the expiration of an existing lease,
and if the existing (bottom) lease is valid for so long as there is
production, the top lease may not vest within lives in being at the
time of the grant plus 21 years. The court alluded to, but did not
specifically discuss this, noting only that the matter was
unsettled.45 9
452. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-27 (1978). Although the court includes the head notes
in its quotation of the statute, "[n]o head note ... constitutes any part of a statute ... [and]
may not be used to determine legislative intent or the legislative history for any statute."
N.D. CENT. CODE . 1-02-12 (1987).
453. Nantt, 382 N.W.2d at 659.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 659-60.
456. Id. at 660 (citing 2 H. WILLIAMS AND C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 322, and
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 399 comment a (1944)).
457. See generally R. HEMINGWAY, LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 6.1 (2d ed. 1983Xthe
nature of oil and gas leases). North Dakota most likely classifies a lease as a profit a' pendre
because the court has recognized, in theory, that an oil and gas lease is subject to
abandonment. See e.g., Olson v. Schwartz, 345 N.W.2d 33, 36 (N.D. 1984). Possessory
interests in property are not generally subject to abandonment. See generally 1 H.
WILLIAMS AND C. MEYERS, Oil and Gas Law § 210.1.
458. See generally 2 H. WILLIAMS AND C. MEYERS, Oil and Gas Law § 322 and
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 399 comment a (1944Xdiscussions on the. rule against
perpetuities).
459. Nantt, 382 N.W.2d at 660.
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More specifically, for an interest to be void under the com-
mon-law rule against perpetuities, the interest must be subject to
the rule and must violate the rule. A top lease which takes effect
at the expiration of an existing lease is properly classified as a
springing executory interest. For example, assume that Able
leases Blackacre to Carr "effective upon the expiration of the
existing oil and gas lease to Baker." This is a springing executory
interest; when Baker's lease expires, a new lease "springs" from
Able to Carr.460 An executory interest was held to be subject to
the rule against perpetuities in the Duke of Norfolks Case;46' this
case also held that an executory interest "vests" at possession. 462
Thus, the rule must be applied to a top lease to see whether the
rule has been violated; if the top lease could possibly vest beyond
the rule, it is void.
In the above example, assume that Baker's existing lease is
valid for so long as oil and gas are produced. Note that if oil is
produced on Blackacre, Able, Baker, and Carr could die, and 21
years could pass before production ceases or before Carr's lease
vests in possession. Because this is possible, the top lease to Carr
violates the common-law rule against perpetuities and is void.463
The top lease in Nantt is subject to the same infirmity,
although the court does not specifically so state. The court, how-
ever, did liken a top lease to an option to lease and noted that it
460. Some writers have erroneously classified the oil and gas top lease as a partial
alienation of the lessor's possibility of reverter. See Brown, Effect of Top Leases:
Obstruction of Title and Related Considerations, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 213, 239-40 (1978).
This classification is possible where the top lease purports to grant an immediately vested
interest. See infra note 463.
461. 3 Ch. Cas. 1 (1682).
462. Id. at -.
463. See generally Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1982) (dealing with a top
royalty deed). When drafting a top lease, there are two possible ways of avoiding the
problem posed by the common-law rule against perpetuities. The lease can specify that it
must vest within the time frame allowed by the rule: "This lease is subject to an existing oil
and gas lease... and shall become effective upon the expiration of such lease.., provided
that if said existing oil and gas lease has not expired prior to one (1) year after its primary
term, this lease shall automatically terminate." See E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, 0. ANDERSON, E.
SMITH, FORMS MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW,
Form #9, #2 (Revised ed. 1987). Under this form, the top lease will vest or terminate no
later than one year after the expiration of the primary term of the existing lease; provided
there is less than 20 years remaining in the primary term, the top lease will vest, if at all,
within the period of the common-law rule.
Alternatively, the lease can specify that it creates an immediately vested interest:
"This lease is granted on lessor's reversionary interest in said premises and is hereby vested
in interest, but is subject to an existing Oil and Gas lease .... Id. at Form # 10, last
paragraph. Since the top lease is immediately vested, the common-law rule against
perpetuities does not apply. If this form is used, the argument for validating the top lease is
that there has been a partial alienation of the lessor's possibility of reverter. See supra note
460. Use of this form is a bit more risky because some courts may refuse to recognize the
top lease as immediately vested; if a court were to elect to classify this interest as a springing
executory interest, the form would violate the common-law rule.
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could violate "the restrictions imposed by § 47-02-27 of the
N.D.C.C.' ' 464 This statement and the overall tenor of the court's
opinion suggests that the court treated the North Dakota statutory
rule against the absolute suspension of the power of alienation as
identical to the common-law rule against perpetuities.465
Other than in two footnotes, the court's analysis treats the
North Dakota statutory rule and the common-law rule as synony-
mous.466 In one footnote, the court correctly recognizes that the
North Dakota statutory rule modifies the common-law rule;467 and
in another footnote, the court contradicts its earlier statement that
an option could violate the North Dakota statutory rule. 46 8 The
court, however, fails to reconcile the body of the opinion with
these footnotes. Before proceeding with a further discussion of
Nantt, the North Dakota statutory rule against the absolute sus-
pension of the power of alienation and the common-law rule
against perpetuities hust be briefly reviewed.
A. COMPARING THE NORTH DAKOTA AND COMMON-LAW
RULES
The North Dakota statutory rule against the absolute suspen-
sion of the power of alienation can be traced in small part to the
California Civil Code of 1872 and in large part to the Field Code;
the Field Code provisions, in turn, can be traced to New York stat-
utes enacted in 1830. A complete review of its history is beyond
the scope of this article; indeed, a complete analysis of the North
Dakota statute would result in a very lengthy article. Accordingly,
this section will briefly trace the history of the North Dakota rule
and clarify the differences between it and the common-law rule
that are relevant to an analysis of Nantt.
North Dakota has two general statutory provisions governing
the suspension of the power of alienation;469 both of these provi-
sions were originally enacted in 1865.470 Section 47-02-31 of the
North Dakota Century Code provides:
Every future interest which, by any possibility, may sus-
pend the absolute power of alienation for a longer period
than is prescribed in this chapter is void in its creation.
464. Nantt, 382 N.W.2d at 660.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 660 n. 5; see also id. at 661 n. 7.
467. Id. at 660 n. 5.
468. Id. at 661 n. 7.
469. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-02-27, -31 (1978).
470. Laws of Dak. Terr. §§ 201 and 202 (Kingsbury 1865).
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Such power of alienation is suspended when there are no
persons in being by whom an absolute interest in posses-
sion can be conveyed.4 1'
While the order of the phrases has been changed, this provision is
substantively identical to the Field Code provision from which it is
derived.472 Note that the second sentence voids interests which
suspend the power of alienation for longer than prescribed.
Section 47-02-27 of the North Dakota Century Code
prescribes the maximum length of time that the power of aliena-
tion may be suspended: "The absolute power of alienation cannot
be suspended, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a
longer period than during the continuance of the lives of persons
in being at the creation of the limitation or condition and twenty-
one years. '473 This provision can also be traced to the Field Code;
however, in its original form the statute referred to only two lives
in being and did not allow an additional 21 years beyond those two
lives.474 The original Field Code and Dakota Territory provisions
are, in turn, virtually identical to provisions enacted in New York
in 1830. 5
Concerning the provision presently codified as section 47-02-
27 of the North Dakota Century Code, the Dakota Territory Legis-
lative Assembly, in 1877, removed the reference to the two lives in
471. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-31 (1978).
472. FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 202. The Field Code provision provides:
Every future interest is void in its creation which, by any possibility, may
suspend the absolute power of alienation for a longer period than is prescribed in
this chapter. Such power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons in
being by whom an absolute interest in possession can be conveyed.
Id. While the North Dakota Century Code source notes attribute the language to the CALI-
FORNIA CIVIL CODE § 716 (1872), this provision was adopted in North Dakota in 1865. Laws
of Dak. Terr. § 202 (Kingsbury 1865). The original California Civil Code provision was
identical to the Field Code provision. CAL. CIV. CODE § 716, historical note (West 1982).
473. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-27 (1978).
474. The FIELD CODE § 201 and the initial Dakota Territory § 201 are identical and
provide:
The absolute power of alienation cannot be suspended by any limitation or
condition whatever, for a longer period than during the continuance of not more
than two lives in being at the creation of the limitation or condition except in the
single case mentioned in section 229.
See Laws of Dak. Terr. § 201 (Kingsbury 1865) and FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 201.
Section 229, to which this section refers, allowed for a longer period of suspension in the
-event a contingent remainder in fee followed a prior remainder in fee, which contingent
remainder was to be effective in the event the first remainderman died under age 21 or
could otherwise lose their estate prior to attaining age 21. This provision was enacted in
Dakota Territory and later repealed. For enactment, see Laws of Dak. Terr. § 229 (Kings-
bury 1865) and FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 229. For repealer, see infra note 478.
475. See 1 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 2, c. 1, t. 2, art. 1 (1830). This source is confirmed in the
annotations to section 201 of the FIELD CODE, citing 1 R.S. 723, § 15 and 773, § 1 and
annotations to section 202 of the FIELD CODE citing 1 R.S. 723, § 14 and 773, §§ 1 and 2.
FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at §§ 201, 202.
82 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1
being.4 6 The 21-year clause was added in 1953.117 The cross ref-
erence to a third statute, not relevant to this discussion, was omit-
ted when the referenced statute was "repealed by omission" from
the North Dakota Century Code.478
A careful reading of these two statutes reveals that, unlike the
common-law rule, these statutes do not address remoteness in
vesting, and by reason of case law,479 their scope is not limited to
future interests. These statutes focus on the suspension of the
power of alienation.
Two examples serve to clarify these differences. First, assume
that 0 conveys Blackacre to "'A and his heirs for so long as liquor
is not served on the premises, then to B and his heirs." As con-
veyed, A has a fee simple on executory limitation and B has a shift-
ing executory interest in fee simple absolute; possession will shift
from A to B if liquor is ever sold on the premises. Executory inter-
ests are subject to the common-law rule against perpetuities, and
executory interests vest at possession. 48 0 This example violates the
rule against perpetuities because 0, A, and B could die and 21
years could pass before liquor is served on the property and C's
interest vests. After applying the rule against perpetuities, A
would have a fee simple determinable and 0 would have a possi-
bility of reverter. 481 The North Dakota statute, however, is not vio-
lated because A and B, or their respective successors, can join in
conveying a fee simple absolute interest to Blackacre at any time;
476. REVISED CODES OF THE TERRITORY OF DAKOTA § 201 (1877). To this extent
only, the statute is based upon section 715 of the California Civil Code of 1872. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 715 (1872). California Civil Code section 715 (the suspension rule) was repealed in
1951. 1951 Cal. Stat. ch. 1463, § 7, p. 3443; CAL. CIV. CODE § 715, historical note (West
1982). However, the suspension rule was recodified in California Civil Code § 715.1,
enacted in its place. 1951 Cal. Stat. ch. 1463, § 1, p. 3442; CAL. CIv. CODE § 715.1,
historical note (West 1982). This statute was repealed in 1959. 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 470, § 1,
p. 2405; CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.1 (West 1982). In 1963, the legislature enacted California
Civil Code § 715.8, which provided for the suspension rule as an alternative definition of
"vested." 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 1455, § 7, p. 3010; CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.8, historical note
(West 1982). This statute was repealed in 1970. 1970 Cal. Stat. ch. 45, § 1, p. 63; CAL. CIV.
CODE § 715.8 (West 1982). Since 1970, California has only the common-law rule. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 715.8 comment (West 1982). The source notes to section 47-02-27 of the North
Dakota Century Code erroneously imply that the entire provision was derived from the
California Civil Code § 715 (1872). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-27 source notes (1978).
477. 1953 N.D. Laws ch. 274, § 1. In 1933, what is now North Dakota Century Code
§ 47-02-27 was materially amended. 1933 N.D. Laws ch. 203, § 1. This amendment is not
relevant to this discussion, because in 1953, the language was amended back to its pre-1933
form and the 21-year clause was added. 1953 N.D. Laws ch. 274, § 1.
478. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-04-13 (1978). For a general explanation of repeals by
omission, see the preface to Volume 1A of the North Dakota Century Code and 1959 N.D.
Laws ch. 37, § 1.
479. Penfield v. Tower, 1 Dak. 216, 46 N.W. 413 (1890).
480. Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1 (1682).
481. See generally LAURENCE AND MINZNER, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO ESTATES IN
LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS, 5-9 - 5-12 (1981).
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in other words, the absolute power of alienation has not been
suspended.48 2
Second, assume that 0 places Whiteacre in a trust 'for a term
of 10 years and so long thereafter as oil, gas, or minerals are pro-
duced from the premises." This trust is a present and therefore
"vested" interest; since the common-law rule against perpetuities
does not apply to vested or present interests, the rule would not be
violated.483 The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, has held
that such a trust violates the North Dakota statutory rule against
the absolute suspension of the power of alienation. 4 4 Because the
terms of the trust and applicable North Dakota statutory law
48 5
prohibits the trustee from conveying the trust property and dis-
tributing the corpus, and because the beneficiaries had no power
to convey, the trust is void.486 This conclusion is reached even
though the statutory rule specifically voids only "future" inter-
482. See generally 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1416 (2d ed.
1956).
483. The trust is best classified as a fee simple determinable with a certain existence of
ten years; this interest is present and therefore vested. The future interest in 0 is best
classified as a possibility of reverter; possibilities of reverter are not subject to the common-
law rule against perpetuities.
484. Carlson v. Tioga Holding Co., 72 N.W.2d 236, 239 (N.D. 1955Xtrust requiring
trustee to hold property for 10 years and then for so long as oil and gas may be produced
was void due to the suspension of the absolute power of alienation). But see Hull v.
Rolfsrud, 65 N.W.2d 94, 101 (N.D. 1954Xtrust which was to be held intact even after
property was sold and proceeds reinvested, was void because it suspended the absolute
power of alienation past the lives in being); Penfield v. Tower, 1 N.D. 216, -, 46 N.W. 413,
414 (1890Xevery estate which suspends the absolute power of alienation for longer than
lives in being at the creation of the condition are void). While these cases were decided
based upon different statutory language from the present provisions, the present language
should lead to a similar result.
Justice Corliss discusses the differences between the common law and statutory rules in
Penfield v. Tower, 1 N.D. 216, 46 N.W. 413 (1890). In Penfield, the court considered a trust
created by a testator who was domiciled in Pennsylvania. Id. at -, 46 N.W. at 414.
However, part of the trust corpus consisted of real property located in North Dakota. Id. at
-, 46 N.W. at 413. After full discussion of the differences between the common-law and
statutory rule, Justice Corliss concluded that the trust did not violate the common-law rule,
but that the trust did violate the North Dakota statutory rule. Id. at -, 46 N.W. at 413-18.
485. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 59-03-14, -19 (1985). These statutes can be traced to the
FIELD CODE §§ 228 and 294 respectively and the Laws of Dak. Terr. §§ 228 and 294
respectively; however, the present language conforms to the CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE of
1872, §§ 863 and 870, respectively, and was enacted in Dakota Territory in 1877. See
REVISED CODES OF THE TERRITORY OF DAKOTA §§ 288, 294 (2d ed. 1877); FIELD CODE,
supra note 33, at §§ 228, 294; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 863, 870 (1872).
486. Carlson, 72 N.W.2d at 239. A similar result has been reached in New York cases.
See, e.g., Douglas v. Cruger, 80 N.Y. 15, 18-19 (1880XNew York law precluded trustee from
placing a mortgage on the trust property); Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265, 351 (N.Y.
1835Xtrust void under New York law because beneficiaries and trustees were the same
person, thus trustee had no power to convey). Note that a trust could be tailored so that it
would violate both the common-law rule and the statutory rule; for an example, see Hull v.
Rolfsrud, 65 N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1954) (holding that the trust violated the North Dakota
statutory rule). Of course, well-drafted trusts violate neither the common-law nor the
statutory rule; for an example, see Montgomery v. Paul, 144 N.W.2d 382 (N.D. 1966).
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ests, 48 7 by reason of the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in
Penfield v. Tower 488 in 1890. In Penfield the court stated: "It is
not merely future estates which are void. Every estate, present or
future, which suspends the absolute power of alienation is
void.
489
As previously stated,49 ° an oil and gas top lease may be subject
to and may violate the common-law rule against perpetuities. To
review, a top lease which by its terms is to take effect upon the
expiration of a bottom lease is best classified as a springing execu-
tory interest; executory interests are subject to the common-law
rule and they vest at possession.491 Accordingly, if the bottom
lease is effective for so long as oil or gas is produced, the persons
who constitute the measuring lives in being at the creation of the
grant could die and more than 21 years could pass before the top
lease would become possessory. Thus, the common-law rule is vio-
lated and the top lease is void for remoteness of vesting.
On the other hand, an oil and gas top lease does not violate
the North Dakota statutory rule against the absolute suspension of
the power of alienation, because the lessor, bottom lessee, and top
lessee can join together to convey a fee simple absolute at any
time. In other words, the absolute power of alienation has not
been suspended. Accordingly, the North Dakota Supreme Court
could simply have concluded that the top lease in Nantt did not
violate the North Dakota statutory rule.492 No other discussion
would have been necessary. A bit too tidy? Perhaps, as one could
further argue that the common-law rule against perpetuities also
applies in North Dakota.
B. DOES THE COMMON-LAW RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
APPLY IN NORTH DAKOTA IN ADDITION TO THE
STATUTORY RULE AGAINST THE INDEFINITE
POWER OF ALIENATION?
Prior to Nantt at least, the short answer to this question was
no, because the North Dakota Supreme Court has so stated.493
487. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-31 (1978).
488. 1 N.D. 216, 46 N.W. 413 (1890).
489. Penfleld v. Tower, 1 N.D. 216, __, 46 N.W. 413, 415 (1890).
490. See supra discussion at notes 459 to 463.
491. Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1 (1682).
492. The court came close to doing so in a footnote when commenting on the
reasoning of the trial judge. Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co., 382 N.W.2d 655, 661 n.7 (N.D.
1986).
493. Anderson v. Blixt, 72 N.W.2d 799, 807 (N.D. 1955). "The common-law rule against
perpetuities is not in force in this state." Id. This statement is dictum, however, as the
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The longer answer is also no, but the answer is more difficult to
reach, because New York courts49 4 and the California courts495
have applied the common-law rule against perpetuities to convey-
ances in their respective states, even though both states have stat-
utory rules that are similar to North Dakota's statutory rule.496
Again consider the conveyance from 0 to A for so long as
liquor is not served on the premises, then to B and his heirs. Based
on decisions decided under the suspension of alienation provisions
of the New York Revised Code of 1830,497 New York courts would
hold that B's shifting executory interest is void for remoteness of
vesting.4 98 As previously discussed,499 such an interest would vio-
late the common-law rule against perpetuities for the same reason.
Professor Lewis Simes, however, suggests that the specific
source of this conclusion lies in other New York statutes, and not
directly with the suspension of alienation provisions.500 Similar
statutes were enacted in North Dakota5 0' and can be traced to the
Field Code; 50 2 however, one of these statutes has been "repealed
court did not apply either the common-law rule or the statutory rule to the interest in
question in that case.
494. The real source of the North Dakota statute is the New York Revised Code of
1830. See discussion supra section A, at note 475.
495. California is erroneously credited as the source of the North Dakota statute. See
discussion supra section A, at notes 475-76.
496. See text supra section A, notes 472-76.
497. N.Y. Rev. Stat. pt. 2, c. 1, t. 2, art. I (1830).
498. See, e.g., In re Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288,._, 87 N.E. 497, 499 (1909Xprovision creating
a trust in favor of issue whom daughter might leave surviving until they reached majority
was void); Walker v. Marcelus & 0. R. Co., 226 N.Y. 347, -, 123 N.E. 736, 737 (1919Xa fee
subject to a collateral limitation is valid unless the remainder does not vest within a
reasonable period); In re Roe, 281 N.Y. 541, -, 24 N.E.2d 322, 325 (1939Xevery future
limitation of an estate is void as too remote unless it must vest within the rule of
perpetuities periodXciting 21 R.C.L. at 289), cited and discussed in L. SIMES, FUTURE
INTERESTS 301-02 (2d ed. 1966). By later enactments, New York had a statutory rule
against perpetuities. 1966 N.Y. Laws, c. 952, codified at N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND
TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
499. See discussion supra section A, at notes 475-85.
500. See L. SIMES, supra note 498, at 301-02 (citing early versions of N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAW § 50 and § 46 (McKinney 1945)).
501. Laws of Dak. Terr. §§ 230 and 234 (Kingsbury 1865Xcodified respectively as N.D.
CENT. CODE § 47-04-14 (1978) and N.D. REV. CODE 47-0414 (1943)).
502. FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at §§ 230, 234. Section 230 provided:
Subject to the rules of this Title .... a freehold estate, as well as a chattel real,
may be created to commence at a future day; an estate for life may be created in
a term of years, and a remainder limited thereon; a remainder of a freehold or
chattel real, either contingent or vested, may be created, expectant on the
determination of a term of years; and a fee may be limited on a fee, upon a
contingency, which if it should occur, must happen within the period described
in this Title.
FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 230 and Laws of Dak. Terr. § 230 (Kingsbury 1865). Cur-
rent statutory language is similar, except that the contingency "must happen within the
period prescribed in this chapter"; since the suspension period is currently codified in chap-
ter 47-02 of the North Dakota Century Code, no period is prescribed in chapter 47-04.
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-04-14, -02-27 (1978). If this statute referred to the period pre-
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by omission" from the North Dakota Century Code. 5°" This arti-
cle omits further discussion of these provisions because they have
never been cited as authority for remoteness of vesting by the
North Dakota Supreme Court.5 °4
The California Supreme Court has adopted the common-law
rule against perpetuities in addition to the statutory rule against
the absolute suspension of the power of alienation. 50 5 This conclu-
sion was based upon the belief that the common-law governing
perpetuities survived the enactment of the statutory rule because,
at the time of the decision, the California Constitution expressly
prohibited perpetuities.5"' This decision should have no persua-
siveness in North Dakota because the North Dakota Constitution
does not contain a provision respecting perpetuities and the statu-
tory rule against the absolute suspension of the power of alienation
has been in effect since territorial days. Moreover, in North
Dakota, "there is no common-law in any case where the law is
declared by the code.-
50 7
To conclude this section, the court in Nantt simply does not
support its apparent adoption of the common-law rule against per-
petuities. Moreover, apart from reasoning akin to that of Professor
scribed in section 47-02-27, a strong argument could be made that the common-law perpe-
tuities rule is adopted within the North Dakota statutory scheme. Section 234 provided:
A contingent remainder cannot be created on a term of years, unless the nature
of the contingency on which it is limited is such that the remainder must vest in
interest during the continuance of not more than two lives in being at the crea-
tion of such remainder, or upon the termination thereof.
FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 234. This statute was repealed by omission from the North
Dakota Century Code. See infra note 503.
503. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-04-17 (1978). For an explanation of "repealed by
omission," see the preface to Volume 1A of the North Dakota Century Code, and 1959 N.D.
Laws ch. 37, § 1.
504. In Anderson v. Blixt, 72 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1955), however, the court did state,
"[o]ur statutes dealing with restraints on alienation are found in Chapter 47-02." Id. at 807.
Note again that these statutory provisions are codified in N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 47-04 (1978).
505. In re Estate of Sahlender, 89 Cal. 2d 69, -, 201 P.2d 69, 76 (1948).
506. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 9 (1954).
507. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-06 (1987Xderived from section six of the Field Code).
See FIELD CODE, supra note 33, at § 6. This was enacted into law by the Dakota Territory
Legislature in 1865. Laws of Dak. Terr. § 6 (Kingsbury 1865). Because of the source notes
to sections 47-02-27, 47-03-31 and 47-04-12 of the North Dakota Century Code, a court
might be tempted to follow California law and adopt the common-law rule. These notes
attribute the source of these statutes to the California Civil Code of 1872; however, these
notes are erroneous because the language of these sections is similar to the original Field
Code language of 1865, adopted in Dakota Territory in 1865. The changes that were made
to these sections when Dakota Territory adopted portions of the California Civil Code of
1872 were minor and certainly could not be construed as an adoption of the common-law
rule. For further discussion, see supra section A, at note 501. In addition, "[tihe rule of
common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be construed strictly has no
application to this code." N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-1 (1987). Section 1-02-1 was derived
from the FIELD CODE § 2032 and enacted by Dakota Territory in 1865. Laws of Dak. Terr.
§ 2032 (Kingsbury 1865).
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Simes' view of the New York cases, adoption, in North Dakota, of
the remoteness of vesting feature of the common-law rule cannot
be supported."°' Finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
previously stated, albeit as dicta, that the common-law rule is not
effective in North Dakota.50 9
C. THE COURT'S REJECTION OF THE STRICT COMMON-LAW
RULE
After noting that the top lease in Nantt may well violate the
common-law rule against perpetuities, thereby implying its exist-
ence in North Dakota, the court then states three situations where
the rule will not be strictly applied. First, it indicates that "it is a
serious matter to strike down a commercial bargain, freely
entered into, unless a significant threat to the public interest
exists."51 0
Second, the court states that ambiguous conveyances should
be construed so as to prevent the conveyance from violating the
rule against perpetuities. Accordingly, the court noted that the
top leases could be construed as options that were immediately
exercised upon the issuance of the second set of drafts; in other
words, the court construed the top leases as being vested interests
not subject to the common-law rule.-1 '
Third, the court noted that under the wait-and-see doctrine,
adopted by the drafters of the Second Restatement of Property,
the top leases had actually vested within the rule against perpetu-
ities, because the bottom leases had terminated at the end of their
primary terms. Although the court's opinion is unclear, appar-
ently, the wait-and-see doctrine will be generally applied in resolv-
508. See discussion supra at notes 497-504 and accompanying text. In Hagen v.
Sacrison, 19 N.D. 160, 123 N.W. 518 (1909), the court briefly discussed remoteness in
vesting, a concept relevant to the common-law rule, but not relevant to the statutory rule.
Id. at -, 123 N.W. at 524. This can properly be regarded as dictum, however, as the court
specifically ruled that the trust in question did not suspend the power of alienation beyond
that permitted in the statutory rule. Id. at -, 123 N.W. at 523-24. The court also discussed
remoteness in vesting in In re Gray's Estate, 27 N.D. 417, -, 146 N.W. 722, 724-27 (1914);
however, this discussion was also dictum in that the interest was construed as not
suspending the power of alienation. 27 N.D. at -, 146 N.W. at 724-27.
509. Anderson v. Blixt, 72 N.W.2d 799, 807 (N.D. 1955).
510. Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co., 382 N.W.2d, 655, 660 (N.D. 1986Xciting 2 H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 322).
511. Id. at 661. The court's construction of the top leases as immediately exercised,
and therefore vested options, further supports the notion that the court was applying the
common-law rulp against perpetuities and not the statutory rule against the absolute
suspension of thts power of alienation. Under the latter, whether or not a top lease
immediately vests is irrelevant because the lessor, bottom lessee, and top lessee could,
acting together, convey the fee. Under the common-law rule, however, whether or not an
option is immediately exercised is relevant because violation of the common-law rule turns
on vesting and unexercised options are generally regarded as nonvested interests.
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ing future perpetuities questions.512
These additional grounds for avoiding the strict application of
the rule against perpetuities cause further problems for title exam-
iners. The court's opinion does not clarify whether any one of
these situations is sufficient to avoid a strict application of the rule,
or whether all three situations, in combination, will avoid strict
application of the rule. In addition, the court may be criticized for
adopting a commercial-transactions exception and the wait-and-
see doctrine in the face of an unqualified statutory rule, although
both doctrines are certainly worthy of adoption in North
Dakota. 13 While the New Hampshire Supreme Court has
adopted both the wait-and-see 14 and the cy pres51 5 doctrines by
case law, and Mississippi has adopted wait-and-see by case law,
51 6
other courts have implemented these doctrines pursuant to statu-
tory authority. 17
In summary, the result in Nantt is correct, but the discussion
causes needless confusion for title examiners who encounter
instruments which raise perpetuities questions. With the excep-
tion of two footnotes, the court treats the statutory and common-
law rules as synonymous. 518 The top lease did not violate the stat-
utory rule because the lessors, the bottom lessees, and the top les-
sees, acting together, could convey the fee at any time; in other
words, the top lease does not violate the statutory rule because the
512. Id. at 661-62. At common law, if there was any possibility that the interest may
not vest in time, the interest was void; in other words, common-law courts would not wait-
and-see.
513. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-02-27, 47-02-31 (1978). In Johnson v. Fitzmaurice,
127 N.W.2d 497 (N.D. 1964), the North Dakota Supreme Court refused to exempt business
trusts from the statutory rule, noting that: "[I1n our view it would be a gross usurpation of
legislative power by this [c]ourt if it were to engraft such an exception upon the applicable
statute." Id. at 498. The court in Nantt does not bother to acknowledge this prior
statement. Prior to Nantt, the closest the North Dakota Supreme Court has come to
adopting a court-made exception occurred in Hagen v. Sacrison, 19 N.D. 160, 123 N.W. 518
(N.D. 1909), wherein the court commented that charitable trusts are "highly favored, and
... are not within the rule against perpetuities." 19 N.D. at __, 123 N.W. at 522 (citations
omitted). Nevertheless, the court went on to discuss the particular trust in light of the state
statutory rule and concluded that the trust did not suspend the power of alienation. Id. at
-, 123 N.W. at 521.
514. Merchants National Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, -, 97 A.2d 207, 211 (1953).
515. Edgerly v. Baker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891).
516. Estate of Anderson v. Deposit Guaranty National Bank, 541 So. 2d 423, 432 (Miss.
1989). See also Nasca v. Board of Appeals of Medway, 27 Mass. App. 47, 534 N.E.2d 792
(1989Xwherein court suggests it may adopt a more complete approach to wait-and-see
based on the Restatement rather than follow the limited Massachusetts statute).
517. For a discussion on statutes adopting the wait-and-see and cy pres doctrines, see R.
CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK, AND D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.22 (L. ed.
1984). While the Second Restatement of Property adopts the wait-and-see rule, the
Restatement's basic rule against perpetuities is not like North Dakota's statutory rule
against the absolute suspension of the power of alienation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY § 1.4 comments (1983).
518. Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co., 382 N.W.2d 665, 660 n. 5, 661 n. 7 (1986).
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power of alienation has not been suspended.51 9 Since the top lease
did not violate the statutory rule against the absolute suspension of
the power of alienation, the top lease was valid. Since the top
lessee could only avoid paying the additional drafts in the event
the lessors' title failed, the drafts should have been paid because
the lessors' title did not fail. The court could have simply disposed
of the case on this basis. The body of the court's opinion ignores
this analysis in favor of a discussion of the common-law rule against
perpetuities. The court issued an opinion that appears to adopt
the common-law rule in one breath and then, without clarifying
precise circumstances, rejects its strict application in the next
breath. Until the court provides further clarification, real estate
lawyers and estate planners will be confused about the state of
perpetuities law in North Dakota. The authors suggest that the
court reassert its prior case law which adheres to the statutory
rule, leaving perpetuities reform to the legislature.52 ° Ideally, the
best solution is for the legislature to enact the new Uniform Statu-
tory Rule Against Perpetuities; however, at a minimum, the legis-
lature should adopt a specific commercial-transactions exception
and a specific wait-and-see doctrine consistent with the general
views expressed by the court in Nan tt.
52 1
CONCLUSION
Historically, North Dakota has had relatively efficient real
estate laws. Traditionally, prospective purchasers, who acquired
title in good faith, had been entitled to rely on the public land
records and to interpret those records based on traditional legal
doctrines. 22 Since counties have maintained official tract indices,
the public has enjoyed easy access to these records; and the North
Dakota Supreme Court has ruled that the public is entitled to rely
on tract indexes without having to refer to the more cumbersome
519. But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-02 (1978), wherein a "mere possibility not
coupled with an interest" is not transferable. "A mere possibility, such as the expectancy of
an heir apparent, is not to be deemed an interest of any kind." N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-
20 (1978) (emphasis supplied). The emphasized clause of this latter statute suggests that
section 4 7-09-02 is not a reference to possibilities of reverter; however, even if it is, a lessor's
possibility of reverter in a typical oil and gas lease should be "coupled with an interest" and
thus transferable because the lessor retains a present royalty interest in the property.
520. The latest proposal for reform is the UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. See 8A U.L.A. 132 (Supp. 1987).
521. See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 8A U.L.A. 132 (Supp. 1987).
For a critical commentary on this act, see Dukeminer, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1023 (1987).
522. Rolette County Bank v. Hanlyn, 48 N.D. 72, __, 183 N.W. 260, 262 (1921).
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and less reliable grantee-grantor indexes.523 In addition, the state
has a marketable record title act 24 which serves to cure certain
clouds on record title that could cause needless delays in and
increase the costs of real estate transactions. The North Dakota
State Bar Association has promulgated title examination standards
that have been periodically updated over the years.525 This
regime is designed to increase the certainty of land titles in order
to protect and encourage investment in real estate and to main-
tain a healthy real estate industry, goals which North Dakotans
continue to support.
Unfortunately, the North Dakota Supreme Court has, over the
years, rendered a few decisions which, although arguably equita-
ble, make real estate title law less certain and hence, less efficient.
These uncertainties are likely to complicate real estate transac-
tions and cause disputes which will lead to lengthy and expensive
litigation which, in turn, will result in unhappy clients who will
blame the legal profession for creating these problems. Striking
the proper balance between efficiency and equity is not always
easy; however, the balance at present seems to be tilted too far on
the equity side of the scale.
523. Hanson v. Zoller, 187 N.W.2d 47, 57 (N.D. 1971).
524. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 47-19.1 (1978).
525. STATE BAR ASSOC. OF N.D., STANDARDS OF TITLE (1988).
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